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ABSTRACT 
This thesis puts forward a formal theory of levels and 
algorithms to provide a foundation for those terms as 
they are used in much of cognitive science and computer 
science. Abstraction with respect to concreteness is 
distinguished from abstraction with respect to detail, 
resulting in three levels of concreteness and a large 
number of algorithmic levels, which are levels of detail 
and the primary focus of the theory. 
An algorithm or ideal machine is a set of sequences of 
states defining a particular level of detail. Rather 
than one fundamental ideal machine to describe the 
behaviour of a complex system, there are many possible 
ideal machines, extending Turing's approach to reflect 
the multiplicity of system descriptions required to 
express more than weak input-output equivalence of 
systems. Cognitive science is concerned with stronger 
equivalence; e.g., do two models go through the same 
states at some level of description? The state-based 
definition of algorithms serves as a basis for such 
strong equivalence and facilitates formal renditions of 
abstraction and implementation as relations between 
algorithms. It is possible to prove within the new 
framework whether or not one given algorithm is a valid 
implementation of another, or whether two unequal 
algorithms have a common abstraction, for example. Some 
implications of the theory are discussed, notably a 
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INTRODUCTION AND._STARTING POI,Nw' 
What is an algorithm? When are two algorithms the same? 
This thesis began as an attempt to characterise and 
contrast connectionist and classical algorithms and 
became an investigation into the more fundamental notion 
of 'algorithm' itself. 
There are easy answers for the above questions from 
theoretical computer science and logic, though even these 
definitions are surprisingly diverse and informal. The 
most precise account in those contexts describes an 
algorithm as a recipe, or a finite list of instructions 
(sometimes constrained to halt after a finite number of 
steps) written in a formal language such as LISP or 
FORTRAN. Two such recipes or programs are weakly 
equivalent if they produce the same output from the same 
input. This weak input-output (or extensional) 
equivalence stands in contrast to the strong equivalence 
of the title of this thesis. 
For cognitive scientists, cognitive psychologists and 
even for many computer scientists, however, this cannot 
be the whole story. We speak of connectionist algorithms 
for pattern recognition, for example, although there may 
not be any obvious list of instructions in such 
algorithms. Students of programming are often asked to 
implement a particular algorithm (such as 'binary search' 
or 'heap sort') in a language of their choice. This makes 
no sense unless there is some idea of 'algorithm' that is 
independent of any particular language. Weak input-output 
equivalence is clearly not enough to classify algorithms 
if different kinds of searches (finding one item among 
many) and sorts (ordering of input items) are to be 
distinguished. In fact, it has been argued that 
psychology is primarily concerned with algorithms, 
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characterised as 'how' a system does what it does rather 
than just 'what' the system does (see Chapter III). 
Clarifying the 'how' in terms of the states through 
which a system passes as input is transformed to output 
forms the basis of the theory of strong equivalence. 
The main contribution of this thesis is a formal 
definition for the cognitive scientists' and practical 
computer scien'tists' sense of algorithm independent of 
its implementation or realisation in a particular 
language, architecture or hardware. This definition 
facilitates accounts of strong equivalence and multiple 
instantiability, and is at the same time related to 
logical recipes in an interesting way. An algorithm is 
taken to be a set of sequences of states; this set also 
defines an ideal machine and a level of description. 
Rather than one fundamental ideal machine (such as the 
Turing machine that underwrites theoretical computer 
science), there are many possible ideal machines at 
different levels of detail, providing the flexibility to 
accommodate the many possible levels of description of 
complex systems. Cognitive science requires more than 
equivalence of input-output profiles of systems or 
models, more even than equivalence of time and space 
requirements on some canonical machine. It needs a means 
of expressing equivalence in this stronger sense: do the 
systems or models go through the same states at any level 
of description? The state-based definition of algorithms 
that is the heart of this thesis captures that strong 
equivalence: two algorithms are the same if they contain 
the same sequences of states; two sequences are the same 
if they contain the same states in the same order. The 
new definition of algorithms does not stand alone but is 
part of a larger formal framework that includes 
definitions of implementation and abstraction as 
relations between states, sequences and algorithms. 
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Taken together these provide a well-defined theory of 
levels of description of complex systems. This makes it 
possible, for example, to prove whether or not one 
algorithm may be viewed as an implementation of another 
algorithm or whether two algorithms that are unequal at a 
given level of detail can be shown to have a common 
abstraction at a coarser level of detail. 
This chapter, 'Introduction and Starting Point', sets the 
stage in terms of assumptions and approach. Then the 
main thesis is gradually developed and its implications 
considered in chapters which themselves contain 
significant related contributions. 
In Chapter II, 'Levels', the received version of levels 
of description based on Marr (1982) is reviewed along 
with recent variations. This critical examination 
culminates in a more rigorous theory of levels, a 
necessary ingredient for a multilevel framework for 
algorithms. In the new definition of levels, abstraction 
and implementation in terms of concreteness are 
distinguished from abstraction and implementation in 
terms of detail, leaving three levels of concreteness. 
These are 'the mathematical level' best characterised by 
lack of space or time measures, 'the physical level' 
characterised by absolute space and time and, between 
these two, 'the algorithmic level' characterised by 
relative space and time measures. In addition to these 
levels of concreteness, there is a very large number of 
levels of detail, all considered to be part of the 
algorithmic level of concreteness. An algorithmic level 
description can be thought of as a description of a 
physical system that may give more than just a 
mathematical input-output relationship; in general, it 
says something about the states through which the system 
passes or could pass. 
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It is this latter sort of level that is the primary focus 
of the thesis. In Chapter III, 'Algorithms', existing 
definitions of algorithms are surveyed, along with the 
usual means of comparing them. This is followed by the 
introduction of the new definition of algorithms in terms 
of states and sequences. As a first cut, abstraction 
and implementation are defined for algorithms as 
procedural abstraction operations, such as 'selection of 
sequences' or 'change of labels'. Throughout Chapter II 
exclusive-or is used as a simple example to illustrate 
the issues; this practice is continued in Chapter III 
which concludes with a detailed and novel comparison of 
five different exclusive-or algorithms (connectionist and 
otherwise) within the new framework. 
Chapter IV extends this practical approach to 'Quicksort: 
A More Detailed Example'. Besides giving a feel for the 
scope and utility of the new framework, an unusual 
analysis of Quicksort results. At some levels of detail 
not ordinarily considered, this algorithm that was 
originally developed to be quick on sequential von 
Neumann machines looks surprisingly suggestive of a 
realisation describable as parallel. If the essence of 
Quicksort lies in a common abstraction of algorithms 
implied by textbook procedures, then that essence is 
likely to be obscured rather than clarified by those 
textbook procedures. 
Chapter V, 'Algorithms Formally Revisited', returns to 
give a more complete and rigorous rendition of the 
definitions of algorithms, abstraction and imple- 
mentation. This formalisation is modelled closely on 
theoretical computer science, particularly the 
formulation of Davis and Weyuker (1983) who give the most 
precise definition of algorithm in the survey of Chapter 
III. It is possible to derive theorems from the 
definitions, and some simple theorems are proved. The 
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relationship between algorithms and Turing computability 
is considered, and a proof of a (very) restricted 
recasting of Church's Thesis is within reach, given that 
algorithms have been defined more generally than for 
particular languages; such a proof is outlined. In 
addition, it is shown that the rather unconstrained 
approach to multilevel algorithms is not so liberal as to 
be meaningless: proofs are given to show that not every 
algorithm can be seen as an implementation of every other 
algorithm and not every sequence can be seen as an 
implementation of every other sequence, even if they both 
have the same number of states. 
The notions of levels and algorithms are so pervasive and 
fundamental to cognitive science and computer science 
that the potential implications of the first chapters are 
widespread. Chapter VI, 'Some Implications', includes a 
sampling from a cognitive science perspective. Any 
theory about complex systems that can be put into formal 
algorithmic terms, such as those defined in Chapter V, is 
likely to be seen in sharper (or at least edifyingly 
different) focus. Programme and process explanations 
(Jackson and Pettit, 1988) and representational 
redescription (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith, forthcoming) 
come under the spotlight, for example. 
Also of note in the varied terrain of Chapter VI is a 
return to the original motivation behind this research: 
what is the relationship between connectionist and 
classical algorithms? The main distinctions that show 
up in the new framework are (1) a greater degree of 
indeterminacy and (2) a greater degree of distributed 
change, i.e., number of values changing in an individual 
state change, in connectionist systems as opposed to 
classical ones -- at their usual levels of description. 
In addition, connectionist systems tend to be viewed as 
having more (and more detailed) levels of theoretical 
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interest. However, it is the similarity rather than the 
difference that emerges most strongly by locating 
algorithms in this formalism. Any system at all can be 
seen as a sequence of states with different explicit 
representations and different degrees of nondeterminism 
and distributed change, depending on the level of detail 
of its algorithmic description. This thesis can be seen 
as the long road to grounding the apparently familiar 
terms of such a characterisation. 
Personal Perspective 
I came to cognitive science as a computer scientist who 
knew something about linguistics and who wanted to know 
more about psychology. I did not expect to encounter such 
familiar constructs as I did in flow-charted theories, 
e.g. Wason and Johnson-Laird's (1972) analysis of the 
four-card problem, and database-like lexical access 
methods. While it was reassuring to be on familiar 
ground, something seemed to be missing, something akin to 
the now standard arguments against classical 
computational theories of psychology (see, for example, 
'The Appeal of PDP' in Rumelhart and McClelland et. al., 
1986). In particular, the grain of beliefs and goals in 
terms of things like hamburgers and restaurants (Schank 
and Abelson, 1977) seemed too coarse. Dennett (1978, p. 
46) makes this point: 
Representations apparently play roles at many 
different levels in the operation of the brain. 
I have already mentioned the possibility of 
codes representing information about the 
tension of eye muscles and so forth, and these 
representations do not fall into the class of 
our beliefs, 
and (on the same page) 
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The conclusion is that writing -- for instance, 
brain writing -- is a dependent form of 
information storage. The brain must store at 
least some of its information in a manner not 
computable by a brain-writing model... 
Ignoring such low level views of representations is just 
the problem with conclusions such as Fodor's (Fodor, 
1975; Fodor et. al., 1980) that we are born with 
language-of-thought words for, say, compact discs or 
video cassette recorders. In a way this is ridiculous, 
yet in a way it is not; we may well have from birth the 
potential, perhaps implicit, building blocks of such 
concepts. Surely computational psychology, is not limited 
to trafficking only in high-level concepts common in 
current natural language. In fact, the better-understood 
complex systems of computer science seem to provide just 
the right domain in which to investigate and clarify 
many-levelled and implicit representation. As Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988) are at pains to point out, these systems 
are also parallel at some levels of description. Still, 
we speak of explicit data structures such as stacks and 
lists. 
The resurgence of connectionism provided timely and vivid 
illustrations of systems in 
depend on 
which high level concepts 
lower level ones in complicated (not 
The attempt to 
appealing about 
straightforwardly hierarchical) ways. 
disentangle what 
connectionism led 
is different and 
inevitably to 
and algorithms. These were two 
consideration of levels 
areas about which I had 
to be clear before I could progress. The development of 
a precise and cohesive theory of levels and algorithms 
became the major project and subject of this thesis. 
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AgAg pt ,ons,._and App,roa,c,h 
Questions about the relationships between levels and 
algorithms, hardware and software, implicit and explicit 
representations or programmed and emergent behaviour can 
be tricky even when posed with respect to the simplest 
program or system imaginable. For that reason I 
concentrate on exclusive-or; most of the main points of 
the thesis can be made using this easy example. The 
questions are indeed still difficult and, I claim, the 
answers are interesting and general. Consequently, my 
approach has been to use simple and uncluttered 
computational examples as far as possible to develop a 
formal theory of algorithms, ignoring as many other 
interacting and thorny philosophical problems as I can. 
In Chapter II there is some attempt to consider theories 
of levels that are based on definitions of semantics and 
reality, but such distinctions are minimised in the final 
theory. 
It may therefore be easier to say what this thesis is not 
about. It does not say anything about 'building a 
thinker' or 'instantiation' of mental states, to borrow 
the terminology of Clark (1989). He contrasts (p. 177) 
the project of psychological explanation 
(laying out the computational causes of 
intelligent behavior) and that of instantiati_on 
(making a machine that actually has 
thoughts). 
While a causal story can be told in terms of the new 
theory, it is best seen as a framework for describing a 
complex system's behaviour at varying levels of detail. 
What counts as a description as opposed to an explanation 
can depend on the context and the question at hand. For 
example, consider the context of a calculator that adds 
two integers between 0 and 20, always coming up with the 
9 
right answer except for the case where '2' and '2' are 
entered. Then its response is '5'. At a more detailed 
level of description, one that includes interim states of 
the calculator and a closer look at its internal 
mechanisms, the system might be described as performing a 
table lookup. Assuming that this level of description 
includes the central table, it might be seen to contain 
the entry '5' for the indices '2' and '2', providing an 
explanation for the behaviour described above. 
Given a second system that also adds up two integers 
between 0 and 20, except that it too responds with '5' 
when given '2' and '2', I would say that the two systems 
under these descriptions are weakly (or input-output, or 
extensionally) equivalent, or predictively equivalent. 
That is, given the input-output behaviour of one system, 
the input-out behaviour of the other can be predicted. 
The two systems may or may not be strongly equivalent, or 
go through the same interim states, at a more detailed 
level of description. If, at some particular level, 
they are strongly equivalent in this sense, then one can 
be said to simulate the other (at that level of detail). 
Again, note that the assertion that one system simulates 
another, at no matter how detailed a level, makes no 
claim that the simulation (or model) instantiates the 
states of the simulated. In talking about weak versus 
strong equivalence, I will specify the level of detail of 
the description as far as possible. Once again the need 
for a precise meaning of such a level reveals itself. 
I am aiming for a theory of levels and algorithms that 
does not depend on principles of semantics or 
intentionality or broad content. This is partly a 
cautious move, given the state of the art; these issues 
are among the most difficult in cognitive science. It 
also coincides with the goal of simplicity. In any case 
it is interesting to see how far we can get without them. 
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The same holds for causality. Of course causality cannot 
be omitted from all explanation, but distinguishing 
(potentially very detailed) descriptions of a process 
from causal claims isolates the descriptive issues still 
further. Yet another major area about which I shall 
have little to say Is development, in both the sense of 
individual learning and that of evolutionary development 
of a species. Here again there are interesting and 
important issues for describing and explaining complex 
systems, but they too often distract from a clear view of 
levels of description of a system at a particular stage 
in its development. 
I am assuming materialism throughout though I shall not 
argue for it. As Dennett asserts (1978, p. 83), 
If Church's Thesis is correct, then the 
constraints of mechanism are no more severe 
than the constraint against begging the 
question in psychology, for any psychology 
that stipulated atomic tasks that were 
'too difficult' to fall under Church's Thesis 
would be a theory with undischarged 
homunculi. 
If we do not abstract away from the finiteness of 
physical systems, then accepting something like Church's 
Thesis becomes even less problematic (see Chapter V). 
In keeping with materialism and simulation, and avoiding 
semantics and causality, I use 'computation' and 
'representation' in a very general sense (at least as 
general as P.S. Churchland, 1986, and Clark, 1989, and in 
contrast to Putnam, 1983a, and Pylyshyn 1984, e.g.), 
unrestricted by von Neumann architecture or a need to 
match intentional terminology. Algorithms turn out to 
be a generalisation of 'computations', as the term occurs 
in theoretical computer science (see Chapter III for full 
details), to sequences of states at many possible levels 
11 
of detail. Representations are labelled values in those 
states, at whatever level of description. States are 
taken to be primary, with processes only implicit. While 
there is some discussion of this in the text, it is best 





Perhaps the most frequently cited terminology for levels 
of explanation is that of David Marr (Marr, 1977; Marr, 
1982; Marr and Poggio, 1977). As a starting point 
therefore I will first present a somewhat simplified 
version of Marr's levels. This version will then be 
related to a rather different interpretation, following 
the original sources more closely. (Note that 'algorithm' 
and 'implementation' will be used in their usual vague 
senses until the new definitions are introduced.) 
An __Exam,p_1 e 
To illustrate the concepts and definitions of levels, 
consider the following example, which will be used 
throughout this chapter and the next. It is meant to be 
a simple example of a complex system. Imagine a 
standard computer, say a VAX/750, that has been 
programmed in PASCAL to calculate the function exclusive- 
or. This function is just the mapping that takes the 
ordered pair (0,0) to 0,(0,1) to 1,(1,0) to 1 and (1,1) 
to 0, or it could be described in words as '"A exclusive- 
or B" is true just in case either "A" or "B" is true, but 
not both.' This function is often abbreviated by 'xor', 
which I will use interchangeably with 'exclusive-or'. 
Also imagine that the PASCAL program has been compiled, 
assembled and executed (that is, it has been translated 
into the lowest level of machine language necessary for 
it to be run, and then run), so that the VAX appears to 
the user at the terminal as an exclusive-or calculator. 
If a '1' and then a '0' are entered, a '1' comes back. 
If a '0' and a '0' are entered, a '0' appears on the 
screen, and so forth. 
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AS,mplif,ied View 
I am tempted to call this section 'The Standard View', 
because what I will be describing is what I understood to 
be Marr's levels from discussions and reading in 
cognitive science in general, without trying to sort out 
what Marr actually had in mind. This appears to be a 
common misconception. See, for example, the view of 
Broadbent (and to a lesser extent, McClelland and 
Rumelhart) in 'Other Views of Levels' later in this 
chapter. Peacocke (1986) comments in a footnote (pp. 
102) that 'There is an element of construction in saying 
that, as far as the function goes, it is only the 
function in extension which is relevant to Marr's level 
1' and Clark (1990, p. 284) also notes the discrepancy 
between Chomsky's competence theory, on which Marr's 
level 1 or computational level is based, and the 
'official dogma'. I have included the simplified version 
here because I still think it is clear and relatively 
uncontroversial. In fact, the top level will be 
preserved intact in the final theory of this thesis. 
Marr suggested three levels of explanation for complex 
systems. The top, or most abstract, level is called the 
computational level. In our example, this is the 
exclusive-or function as a mathematical object. At this 
level, we can prove things about the function itself, 
such as A xor B = (A or B) and (not(A and B)), 
independently of how (or even if) that function may 
be implemented in some physical device using some 
algorithm. 
The middle level is the algorithmic level. At this 
level, there can be an explanation of how the complex 
system produces the appropriate output from the given 
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input. The PASCAL program mentioned in the example 
embodies such an algorithm, as in the following: 
GET X; 
GET Y; 
IF X = Y THEN 
Z = 0; 
OTHERWISE 
Z = 1; 
OUTPUT(Z); 
END; 
(This is not PASCAL, but a semiformal pseudocode.) Of 
course, this example does not give the only possible 
algorithm, which is why the computational level may be 
(some would say should be) considered separately. An 
alternative algorithm might be this one: 
GET Y; 
GET X; 
OUTPUT((X OR Y) AND (NOT(X AND Y))). 
At the bottom, most concrete, level is the implementation 
level. This is the level of explanation in terms of the 
physical device or hardware in which an algorithm is 
implemented. An explanation of the VAX hardware and how 
it functions to produce the appropriate behaviour for 
exclusive-or would be an explanation at this level. As 
was the case in going from the computational to the 
algorithmic level, the move from the algorithmic to the 
implementation level involves a narrowing down to one of 
many alternatives. Our PASCAL program could run on a 
VAX or an IBM personal computer. As Searle points out 
(1980), any function that is Turing-computable can be 
implemented 'using a roll of toilet paper and a pile of 




What Marr actually says is rather different, particularly 
with respect to the computational level. On the other 
hand, the implementational level, or 'hardware 
implementation level' as he calls it (Marr 1982, p. 25), 
is much the same as in the simplified view. This is 
just the level of explanation of the physical device in 
which an algorithm is implemented, be it person or 
computer. As far as it goes -- this level is not given 
much attention by Marr -- it is straightforward (but I 
will have more to say about this later). One point that 
he emphasises about the relationship between this level 
and the algorithmic level is that the former places 
constraints on the latter, restricting the 
representations and operations that can be used at the 
algorithmic level. 
The 'representation and algorithm level' (Marr's name for 
the algorithmic level) can be seen as being squeezed 
between the constraints of the hardware from below and 
the constraints of the computation to be performed from 
above. Once again, the simplified view gives a good 
idea of what Marr means by this level, but there are some 
issues which are stressed in Marr's rendition but are not 
usually mentioned by others. These issues are centred 
around the nature and primacy of the representation. 
The representation is itself a system, much like a 
grammar: it is symbolic and compositional. 'A 
representation,' as Marr defines it (Marr 1982, p. 20), 
'is a formal system for making explicit certain entities 
or types of information, together with a specification of 
how the system does this.' He gives as examples numeral 
systems, such as binary and Roman numerals, pointing out 
that particular representations aid or impede various 
operations, such as determining whether or not a given 
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number is a power of two. The distinction between 
process (algorithm) and representation is crucial, and 
the choice of representation comes first and restricts 
the choice of process. Of course, there may still be 
many possible suitable algorithms, given a particular 
representation. 
While a description at the representation and algorithm 
level is meant to answer the question 'how?', the 
computational level description is intended to answer the 
questions 'what?' and 'why?'. Unfortunately, a precise 
definition of Marr's all-important computational level 
and even his more general term 'information processing 
task' are left frustratingly vague. One of the most 
unambiguous things he says about the computational level 
is that it is the same level as Chomsky's competence 
theory for transformational grammar (Marr, 1977, p. 38), 
referring to Chomsky's Aspecto of the Theor_y__of_,_S atax. 
Chomsky (1965, e.g.) distinguishes competence theories 
from performance theories in linguistics, and he 
considers this to generalise to 'empirical investigation 
of other complex phenomena' (p. 4). A fundamental 
feature of a competence theory is its idealisation (p. 
3): 
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with 
an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely 
homogeneous speech-community, who knows its 
language perfectly and is unaffected by such 
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory 
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention 
and interest, and errors (random or 
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of 
the language in actual performance. 
It is clear that this is different from the top level as 
described above in 'The Simplified View'. 
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If we take the competence theory as a description of an 
individual system (but not necessarily of the purpose for 
which it was intended), the following observations will 
be important in the formulation of a more rigorous 
definition of levels. A competence theory of an ideal 
speaker will be very likely to have a different input- 
output profile to a normal human speaker. In the same 
way, a competence theory of an ideal exclusive-or 
calculator might have a different extension to an 
exclusive-or calculator with bugs while under 
development. At the same time, both the competence 
theories and the mathematical extensions can be 
implemented in an arbitrary member of possible algorithms 
or hardware devices. In any case, the controversy and 
confusion surrounding Chomsky's competence-performance 
distinction argues against its inclusion in a clear-cut 
levels framework. 
Let us see if Marr makes the distinction any clearer. 
In his own description of the computational level in 
Vision, he states that the 
important features are (1) that it contains 
separate arguments about what is computed and 
why and (2) that the resulting operation is 
defined uniquely by the constraints it has to 
satisfy (p. 23). 
His example of a cash register's computational theory has 
the general theory of addition as the 'what' and the 
relevance of this theory to the cash register as 'why'. 
For example, 
If you buy nothing, it should cost you nothing; 
and buying nothing and something should cost 
the same as buying just the something. (The 
rules for zero.) (p. 22), 
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and so on for commutativity, associativity and inverses. 
These rules also serve to illustrate the constraints of 
the second feature, given in (2) above. 
I think that it is clear that in the computational level, 
Marr, like Chomsky, intends more than the purely 
mathematical view of an abstract function. This is best 
illustrated by his assertion that the computational 
problem of chess is more than 'take the opponent's king' 
(Marr, 1977, p. 38). Yet there remains an element of 
abstraction and idealism in this level: it is 
independent of any particular representation, as addition 
is independent of the numeral system. Neither is the 
computational level description an existence proof; 
evidence that some effective procedure, any effective 
procedure, exists by which the problem under 
consideration can be solved is not enough. In a 
footnote on the same page, Marr states 
One computational theory that in principle can 
solve chess is exhaustive search. The real 
interest lies however in formulating the pieces 
of computation that we apply to the game. One 
presumably wants a computational theory that 
has a rather general application, together with 
a demonstration that it happens to be 
applicable to some class of games of chess, and 
evidence that we play games in this class. 
This is Marr's most explicit textual evidence that the 
computational level is really a coarse algorithmic level, 
or maybe a theory at level 1.5 (Peacocke, 1986) -- 
somewhere between the simplified top level (which 
Peacocke calls level 1) and the algorithm level (or level 
2). 
Peacocke's level 1.5 is meant to be the level of 
'information on which the algorithm draws' (p. 101), but 
it is in fact consistent with an algorithmic level of 
detail in the new theory which concludes this chapter. 
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He seems to have an idea of an algorithm that is 
something akin to a program, suggesting 'a suitably 
constrained Augmented Transition Network, or some other 
favoured type of parser' as examples of algorithms. A 
certain amount of confusion is in evidence, however, in 
his support of simplifying Marr's top level, as noted 
above. 'The defence of this construction', he claims 
(p. 102 - 103), 
is that it is hard to see how finer-grained 
distinctions could be relevant at level 1, 
given that algorithms by which the function is 
computed are not distinguished until level 2. 
But it is just that sort of finer-grained distinction 
that is the point of Peacocke's paper on level 1.5 and 
also, as shown in the chess example, of some of Marr's 
own discussion of level 1. 
Can we pin this in-between level down any further? What 
exactly is this computational theory level? The answers 
Marr gives are largely qualitative. In my 
interpretation, one implication of his 1977 paper is that 
only some information processing problems have a 
computational level description, which he calls in this 
paper a 'Type 1 theory'. The explicitly given 
differences between Type 1 and Type 2 theories (both are 
information processing theories, however) are that the 
former is hierarchic and symbolic, while the latter is 
heterarchic and, presumably, not symbolic. The implicit 
differences lie in the language that is employed to 
describe them. Type 1 theories are referred to as being 
'neatly circumscribed' (p. 39), 'clean' (p. 39 and p. 42) 
and 'concise' (p. 41), possessing 'beauty' (p. 41) and 
addressing 'deep principles' (p. 42) and 'structure' (p. 
40). Type 2 theories, however, are described as 'messy' 
(p. 41), 'untidy' (p. 41) or 'wired-in' (p. 42), and are 
concerned with 'details' (p. 41) and 'performance' (p. 
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39) and 'mechanisms' (p. 42 and p. 45). The idea seems 
to be that Type 1 theories are the elegant theories, 
where elegance is used in the same way that mathematical 
elegance is used to distinguish a nice proof from a 
sloppy, ad hoc one. There is also the notion, again 
reflecting Chomsky, of having the right description at an 
independent level without being tied to the constraints 
of implementation. 
Marr does emphasise, in his rhetoric at least, the 
primary importance of the computational level, and this 
can be understood in part historically. His work can be 
opposed to approaches to vision aimed at the level of 
individual neurons. At the same time, he is reacting 
against a style of artificial intelligence theorising in 
which the levels of description are confused: 
... particular data structures, such as lists 
of attribute value pairs called property lists 
in the Lisp programming language, were held to 
amount to theories of representation of 
knowledge ... (1982, p. 28). 
Although he does not necessarily live up to his own 
standards, Marr asserts (on p. 27) that 
it is the top level, the level of computational 
theory, which is critically important from an 
information-processing point of view. 
He expands on this idea in a way that implies that by 
'information-processing point of view' he means a top- 
down approach. An information processing problem, then, 
would be one such as perception (according to Marr), for 
which 
an algorithm is likely to be understood more 
readily by understanding the nature of the 
problem being solved than by examining the 
mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is 
embodied (p. 27). 
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This sounds like the sort of problem which should have a 
Type 1 theory, suggesting that Marr had revised his view 
of information processing since 1977, when both Type 1 
and Type 2 theories were considered to be theories 
addressing information processing problems. 
Disregarding the question of 'information processing', 
which does not seem very illuminating, let us take a look 
at our example in a final effort to capture Marr's 
computational theory level. The exclusive-or function 
which was put forward as the top level now appears 
incomplete. It can answer the 'what?' question, since 
there are many ways in which the exclusive-or function 
can be described, each of which constrains what must be 
computed without tying down a representation or 
algorithm. But there is no complementary answer to 
'why?' -- why do these constraints fit the problem at 
hand? This is simply because we have not specified any 
context or wider problem. Perhaps it would be better to 
say that the problem specified in the example just is 
that of an exclusive-or calculator, reducing the 'why?' 
part of the question to the identity of the exclusive-or 
function with itself. This seems appropriate, and in 
fact this is what could have happened in Marr's example 
if he had chosen to describe a cash register as an adding 
machine rather than as something involved in the wider 
world of buying and selling. 
What exactly is the computation theoretical level 
description for the example? I think it could be given 
as 'A xor B = (A or B) and (not (A and B) ) ' , where 'or' , 
'and', 'not' and parentheses and precedence are all taken 
to be previously defined. This fully describes what one 
usually thinks of as exclusive-or, and it would certainly 
be problematic if our exclusive-or calculation did not 
fit the constraints implied by this description. 
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Moreover, while it suggests a particular sort of 
algorithm, it is still independent of any particular 
algorithm or implementation in the way I think Marr 
means. What is left vague, insofar as Marr and Chomsky 
are vague on this point, is whether or why this 
particular formulation of the computational theory is the 
right one or even a good one. 
Marr sees his levels approach as adding some much-needed 
rigour to the artificial intelligence or information 
processing project. While I think it is not nearly so 
clear and useful as he had hoped, it is certainly a step 
in the right direction. 
NEWELL AND PYLYSITYN'S LEVELS 
Like the levels of Marr, Zenon Pylyshyn's view of 
functional architecture, along with the theory of levels 
that underlies it, has been very influential and accepted 
on a wide scale. Particularly as it is described in 
Computation._and__Cognition (Pylyshyn, 1984), his position 
is often clear and frequently referenced. Consequently, 
I have chosen to include a more detailed look at 
Pylyshyn's levels, but first I want to review those of 
Newell, on which they are based. 
Newell's Levels 
Newell explicitly declares himself a realist about 
levels. '... computer system levels', he asserts, 
are a reflection of the nature of the physical 
world. They are not just a point of view that 
exists solely in the eye of the beholder. 
This reality comes from computer system levels 
being genuine specializations, rather than 
being just abstractions that can be applied 
uniformly. (Newell, 1982, p. 98). 
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In an attempt to sort out what this realism amounts to, 
let us look more closely at the levels Newell enumerates 
and the term 'specialization' (as opposed to 
abstraction), along with the related notion of 
'technology'. 
Newell's 'standard hierarchy, familiar to everyone in 
computer science' (p. 94; all references in this 
subsection are to Newell, 1982, unless otherwise noted) 
is given as follows (primarily taken from his Figure 2 
and Table 1, both p. 96). At the bottom is the device 
level, which has as its medium electrons and magnetic 
domains. Next, moving up, is the circuit level, which 
has as its medium current and voltage. This seems to be 
something like a physical circuit, because he mentions 
that these are usually electric but could also be fluid. 
Next comes the logic circuit sublevel (also called 
combinatorial and sequential circuits), whose medium is 
single bits. Along with the next higher sublevel, the 
register-transfer sublevel (or architecture sublevel), 
whose medium is bit vectors, this makes up the logic 
level, whose medium in general is bits. The symbol 
level, which is supposed to be at the same height as the 
register-transfer level, is also called the program level 
and has as its medium symbolic expressions. The highest 
level (so far) is the configuration or PMS (processor- 
memory-switch) level, which 'lies directly above both the 
symbol level and the register-transfer level' (p. 95) 
I think an example is desperately needed at this point. 
Returning to our earlier one, in which a VAX can be seen 
as an exclusive-or calculator, I think the whole VAX with 
peripherals, reading in data and writing out data, is the 
configuration level view. This would be more complex if 
there were several computers or processors; it is not 
just the input-output description. The program (or 
symbol) level is the easiest to pinpoint; it is the 
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PASCAL version, as in one of the possible algorithmic 
level descriptions of Marr. The register-transfer 
sublevel must be the same thing, judging from Newell's 
equation of these two levels, but with symbolic 
expressions viewed as bit vectors and variables viewed as 
registers or storage locations. Perhaps this could be 
illustrated in the exclusive-or example by the actual 
loaded (ready to run) object code, all in ones and zeroes 
with explicit addresses. Even then, the exact registers 
may not be known, having been left to an operating system 
decision to be made as the program runs. It is not 
clear why two levels are called sublevels or that Newell 
intends any profound difference between 'level' and 
'sublevel'. I think they are just two ways of looking 
at the system in terms of its underlying logic, one bit 
by bit, the other vector by vector. Let us continue 
with the example, then. Assuming we have the object 
code, along with a trace of the actual registers and 
storage locations used (defining the logic circuit level 
description), then we could have the same program, but 
with operations broken down into operations on one bit at 
a time, and this would comprise the logic circuit 
sublevel. The plain circuit level I understand to be a 
physical level, as mentioned above. This would mean a 
description of xor in terms of the particular circuits of 
a VAX/750, be they Motorola 6200 chips or whatever. The 
device level appears to be a physical level as well, 
having to do with molecules and magnetic fields; it is 
(p. 97) 'used only to devise components at the circuit 
level'. 
Each level must have an internal coherence; it must be a 
non-arbitrary system: 
Computer system levels are not simply levels of 
abstraction. That a system has a description 
at a given level does not necessarily imply it 
has a description at higher levels. There is 
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no way to abstract from an arbitrary electronic 
circuit to obtain a logic-level system. There 
is no way to abstract from an arbitrary 
register-transfer system to obtain a symbol- 
level system. (p. 97) 
Newell does not elaborate further on the implication that 
a specialization is different from an abstraction, but it 
is related to the idea of a technology, which he 
describes in the following way (p. 97, his emphasis): 
Computer systems levels are realized by 
technologies. The notion of a technology has 
not received the conceptual attention it 
deserves. But roughly, given a specification 
of a particular system at a level, it is 
possible to construct by routine means a 
physical system that realizes that 
specification. Thus, systems can be obtained 
to specification within limits of time and 
cost. It is not possible to invent 
arbitrarily additional computer system levels 
that nestle between existing levels. 
Potential levels do not become technologies, 
just by being thought up. Nature has a say in 
whether a technology can exist. 
At the same time, Newell goes on to say that these levels 
are approximate and incomplete. The defining aspects of 
a level are (from Table 1, p. 96), with parenthetical 
examples from the symbol level, systems (computers), 
medium (symbols, expressions), components (memories, 
operations), composition laws (disjunction, association) 
and behaviour laws (sequential interpretation). In 
addition, the levels given share the following 
characteristics (also from p. 96): 
Point 1. Specification of a system at a level 
always determines completely a 
definite behavior for the system at 
that level (given initial and 
boundary conditions). 
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Point 2. The behavior of the total system 
results from the local effects of 
each component of the system 
processing the medium at its inputs 
to produce its outputs. 
Point 3. The immense variety of behavior is 
obtained by system structure, i.e., 
by the variety of ways of assembling 
a small number of component types 
(though perhaps a large number of 
instances of each type). 
Point 4. The medium is realized by state-like 
properties of matter, which remain 
passive until changed by the 
components. 
Newell's main purpose in introducing and explaining the 
foregoing levels and concepts is to lay the foundations 
for proposing a new level, the knowledge level, which he 
claims had been conflated with the symbol level to which 
it remains related. The whole thing centres on the 
principle of rationality, which is given explicitly (on 
p. 102): 
If an agent has knowledge that one of its 
actions will lead to one of its goals, then the 
agent will select that action. 
Knowledge is defined as anything to which the principle 
of rationality applies, and it looks a lot like what has 
come to be known as 'folk psychology'. According to the 
defining aspects of levels, the knowledge level has as 
its system the agent. This is defined as bodies of 
knowledge, goals and actions. Its medium is knowledge, 
and its components are goals, actions and bodies. No 
composition laws are given, and it has one behaviour law: 
the principle of rationality (pp. 100-101). 
However, the knowledge level is distinguished from its 




surprises because they can be put in direct 
to the four points listed earlier. 
to Point 1, the first surprise is that 
at the knowledge level does not completely 
determine behaviour at that level. In 
Point 2, the second surprise is that 
determined globally, by the principle of 







4) are the lack of structure at the knowledge level and 
the assertion that its medium is not a state-like 
physical structure. 
Once again, we are faced with the question, what exactly 
is this top level? Like Marr, Newell refers to 
Chomsky's competence level as being what he has in mind. 
The principle of rationality puts some constraint on the 
notion. In order to extend our exclusive-or example, we 
must view the VAX-calculator as an agent that has as its 
goal the calculation of exclusive-or for some particular 
inputs, say, and also has knowledge of, for example, 
'and' and 'or' and 'not' and how to put them into action 
in the appropriate manner. We still do not have any 
clear approach, I claim, to justify this as the 'right' 
knowledge level view, if indeed there is such a unique 
view. Newell's realism about levels seems to imply that 
it should be unique. 
Pylyshyn'.s, Levels 
Zenon Pylyshyn (1984) takes over a sort of combination of 
Marr's levels and Newell's levels, and then carries the 
definition of the relationship between the top two levels 
a step further. Like Marr, he posits three levels. 
The bottom level is the physical level, described 
alternatively as biological, neurophysiological or in 
terms of physics. As far as I can tell, it is 
completely interchangeable with Marr's hardware 
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implementation level and is roughly equivalent to 
Newell's device and/or circuit levels. Similarly, 
Pylyshyn's symbol-processing or syntactic level fulfils 
the same role as Marr's representation and algorithmic 
level or Newell's symbol level. For instance, Pylyshyn 
frequently refers to this level as syntactic, using a 
LISP program as an example of a description of a complex 
system at this level, while Newell, as we have seen, also 
calls it the program level. 
The interesting case once again is the top level, which 
Pylyshyn has renamed the semantic (or representational) 
level. The implication is that it is identical to 
Newell's knowledge level, as implied in the assertion 
' ... Newell (1980, 1982) ... uses the term "knowledge 
level" where I use "semantic level".' (1984, p. 32), but 
this is not so. The name change is not important; 
Newell (1982) acknowledges- the possible confusion in 
using 'knowledge' where the philosophical community would 
tend to use 'belief', and it is this confusion that 
Pylyshyn hopes to remedy by the change of terminology. 
The substantial difference, however, is as follows. 
Whereas Newell is very careful to separate the knowledge 
level view of a system in terms of beliefs, goals and the 
principle of rationality, all implemented somehow (but we 
do not want to say how), Pylyshyn's view relies crucially 
on those distinctions being reflected at the syntactic 
level. Beliefs and goals, at any rate, are encoded and 
processed to produce rational behaviour. He wants to 
claim (p. 40) 'that the symbols represent one content and 
no other' and that 'syntax parallels semantics'. The 
advantage to Pylyshyn of computation is that it shows us 
just how this can be done. He argues that the semantic 
level is the appropriate level for cognitive science 
explanations, emphasising that 
29 
the notion of representation is necessary only 
in the context of explanation; it is needed to 
state generalizations concerning the behavior 
of systems under certain descriptions. (p. 26). 
At the same time, the leap from Newell's view is clear 
when Pylyshyn asserts that 
As materialists we must ask how behavioral 
regularities such as those captured by 
statements that mention extrinsic but causally 
unconnected entities (or perhaps nonexistent 
objects) are possible in a world governed by 
physical laws ... The answer I ultimately give 
to this puzzle is that the causes of the 
behavior are ... some physically instantiated 
internal representation of such things, that 
is, a physical code or a symbol. (pp. 25-26, 
his emphasis). 
Pylyshyn makes explicit what Marr and Newell seem to 
believe but avoid saying. That is that what makes a 
particular theory centred on the uppermost level right is 
that the theoretical entities posited at that level are 
real at the middle level -- at least as far as atoms and 
molecules and other invisible physical entities are real. 
The symbols or codes of the syntactic level are what 
parallel the semantics, while the more detailed states 
and operations of the syntactic level are mere messy 
implementations. The vocabulary continues to reflect 
this division as well. The highest level is also called 
cognitive, computational, mental and intentional, as 
opposed to the symbol processing 'functional 
architecture', which is syntactical or non-semantical, 
non-representational, non-cognitive and 'wired-in'. But 
the implication that a semantical theory should be an 
elegant theory is spelled out little more. The highest 
level semantic theories capture the right generalisations 
because they reflect folk psychology categories, which 
are intuitively plausible and have held up well through 
time; they are the best we have. 
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Apart from the reference to folk psychology, Pylyshyn 
gives no argument for why these three levels make up the 
appropriate description and explanation of complex 
systems. He starts from the assumption that functional 
psychology is a distinct and independent level from the 
physical, based on Fodor's irreducibility argument 
(Fodor, 1974; Fodor, 1975). Briefly, this is the claim 
that symbolic level properties and laws cannot be reduced 
to physical level ones, because properties at the higher 
level cross-classify properties at the lower level. 
Programming languages, for example, can be instantiated 
in arbitrarily many physical ways. Any attempt to 
characterise the behaviour of the programs at the 
physical level is doomed, Fodor and Pylyshyn claim. A 
similar argument can be made for the autonomy of the 
semantic level, Pylyshyn argues. In the same way, an 
analogy is made with the autonomy of biology with respect 
to physics (pp. 35-36). Like other generalisations, 
constraints must be stated in terms of the appropriate 
level. These lines of reasoning provide a persuasive 
case for allowing multiple levels of description, but the 
appeal to folk psychology and the reference to Newell, 
whom we have already considered, are the only support for 
why these particular levels are the right ones to use. 
Granted, they are implicit in much current theorising in 
cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, but 
that is arguably the result of the same influence of folk 
psychology and arguments such as those of Fodor. 
In an effort to try and understand what Pylyshyn is 
saying up to this point, let us take a different 
approach. Let us try placing our old familiar example 
into his framework. (He uses a similar example of 
binary addition on pp. 59-62 of Pylyshyn, 1984). 
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The states of the memory registers are designated by 
expressions 'x' and 'o'. Let us further suppose, 
following Pylyshyn closely, that when a certain pattern 
(designated by the symbol 'xor') occurs in a position of 
the machine called its 'instruction register', the 
machine's memory registers change states according to a 
specifiable regularity. So when part of the machine 
called 'register 1' is in the state designated by 'x' and 
'register 2' is in the state designated by 'o', then 
'register 3' changes into the state corresponding to 'x'. 
With physical and algorithmic level descriptions as 
before, the semantic function could be defined more in 
line with Pylyshyn's view as: 
(1) SF[[o]] = 0 
(The semantic interpretation of 'o' is the 
number zero.) 
(2) SF[ [x] ] = 1 
(The semantic interpretation of 'x' is the 
number one.) 
If the computer is in the state characterised by the 
description: 
(1) Register 1 'contains' symbol T'. 
(2) Register 2 'contains' symbol T". 
(3) The instruction register 'contains' the symbol 
'xor'. 
then the computer goes into the state characterised by: 
Register 3 'contains' the string T, where 
SF[[T]] = SF[[T']] exclusive-or SF[[T"]]. 
Although this example does not get into the 
'systematicity' that Pylyshyn sees as so important, it 
makes clear the difference between Pylyshyn's (and Marr's 
and Newell's) view of the top level and that of the 
simplified Marr view (see earlier sections of this 
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chapter). This clearly says more than just the 
mathematical view of the exclusive-or function. In 
taking this definite step, Pylyshyn goes beyond Marr and 
Newell and into what I think Marr would call the 
representation and algorithm (or symbol) level. 
Consider Marr's idea of representations as systems, such 
as numeral systems; this is just what Pylyshyn is 
describing in his addition example. Given the 
difficulty in defining Marr's computational level, 
consider the simplified view of Marr's levels, which 
takes the top level as the functional extension. From 
this angle, Pylyshyn's semantic level is descending below 
the mathematical level to say something, though certainly 
not everything, about 'how' a function is carried out. 
OTHER.-VIEWS OF LEVELS 
There are numerous other views of levels in the 
literature. The ones that follow are very influential 
and have certainly influenced what follows in this 
thesis. The revised view of levels presented at the end 
of the chapter has grown out of at least all of these, 
along with the views of Marr, Newell and Pylyshyn. The 
exchange between McClelland and Rumelhart and Broadbent 
is a particularly good illustration of some of the 
confusion surrounding levels talk. 
Dennett's Stances 
A common influence on most approaches to levels, 
including those that are reviewed here, is likely to be 
found in the early work of Daniel Dennett on 'intentional 
systems'. Without worrying about his motivation for now 
(but see the final section of this chapter), let us 
consider his definitions of 'levels of description', or 
'stances', as he calls them (Dennett, 1971, p. 221 in 
Mind, Design). 
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The systems with which Dennett is concerned are complex 
ones, such as people or chess-playing computers, for 
which one can and often does 'explain and predict their 
behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to them ...' 
(p. 225, again in Mind Design; all further references to 
Dennett, 1971, will be from this source). The emphasis 
at the top level, or 'intentional stance', here should be 
placed on prediction of output from input, without 
necessarily explaining anything about how the actual 
mechanisms of this particular system serve to bring about 
the predicted results or what states the system goes 
through. The middle level addresses the mechanisms; 
this is clarified in Dennett, 1987. A word of caution 
is in order, however, as this design level is often 
elaborated in terms of programs (see Chapter III and VI 
for more on the relationship between programs and 
algorithms.) 
Exactly what are Dennett's descriptive stances? By 
name, from the bottom up, they are the 'physical stance', 
the 'design stance' and the 'intentional stance', closely 
parallelling the three levels of Marr and Pylyshyn. At 
the physical level, 
predictions are based on the actual physical 
state of the particular object and are worked 
out by applying whatever knowledge we have of 
the laws of nature. (p. 222). 
The spirit of this level appears to be entirely analogous 
to that behind Marr's physical implementation level. In 
fact, there is widespread agreement about this level in 
the views presented here, the exception being Newell, 
possibly, who could be said to subdivide the physical 
level. Dennett explicitly relates his stances to Marr 
and Chomsky in The Intentional Stance (Dennett, 1987, pp. 
74-6) -- see below. 
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One point emphasised in Dennett's earlier paper is that 
the physical stance is the appropriate vantage point from 
which to predict malfunctions or outcomes not designed 
into the system such as 'If you turn on the switch you'll 
get a nasty shock.' (p. 222) It is not just the 
application of the natural laws to a physical state, 
then, that places a description at the physical level; 
there is some ambiguity about whether a particular 
description, taken out of context, is from the design or 
physical stance. If, for example, the system in 
question was designed particularly to give shocks to 
switch-turners, then the identical prediction 'If you 
turn on the switch you'll get a nasty shock' would be a 
prediction from the design stance. However (p. 222) 
the physical stance is generally reserved for 
instances of breakdown, where the condition 
preventing normal operation is generalized and 
easily locatable... 
It should come as no surprise that predictions from the 
design stance are defined as being generated by assuming 
each functional component will perform as designed. The 
design includes the arrangement of the functions to 
fulfil their purposes. This use of 'function' 
highlights the purpose-relative definition of the term, 
which tends to be forgotten in computer science lingo. 
Even so, the design stance is close to being the same as 
the representation and algorithm level of Marr or the 
symbol level of Newell and Pylyshyn, for it is of this 
stance that Dennett says, 
If one knows exactly how the computer is 
designed (including the impermanent part of its 
design: its program), one can predict its 
designed response to any move one makes by 
following the computation instructions of the 
program (p. 221). 
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However the design here includes the design of the 
particular machine, and therefore diverges from the 
machine independence that is the hallmark of Pylyshyn's 
and others' similar level. 
Predictions at the highest level, from the intentional 
stance, assume not only (as in the design stance case) 
that the machine will perform as it was designed to do, 
but also that the design is optimal in a certain way. 
This begins to sound very close to Newell's knowledge 
level, which does not imply any particular structure, but 
is founded on the principle of rationality. It should 
also be noted that Dennett draws his examples primarily 
from explanation and prediction in the sense of folk 
psychology, such as a chess player attempting to guess 
the next move of his or her opponent. Parallelling the 
descent from the design to the physical stance in case 
the assumption of proper functioning is violated, when 
the design is less than optimal or rational, one moves 
from the intentional stance to the design stance for 
explanation. 
In The Intentional--- Stance, especially in the third 
chapter, Dennett reaffirms and clarifies his position. 
In particular, he explicitly calls the intentional stance 
an idealisation, such as the highest level, the 
computational level, of Marr and the notion of competence 
of Chomsky. Unlike Marr, however, Dennett clearly 
allows for the possibility that a good idealisation may 
have little to do with the correct theory at a lower 
level: 
The fact about competence models that provoked 
my 'instrumentalism' is that the decomposition 
of one's competence model into parts, phases, 
states, steps, or whatever need shed no light 
at all on the decomposition of actual 
mechanical parts, phases, states, or steps of 
the system being modelled -- even when the 
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competence model is, as a competence model, 
excellent. (pp. 75-76). 
Dennett goes on to defend the intentional stance as an 
excellent competence model (relating it explicitly to 
Chomsky and Marr), still using prediction and explanation 
primarily in folk psychological terms. He is interested 
in grounding mental state talk as it is used in our 
common language and understanding of each other, rather 
than in cognitive psychology. While continuing to 
mention 'explanation', prediction (or weak equivalence) 
carries the weight, at least at the highest level. In 
addition, Dennett justifies the particular idealisation 
of the intentional stance in terms of evolution towards 
rationality. 
Haugeland'_s Levels--and Dimensions 
In his influential paper, 'The Nature and Plausibility of 
Cognitivism' (Haugeland, 1978), John Haugeland addresses 
the nature of scientific explanation in general, before 
applying his approach to 'cognitivism', or computational 
psychology of the more traditional sort. In particular, 
he considers three types of explanation: derivational- 
nomological (a restriction of deductive-nomological), 
morphological and systematic. Our primary concerns here 
are levels and dimensions, which are defined in terms of 
systematic explanation. Systematic explanation is 
appropriate for explicating complex systems in which the 
behaviour of the whole crucially involves complex 
interaction of the parts. We can assume, for this 
section, that this is the right sort of explanation for 
many questions about classical artificial intelligence 
chess programs, for example, as Haugeland suggests, and 
possibly for computational psychology. In Haugeland's 
words, systematic explanation (he is describing the 
example of an automobile engine in particular) 
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requires specification of a complexly organized 
pattern of interdependent interactions. The 
various parts of an engine do many different 
things, so to speak 'working together' or 
'cooperating' in an organized way, to produce 
an effect quite unlike what any of them could 
do alone. (p. 247 -- page numbers refer to the 
version in Haugeland, 1981). 
Some further explanations may require 'reduction' of the 
original system, perhaps explaining its components in the 
derivational-nomological or morphological style or as 
systems once again. In any case, Haugeland calls this 
'systematic reduction', after the type of explanation 
being reduced. Particularly in the case of systems 
reducing to other systems, we have a systematic 
hierarchy, such as discussed by Simon (1969) and 'levels' 
of explanation. Ultimately, such a reduction will reach 
a level at which the explanation is of a different, non- 
systematic, sort. Any lower level beyond this, 
therefore, would not be the result of a systematic 
reduction. 
In this context, Haugeland gives a fairly precise 
definition (unlike Marr) of an information processing 
system; it does seem to me to be very much like what 
Marr had in mind. It is an 'intentional black box' 
which can be explained (systematically) without 'de- 
interpreting'. This definition needs two more 
definitions to be understood. First, an intentional 
black box is, simplifying somewhat, some system toward 
which one can take the intentional stance, using 
Dennett's terminology, with some additional constraints 
on the structure of the inputs and outputs. The 
'intentional interpretation' of inputs, outputs and 
systems is grounded in 'a regular general scheme' (p. 
255) for determining the meaning of tokens in terms of 
their simple or complex types and, pivotally (giving rise 
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to the 'fairly' in 'fairly precise definition' above), in 
showing empirically 
that under the interpretations the actual 
outputs consistently make reasonable sense in 
the context (pattern) of actual prior inputs 
and other actual outputs. (p. 256). 
Second, by 'without de-interpreting' an intentional black 
box, Haugeland means, in his own words, 
explaining its input/output ability in terms of 
how it would be characterized under the 
intentional interpretation regardless of 
whatever other descriptions might be available 
for the same input and output behavior. For 
example, if our chess player is an IPS 
(information processing system), that means 
there is a systematic explanation of how it 
manages to come up with legal and plausible 
moves as such, regardless of how it manages to 
press certain type bars against paper, light 
certain lights, or do whatever it does that 
gets interpreted as those moves. (pp. 258-259). 
One can think of an information processing system being 
expanded as it is explained along the plane of 
intentional interpretation (see Figure 2.1). 
If an explanation descends below the plane on which 
explanations are in terms of chess, then Haugeland uses 
the term 'change of dimension' (p. 263) to describe this 
sort of intentional reduction, since 'change of level' 
has already been used to describe the levels along that 
plane. For example, another dimension of explanation of 
the chess system might be in terms of linked lists (in 
case it were written in the LISP programming language, 
especially) or even electrical circuits. We get a 
picture such as that in Figure 2.2. These figures help 
to illustrate what I understand Haugeland to mean when he 
says 
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There can be different level hierarchies in 
different dimensions, but they are 'orthogonal' 
rather than sequential. That is, it is a 
mistake to think of the lowest level on one 
dimension as a higher level than the highest 
level on a lower dimension. Thus, an and-gate 
is not a higher level component than a disk 
memory; they are components on different 
dimensions, and hence incomparable as to level. 
(p. 264). 
McClelland, Rumelhart and Broadbent 
A good illustration of the confusion about levels can be 
found in the exchange between McClelland and Rumelhart 
and Broadbent in 'Distributed Memory and the 
Representation of General and Specific Information' and 
its follow-up (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1985; Rumelhart 
and McClelland, 1985; Broadbent 1985). As a result, I 
shall go through it in some detail before presenting the 
approach to levels that is ultimately reached. In the 
initial article, McClelland and Rumelhart put forward a 
distributed, connectionist model of some aspects of 
memory, opposing it primarily to Morton's (1979) logogen 
model. The details of the data and the models do not 
concern us here so much as the ensuing discussion. It 
is there that the two authors attempt to defend 
themselves against Broadbent's accusation that they are 
presenting a theory at the wrong level, the 
implementation level. 
In the target article, Marr's levels are not referenced 
explicitly, but his theory or something similar is 
assumed. For example, the authors acknowledge a human 
implementation level as well as the view that psychology 
in general, and their model in particular, addresses 
something more abstract. This can be seen when they ask 
themselves the following question. 
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It may be conceded that distributed models 
describe the physiological substrate of memory 
better than other models, but why should we 
assume that they help us to characterize human 
information processing at a more abstract level 
of description? (McClelland and Rumelhart, 
1985, p. 184). 
They go on to answer their own question by taking two 
different tacks, the combination of which leads me to 
believe that their underlying theory of levels is very 
close indeed to the simplified view of Marr's theory as 
presented earlier. 
The first and most direct response to the question is 
that their model is 'some of both' (p. 184) , that is, it 
is partly a different level of description to the logogen 
model and partly a different description at the same 
level. In the simplified version of Marr's levels, this 
would make sense. If Morton's model defines an abstract 
function which makes testable predictions, then 
McClelland and Rumelhart's model can be seen as defining 
an algorithm, which is a description at a different 
level. At the same time, the input-output profile of 
that algorithm -- the model viewed at the higher level -- 
can be seen as a different description at the same level. 
It is not clear that Marr's actual view is in conflict so 
far; he acknowledges the intermingling and mutual 
constraints of all levels, though his reference to 
Chomsky may be at odds with this. The evidence that 
McClelland and Rumelhart have something closer to the 
simplified, as opposed to the actual, levels of Marr can 
be found in their discussion of the 'correct cognitive 
level' (p. 184), which could be the same as the 
computational level. They proceed to argue that their 
model cannot be just an implementation of logogen-like 
models because there are differences in the predictions 
made by their model and enumeration models (models in 
which memory traces are 'enumerated', or stored 
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separately, as in the logogen model). In Marr's levels, 
there could well be differences in prediction between 
computational and lower level descriptions resulting from 
the idealisation of the computational level. In other 
words, it is possible that some logogen-like model is the 
right computational level theory and a distributed model, 
such as McClelland and Rumelhart are advancing, is an 
implementation of it -- even if they do make different 
predictions. (It should also be noted that the issues 
are further confused by McClelland's and Rumelhart's 
frequent comparisons of distributed and more traditional 
models of memory in general. This sort of confusion 
will be taken up in Chapter VI.) The second strand of 
the response to different levels, or different 
descriptions, implicitly assumes that all psychological 
models are also algorithmic models. For example, it is 
pointed out that although models may share the same 
(behavioural) predictions, they can differ at 'a process 
level' (p. 185). In summary, McClelland and Rumelhart 
implicitly assume a view of levels close to the 
simplified version of Marr. Further, they assume that 
all psychological models are algorithmic models. Their 
position is clarified as they defend themselves against 
the criticisms of Donald Broadbent. 
Broadbent (1985) attacks McClelland and Rumelhart for 
addressing the wrong level. While acknowledging the 
plausibility of distributed memory underlying the logogen 
theory, he invokes Marr's levels explicitly in claiming 
that even though logogens are part of what you would call 
a computational level theory, the distributed memory 
model is at the implementational level. Surprisingly, 
there is no mention of Marr's 'algorithm and 
representation' level, and Rumelhart and McClelland get a 
lot of mileage out of this omission. In fact, 
Broadbent's idea of levels seems to be the following. 
He lumps together the algorithmic and implementational 
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levels of Marr and calls them simply 'implementational'. 
For example, he states that 
M & R regard certain behavioral experiments as 
relevant to their model; the present point of 
view is that those experiments have no bearing 
on the question of distributed versus specific 
traces, but have their impact at a different 
level of theory. (p. 189) 
It is also implied by the use of 'behavioral' in this 
quote that Broadbent too is taking the simplified view of 
the computational level as the mathematical input-output 
level. Further convincing evidence can be found on page 
190, where he asserts that, based on the equivalence in 
computational power (the weak Turing machine notion of 
equivalence), 
... the conclusion of the conceptual analyses 
of the 1950s was that the distinction of 
distributed versus specific representations had 
no importance at the computational level with 
which psychology deals. 
Rumelhart and McClelland have brushed up on Marr's levels 
for their response. Adding a disclaimer (they do not 
necessarily agree entirely with this version of levels), 
they give a clear presentation of Marr's view. Whether 
or not they appreciate all the subtleties of the 
computational level is still open to interpretation: 
Casual appeals to Turing's thesis may be 
sufficient to establish equivalence at the 
computational level ... (p. 195). 
Also, 
At the computational level, it does not matter 
whether the theory is stated as a program for a 
Turing Machine, as a set of axioms, or as a set 
of rewrite rules. It does not matter how long 
it takes ... 
45 
This can be contrasted to Marr's implication that in the 
case of computational theories for chess at least, it may 
indeed matter how long it takes (1977, p. 38, or see the 
first section of this chapter). 
Their answer to Broadbent takes essentially two parts, 
both based on the algorithmic level. First, they 
rightly claim, Broadbent totally ignores this level in 
his criticism. (To be fair, McClelland and Rumelhart 
mention 'implementation' and 'predictions' and do not 
specifically discuss 'algorithms' in their original paper 
either.) Second, they disagree with Broadbent's 
assertion that the computational level is the right level 
for theories of cognitive psychology. In fact, they 
claim that while all levels are of interest, it is 
primarily the algorithmic level that is the correct 
province of psychology: 
It is the algorithmic level at which we are 
concerned with such issues as efficiency, 
degradation of performance under noise or other 
adverse conditions, whether a particular 
problem is hard or difficult, which problems 
are solved quickly, which take a long time to 
solve, how information is represented, and so 
on. (Rumelhart and McClelland 1985, p. 194). 
Despite some lingering confusion over the role of the 
actual hardware and the status of connectionist versus 
classical psychology in general (see Chapter VI for more 
on this), I think this is just the right response to 
Broadbent. Furthermore, they go on to extend the 
standard view of levels by suggesting that the 
algorithmic level should itself be subdivided into many 
levels of analysis (p. 196). I will have more to say 
about this in the next section as well as in subsequent 
chapters. 
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This idea of sublevels appears in both of the 'Other 
Notions of Levels' (p. 195) discussed by Rumelhart and 
McClelland, and it is appropriate that they be reviewed 
here. First is the idea of programming language levels. 
PASCAL, for example, is a 'higher level language' than 
VAX assembler code. This, they claim, is what most of 
their critics who cite levels have in mind: 
They only believe the psychological models are 
more simply and easily stated in an equivalent 
higher level language -- so why bother? (p. 
195). 
The problems with this argument, they assert, are 
twofold. One problem is that the relationship between a 
PASCAL program and the assembler program obtained by 
compiling it is a special one; there is no equivalent 
theory compiler in science. The other problem is that, 
while there is an assembler version of every PASCAL 
program, this relationship does not hold in the opposite 
direction; most assembler programs have no equivalent in 
PASCAL. Note, however, that this is not clear in 
general. Any assembler language can be emulated by 
PASCAL. This is yet another illustration of the need 
for precision in discussing levels and strong equivalence 
of algorithms. 
The second notion of sublevels, which McClelland and 
Rumelhart find much more appealing, is that of 
macroscopic theories and microscopic theories. Their 
example is Newtonian mechanics (or the logogen model) as 
the macroscopic theory and quantum field theory (or their 
own distributed model) as the microscopic theory. The 
two theories, in either case, make many of the same 
predictions, but where they diverge, it is the 
microscopic theory that is correct. Macroscopic 
theories can be seen as frequently useful approximations 
to the microscopic theories, the latter of which are (it 
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is implied) more correct. It is this view of levels 
that McClelland and Rumelhart like best. It can be 
summarised as having a number of algorithmic sublevels, 
bounded by the computational and implementational levels. 
A higher sublevel is a 'useful approximation' of a lower 
sublevel, as outlined above. 
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
A NEW PICTURE OF LEVELS OF 
DESCRIPTION OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
In cognitive psychology and in computer science the 
notion of levels is an important one. To speak only in 
terms of one level of components, such as 'memory' or 
'lists' rules out the possibility of further explaining 
how those components are themselves structured and how 
their subcomponents interact. On the other hand, to 
limit explanation or even description to the lowest level 
(if that could be determined), say the level of physics, 
would be to miss out on important generalisations. The 
fundamental importance of levels is as uncontroversial as 
anything in cognitive science. In support of this 
claim, it is one of the few initial points of agreement 
between McClelland and Rumelhart and Broadbent in their 
exchange described in 'Other, Views of Levels'. Still, 
the variety of levels, as we have seen from a few 
representative viewpoints, is wide-ranging, and the 
definitions are less than precise. With some minor 
modifications, this situation can be put right, laying 
the groundwork for more precision and clarity in the 
related concepts of algorithms and abstraction, topics 
which will be the focus of the next chapters. 
What Are Levels Levels of? 
My view is that levels are not 'real' in the way that 
Newell suggests (1982, discussed earlier in this 
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chapter), but rather they are levels of description, 
especially levels of description of complex systems and 
often for the purpose of explanation. This is a weak 
view: support for this minimal claim comes down to 
nothing more than the importance of levels -- they are at 
least levels of description. Brian Smith (1986, p. 42) 
states the difficulty clearly: 
I don't understand what it is to say, for 
example, that a level 'really exists', rather 
than being a point of view. Usually there are 
theoretical frameworks under which we describe 
computational devices; in one sense these are 
viewpoints, but that fact doesn't make the 
objects viewed from those viewpoints any less 
real, or descriptions in the viewpoints' terms 
any less true. 
If there is a claim that levels are more than 
descriptions or points of view, then an argument is 
necessary. Newell in fact claims more, at least for 
levels of computer systems, but his attempts to support 
the claim are insufficient. They hinge on the levels as 
systems realised in 'technologies'. A technology enables 
the realisation of levels in a routine manner in Newell's 
description, allowing for estimates of time and cost. 
In this sense, there is a 'circuit technology' and a 
'programming language technology' (although it should be 
noted that development times and costs of computer 
systems, especially software, are notoriously difficult 
to predict). Let us look more closely at the 
programming language level or symbol level. Given the 
wide range of programming languages, a chess-playing 
computer, for example, might be described at the level of 
machine language, assembler language, LISP, or a high 
level language built on top of LISP. Between any two of 
these sublevels, an interim programming language could be 
devised. Granted, these are sublevels within the 
'single' symbol level, at least at first glance. On 
closer inspection, there is no clear boundary between the 
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symbolic level and the logic level. A description in 
machine language, for example, might be viewed as either. 
Furthermore, the appropriate description of a system in 
some context may cross these technological boundaries, 
giving a high level perspective as background for a more 
detailed, low level description of a particular function. 
The crucial claim that each level must itself be a system 
is not supported separately. My position on this issue 
(developed in the next chapter) is that some levels of 
abstraction may be conveniently characterised as systems 
in the way I think Newell intends, but this is not an 
essential requirement for defining a level. 
Perhaps what Newell has in mind as levels are more like 
the dimensions of Haugeland (1978, also discussed in this 
chapter in 'Other Views of Levels'). It is the subject 
matter that changes between dimensions, from linked lists 
to bit vectors in the case of the symbolic dimension to 
the logic dimension. In the case of computers it is 
tempting to think in terms of only these levels, given 
that there is usually an application, a programming 
language and a particular machine in question. As a 
result, the technology argument may be more appropriate 
for systems which have been engineered in terms of 
particular technologies as opposed to the analysis of 
'systems' such as people, whose design history is not 
entirely clear. But even an engineered system may be 
described in terms other than those of its underlying 
technology if it is seen as a system other than the one 
it was designed to be. 
How Many Levels? 
Assuming our levels are levels of description, how many 
should there be? The answer I shall advocate is 'It 
depends', or 'Arbitrarily many, depending on the context 
and the sort of description or explanation required'. 
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However, there have been several exponents of a 
particular number of distinguished levels, notably three 
levels. The arguments in the section above are related, 
since Newell claimed in defence of the reality of levels 
that new levels could not be sandwiched arbitrarily in 
between existing levels. He proposed five levels or 
perhaps six levels, depending on whether sublevels are 
counted as 'real' levels or not. Just as Newell's 
reasoning for his particular levels was weakened by 
removing constraints from the definition of levels, so 
are the cases for the more common starting point of three 
primary levels. We have seen three advocates of various 
versions of this starting point; let us consider each of 
them in turn. 
To begin with, Marr (1982) 
specifically arguing that 
suggests three levels without 
there should be no more. As 
has been noted, the top level at times appears 
algorithmic. While Marr's levels, or the simplified 
version of them, have been the accepted foundation of 
level talk, recently they have attracted criticism, 
especially regarding the individuation of three levels. 
Sejnowski, Koch and Churchland (1988), for example, take 
what counts as computational or implementation to be 
dependent on where you are in the picture (p. 1305): 
... a model of an intermediate level of 
organization will necessarily simplify with 
respect to the structural properties of lower 
level elements, though it ought to try to 
incorporate as many of that level's functional 
properties as actually figure in the higher 
level's computational tasks. Thus, a model of 
a large network of neurons will necessarily 
simplify the molecular level within a single 
neuron. 
Similarly, Lycan (1987) points out that three levels are 
not enough, even in the better understood context of 
computers. We have already seen an argument by 
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McClelland and Rumelhart that the algorithmic level 
should be divided into sublevels. The main force of all 
of these persuasive counterexamples is as follows. 
First, it is difficult to separate the proposed three 
levels clearly. Second, it is easy to create levels in 
between the given levels. Third, point of view and 
context cannot be ignored. Interestingly, in an early 
paper (Marr and Poggio, 1977) even Marr advocated four 
levels, splitting the physical level into two parts (p. 
470): 
For a system that solves an information- 
processing problem, we may distinguish four 
important levels of description. At the 
lowest, there is basic component and circuit 
analysis -- how do transistors, neurons, 
diodes, and synapses work? The second level 
is that of particular mechanisms: adders, 
multipliers, and memories accessed by address 
or by content. The third level is that of the 
algorithm, and the top level contains the 
theory of the overall computation. 
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Pylyshyn's arguments for three levels are based, he 
claims, on Newell's levels, but Newell himself actually 
advocated five or six levels, at least for computer 
systems. Beyond that, Pylyshyn presents a good case for 
a number of different levels capturing the appropriate 
generalisations, yet says nothing that justifies limiting 
that number to the three he has in mind. Pylyshyn does 
say there are 'at least' three levels and at times seems 
to divide the physical level into separate physics and 
biology levels. Levels are justified by their 
explanatory power, their ability to capture useful 
generalisations. While agreeing that different levels 
are required to capture different generalisations, I 
claim that the appropriate level of description or 
explanation cannot be determined without a particular 
question in a particular context. 
z':5 
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The design and physical stances of Dennett could (and I 
think should) be applied to a variety of levels of 
algorithms. From the design stance, only those aspects 
that were intentionally designed into an algorithm are 
considered. The physical stance covers the remaining 
assumptions that were not explicitly part of the design. 
The intentional stance is represented as 
a rationalistic calculus of interpretation and 
prediction -- an idealizing, abstract, 
instrumentalistic interpretation method that 
has evolved because it works and works because 
we have evolved. (Dennett, 1987, pp 48-49). 
It is what we resort to when attempting to interact in a 
common sense way with complex systems such as chess- 
playing computers or other human beings. Dennett's 
intentional system theory is to justify intentional talk, 
talk about beliefs and desires, and its usefulness in 
everyday life. His arguments for this level do not 
carry over so well to scientific explanation in 
psychology, nor are they meant to do so. 
In conclusion, there is no clear cut case for limiting 
the number of levels for the purposes of cognitive 
psychology, while there is good reason to allow many 
levels based on the context and purpose of description or 
explanation. In accord with Dennett, but with an eye to 
more levels, I seek a formal and systematic foundation in 
part based on Turing's foundation for computability 
theory. 
What is the Relationship,between Levels? 
With the exception of Haugeland's, all the theories of 
levels discussed so far have a common characteristic. 
They all place the proposed levels as variations along a 
single dimension, from less to more abstract. This 
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applies to the more recent multilevel suggestions, as 
well, which I think represent movement in the right 
direction. They add extra steps along the same 
dimension. In addition to retaining that single 
dimension, they do not question the idea of a high 
mathematical or computational level and a low physical 
level, though it is accommodated in different ways. 
McClelland and Rumelhart, to start with, place the 
computational level and the physical level at (positive) 
infinity and negative infinity, if you will, along the 
dimension. They are boundary levels, but they are 
accessible in a way that infinity may not be -- I do not 
care to push this number line analogy too far. In 
between, of primary interest to cognitive psychology, are 
the many algorithmic levels. Sejnowski, Koch and 
Churchland, on the other hand, put the computational and 
implementational levels at one above and one below the 
current algorithmic level, labelling levels only 
relatively. Churchland and Sejnowski (1988) also make 
the important point that all formally described levels 
are independent of the lower levels in that they can be 
implemented in many ways (p.742): 
Computational theory tells us that algorithms 
can be run on different machines and in that 
sense, and that sense alone, the algorithm is 
independent of the implementation. The formal 
point is straightforward: since an algorithm 
is formal, no specific physical parameters (for 
example, vacuum tubes or Cat+) are part of the 
algorithm. 
More will be said about this in the next chapter. 
Returning to the old exclusive-or example, we might have 
the following views of levels. Let us start with the 
simplified Marr version. As shown in Figure 2.3, this 
is just the basic three levels. The computational level 
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COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL (TOP) 
XOR: (0,0) --> 0; (0,1) --> 1; (1,0) --> 1; 
(1,1) --> 0 
ALGORITHMIC LEVEL 
get x; get y; if x = y then z = 0, 
otherwise z = 1 
output(z); end 
IMPLEMENTATION-LEVEL- (BOTTOM, 
L15: cmpl 4(ap), 8(ap); jneq L16; 




is represented in the figure by the exclusive-or mapping. 
This is meant to be the abstract mathematical function, 
saying nothing about how such a function might be carried 
out. At the bottom, some of the VAX assembler version 
has been used to represent the hardware or implementation 
level. In between is a possible algorithm connecting the 
two. 
That there are in fact levels between these is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. Now, on either side of the old 
algorithmic level, between it and the outer levels are 
more (shall we say algorithmic?) levels. Rumelhart and 
McClelland would call these subdivisions of the 
algorithmic level, while Sejnowski et. al. would say that 
either of the three middle levels could be considered 
algorithmic, and the levels above and below each one 
could be considered computational and implementational, 
respectively. 
Furthermore, why should we be content to add levels only 
between the original three? At the bottom, we could go 
beyond the level of the VAX assembler (in Figure 2.5, an 
attempt is made to represent this lower level with 
machine level binary coding), even down to the level of 
molecular interaction. At the top, we could abstract 
from the two-valued function to a nondeterministic one- 
valued relation, by considering only the first input. 
This would give the relation taking 1 to 0, 0 to 0, 1 to 
1 and 0 to 1, as is also illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
I am, as stated earlier, entirely in agreement with a 
many-layered theory of levels of description. At the 
same time, there is still something worrying about the 
picture in Figure 2.5. Each line in the figure could be 
interpreted as an algorithm, but each one could also be 
taken to be a formal, mathematical object in which only 
the extension is significant. This is how algorithms 
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COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL (TOP) 
XOR: (0,0) --> 0; (0,1) -->1; (1,0) --> 1; 
(1,1) --> 0 
get 2 inputs; use equality check: 
x = y => 0; x not = y => 1 
ALGORITHMIC LEVEL 
get x; get y; if x = y then z = 
otherwise z = 1; 
output(z); end 
0, 
get x; get y; if x not in (0,1) or y in (0,1) then 
stop, otherwise 
if x = y then z = 0, 
otherwise z = 1; 
output(z); end 
IMPLEMENTATION-LEVEL (BOTTOM) 
L15: cmpl 4(ap), 8(ap); jneq L16; 




0 --> 0; 0 --> 1; 1 --> 1; 1 --> 0 
COMPUTATIONAL__LEVEL.(TOP) 
XOR: (0,0 --> 0; (0,1) --> 1; (1,0) --> 1; 
(1,1) --> 0 
get 2 inputs; use equality check: 
x = y => 0; x not = y => 1 
ALGORITHMIC LEVEL 
get x; get y; if x = y then z = 0, 
otherwise z = 1; 
output(z); end 
get x; get y; if x not in (0,1) or y in (0,1) then 
stop, otherwise 
if x = y then z= 0, 
otherwise z = 1; 
output(z); end 
IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL (BOTTOM) 
L15: cmpl 4(ap), 8(ap); jneq L16; 





tend to be viewed in proofs of equivalence or 
correctness, for example. Similarly, each line could be 
implemented in a physical device. The algorithm would 
then describe, more or less completely, the workings of 
that device, relative to a certain perspective. In other 
words, there is something very appealing in the three 
(simplified) levels of Marr, and yet the near-continuum 
of algorithms along a dimension (as might be developed 
along the lines of Figure 2.5) should not be thrown away. 
In Figure 2.6, I have tried to retain, but at the same 
time to separate, at least two senses of 'abstraction' 
whose conflation has contributed to the confusion of 
levels. Along one dimension, top to bottom, is 
abstraction in terms of concreteness. These levels are 
close to those of the simplified Marr view, and they are 
represented by planes in the figure. The second sort of 
abstraction has to do with the amount of detail. On the 
algorithmic plane, therefore, I have indicated some of 
the continuum of levels from the earlier figures. In 
terms of this picture, we can take 'abstraction' to mean 
any of three types of moves. It can mean a move from 
one plane up to a higher plane, or it can be a move from 
one level on a particular plane to a less detailed level 
on the same plane. In addition, it can be a combined 
move to less detail on a plane and then up to a higher 
plane (or up to a higher plane first, and then to less 
detail on that plane). There need not be just a single 
path in any of these directions. From a particular 
starting point, such as 'get x; get y; etc.', abstraction 
in either of the two basic senses can take any of a large 
number of possible directions. Similarly, details of an 
algorithm can be added in many different ways, each of 
which can be implemented in many sorts of hardware. I 
will try to reserve 'implementation' primarily for 
implementation with respect to detail and use 










device. The possible interrelationships of levels and 
the clarification of 'algorithm' and 'abstraction' will 
be further explored in the next chapter. 
It may be recalled that Haugeland was the exception to 
the earlier views of levels along a single dimension. 
His two-dimensional view (my use of dimension should not 
be confused with Haugeland's use of the word to label one 
particular direction) no doubt influenced my two- 
dimensional formulation indirectly, but it is somewhat 
different. While both versions share the idea of a 
change in level as a variation in the amount of detail, 
they diverge in what is shown as a change in the other 
direction. This 'other direction' is referred to by 
Haugeland as a change in dimension, and it can be seen as 
a change in subject matter, from chess to lists, for 
example (see Figure 2.2). The concreteness aspect of 
abstraction is not so apparent: Chess talk might be 
viewed as less concrete than list talk to some, but this 
is debatable. Further, Haugeland takes pains to point 
out that a level on one dimension cannot be compared 
(said to be higher or lower than) a level on another 
dimension. In the view presented in Figure 2.6 above, 
on the other hand, there is a corresponding mathematical 
level and concrete realisation for each individual 
algorithmic level, so a means of comparison across levels 
is possible, for some algorithms at least. Haugeland's 
change in subject is important to capture as well, and I 
think it can be handled, but that is left for Chapter 
III. 
Before going on to the important concepts of algorithms 
and abstraction, terms which have been used rather 
loosely up to this point, let us examine the new picture 
of levels for the sake of clarity. This should provide 
a means of checking that some of the pitfalls of earlier 
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definitions of levels are avoided, as well as giving a 
firm basis from which to proceed. 
One way to describe the theory of levels I am advocating 
is to take an overview of the structure. At first 
glance it has a lot in common with the simplified Marr 
levels. There are three levels of concreteness. The 
highest, or least concrete level, is the level of 
mathematical functions or, to be more general, it would 
be better to say mathematical relations. These may be 
written in any number of ways. (((0,0), 0), ((0,1), 1), 
((1,0), 0), ((1,1), 0)) or 'exclusive-or' or 'Z :_ (x1y) 
& not (x & y)' are all possibilities for the usual 
example, because what is important is the mathematical 
relationship between input and output, not the 
representation and not how one might get from the input 
to the output. This level is independent of space and 
time, dealing as it does with abstract, mathematical 
relationships. It can be contrasted to the concrete 
physical level and the relative space and time of the 
algorithmic level. 
Jumping down to the bottom level, we get to the concrete 
world of both absolute space and absolute time, the 
physical level. At this level we have real objects, 
such as the VAX which may be described at the highest 
level as calculating the mathematical function exclusive- 
or, among its many and varied possible descriptions. 
There is not really anything called a 'physical 
description', only physical objects themselves. Any 
description of them will be abstracted from some aspects 
of their physical extension. In contrast, the 
mathematical and algorithmic levels of description are, 
as the name implies, descriptive. There is no sense of 
more or less detailed physical systems. 
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The middle level, or algorithmic level, is in between the 
other two in terms of concreteness. It may be said to 
deal with the space and time taken up by mathematical 
functions realised in physical systems, but only at a 
level removed from the physical world. For example, a 
von Neumann algorithm to put a number of items in order 
can be said to operate in linear time if the number of 
operations it performs is proportional to the number of 
input items. It might also be said to require a certain 
amount of storage, which can again be dependent on the 
number of input items. These time and space 
measurements are abstractions, however, and do not give 
the exact amount of time or space involved in any 
particular realisation, although they provide a measure 
that can be used across certain classes of realisations 
(such as von Neumann machines) with suitable caution. 
The idea of algorithm, as noted, is left vague here, but 
it is intended to include algorithms and representations 
without distinction (insofar as it is possible) between 
process and data. Intuitions regarding algorithms, if 
they have not caused major difficulties so far, should 
suffice for now. A LISP program or the various symbol 
levels would be one way of viewing algorithms until we 
get to Chapter III. 
On the algorithmic plane by itself, different levels of 
abstraction are distinguished in terms of detail rather 
than in terms of concreteness. In Figure 2.6, then, a 
detailed description of VAX assembler code adds more 
detail to an explanation of how a program in a higher 
level language calculates exclusive-or. The linear path 
from less to more detail in the illustration may be 
misleading; detail can be added in many possible ways. 
Another way of looking at the proposed theory of levels 
is from the vantage point of a particular algorithm. In 







algorithm in question. It can be seen as a mathematical 
relation, by moving upward to a more abstract (with 
respect to concreteness) plane. Alternatively, it can 
be realised in arbitrarily many ways by moving down to 
the physical plane. On the algorithmic plane, it can 
also be further defined or explained with the addition of 
detail in an arbitrarily large number of ways. It can 
be a starting point for abstraction, as well, giving less 
specific algorithms on a higher level, a level of less 
detail. 
With figures such as Figures 2.5 and 2.6, there is the 
danger that Rumelhart and McClelland (1985) warned 
against, the danger of incorporating the peculiar 
relationships between levels of programs into more 
general levels of description and explanation of complex 
systems. These problems will be addressed in the 
process of developing a more precise definition of 
.algorithms, a process which includes a closer look at the 
relationship between software and hardware. 
65 
CHAPTER I I I 
ALGORITHMS 
THE IMPORTANCE,OF ALGORITHMS 
In Computation and, .Cognition (Pylyshyn, 1984), Zenon 
Pylyshyn puts forward his idea-of algorithms. He writes 
eloquently on behalf of the importance of getting clear 
about algorithms and the importance of using 
computational models in psychology in a principled way. 
In fact the entire book can be taken as an argument 
supporting these two points. He asserts, as an example, 
on page 85 that 
Psychologists pursue the goal of explanation, 
which means that, although we pursue the 
constructivist program, we must make sure our 
use of computer models is principled. This, 
in turn, means that stringent constraints must 
be applied to the theory construction task to 
ensure that the principles are separated from 
the ad hoc tailoring of the systems to make 
them fit the data. 
At the same time, he notes 
... little progress has been made in formally 
defining the algorithmic equivalence of 
programs. No one has yet produced a natural, 
uniform way of distinguishing essential from 
nonessential properties in programs that 
applies over a variety of domains and 
languages. (p. 90) 
In the terms of the new picture of levels put forward in 
the last chapter, complex physical systems such as people 
and machines can be described and explained at many 
different algorithmic and mathematical levels. 
Cognitive psychologists are potentially interested in any 
of these levels. The same is true of any other 'reverse 
engineering' enterprise. Imagine the task of a repairer 
of software who must determine the organisation of a 
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program written by someone else in order to fix or update 
it. It may be helpful to know the original purpose of 
the program. To take a geometric example, perhaps at 
the mathematical level the program can be described as 
calculating the direction from one point in space to 
another point in space, given two points in a plane as 
input. The various levels of description required 
beyond this are dependent on the symptoms of the problem 
(maybe the program fails if two identical points are 
given as input), the requirements for the change (the 
function might have to be extended to handle points in 
three or more dimensions, rather than just a plane) and 
on the internal structure of the program itself. If the 
problem seems to be that the program does not properly 
respond in the case of two identical input points, the 
algorithm may not have to be understood as thoroughly (or 
rather, at such a detailed level) if this case is treated 
separately at the beginning of the program. 
So far, the term 'algorithm' has been used practically 
synonymously with 'program', based on one way of using it 
in computer science, but mainly as a device to get off 
the ground. The new ways of talking about levels and 
algorithms that I am advocating are interdependent, so 
some simplifications are required in order to begin at 
all. 
This traditional way of using 'algorithm' is perfectly 
adequate for the modifier of software and for many other 
purposes. Precise definitions of this type are given in 
the next section. If, however, the term is used in 
psychology to support mental state talk, more care is 
needed. Much of cognitive science and cognitive 
psychology in recent years has been based on an analogy 
with computer systems (without saying which came first). 
In attempts to explicate the mental as opposed to the 
physical in the face of prevailing materialism, the 
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distinction between software and hardware has been a 
tempting toehold. 
Because the computer system case is better understood and 
more ethical to poke and prod, and also because the 
languages of computer science and of cognitive science 
are so intertwined, there is a definite computational 
bias in the approach adopted here. At the same time, 
the motivation comes from trying to make sense of talk 
about mental states in cognitive science. In 
computational terms, that could be translated into trying 
to make sense of 'software states'. 
What could a software state be? A first response might 
be the program line or statement that is currently being 
executed. But which program, the high level LISP 
version or the compiled assembler version, to take but 
two possibilities? What if the original LISP code is 
lost forever? Does the computer still move through 
'software states' defined by it? What if the same steps 
are hardwired (built into the hardware) of another 
machine modelled on the first, so that it arguably goes 
through the same steps, but there are no programmed 
instructions located in a program memory? 
In 'Minds and Machines' (Putnam, 1960), Hilary Putnam 
sets out an analogy 
between logical states of a Turing machine and 
mental states of a human being, on the one 
hand, and structural states of a Turing machine 
and physical states of a human being, on the 
other (p. 373 in Putnam, 1975), 
whereby rational thought might be understood in part by 
understanding the '"program" which determines which 
states follow which.' In fact at various times, he 
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argued for, in his own words (1973, p. 210 in the version 
in Haugeland, 1981), 
the hypothesis that (1) a whole human being is 
a Turing machine, and (2) that psychological 
states of a human being are Turing machine 
states or disjunctions of Turing machine 
states. 
He reached the conclusion that 'psychological states are 
not machine states nor are they disjunctions of machine 
states.' (p. 216). Rather than looking at the proper 
relationship of various levels of abstraction, he moves 
toward abandoning algorithmic psychology altogether, 
based on arguments for the autonomy of psychology much 
like those presented later by Pylyshyn (1984), among 
others. 
The answer that I shall be advocating is that there are 
only states of physical machines, but that these can be 
described at many levels (algorithmic and mathematical). 
Algorithms are defined in terms of the states (also at 
many levels) through which they pass. In some cases 
these algorithmic descriptions can be abbreviated by 
program descriptions. Rather than a sharp distinction 
between physical states and mental states, there is a 
near-continuum of system state descriptions. At the 
more detailed end of the spectrum, these look more like 
what are usually called physical states. At the less 
detailed end, they are more like mental states. Higher 
level descriptions are more or less correct, depending on 
how they are aligned with lower level, more detailed 
descriptions. In this framework, the relation between 
software and hardware can be made clear. Software, a 
LISP program say, is a design or possibly a theory, 
depending on one's point of view, about how a physical 
system carries out a function. More accurately, at the 
abstract mathematical level it is a predictive design or 
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theory about what the system carries out. It may or may 
not be an algorithmic theory, specifying something about 
how the final state is reached, i.e. about what states 
are passed through in the interim. Whether software is 
an abbreviation of an algorithm of an actual system or 
not depends on the complexity of the particular compiler, 
the nature of the machine and the level of algorithm in 
question. 
This is merely an introduction to provide a flavour and a 
context for the following discussion of algorithms. It 
will be clarified and expanded in what follows. A 
consideration of some implications of this approach is 
taken up in Chapters V and VI. 
DEFINITIONS-OF ALGORITHMS 
The definition of an algorithm is typically given as a 
finite sequence of instructions that when followed will 
terminate after a finite number of steps. In addition 
to the requirement of finiteness, in both of these ways, 
there is a requirement of definiteness. The 
instructions must be stated precisely, even formally. 
Davis (1958, p. xv) is 
concerned with the problem of the existence of 
algorithms or effective computational 
procedures for solving various problems. What 
we have in mind are sets of instructions that 
provide mechanical procedures by which the 
answer to any one of a class of questions can 
be obtained. Such instructions are to be 
conceived of as requiring no 'creative' thought 
in their execution. In principle, it is 
always possible to construct a machine for 
carrying out such a set of instructions or to 
prepare a program by means of which a given 
large-scale digital computer will be enabled to 
carry them out. 
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While algorithms defined in this way may not be tied to 
a particular language, in a discussion of Church's thesis 
in Davis and Weyuker (1983, p. 54), the following 
explicit statement is made (with emphasis added): 
But, since the word 'al,gorithm' has no general 
definition separated from a particular 
language, Church's thesis cannot be proved as a 
mathematical theorem. 
More or less precise versions of this type of definition 
are given to beginning computer science students. 
Brookshear (1988, an introductory textbook), for example, 
refers informally to an algorithm as a 'step-by-step 
process' and then states (p. 130) 'Technically speaking, 
computer science defines the term algorithm as a finite 
sequence of unambiguous, executable steps that will 
ultimately terminate if followed.' 
On the other hand, Enderton (1972), who is concerned with 
as precise and mathematically correct formulation as 
possible, settles for something less than a particular 
formal language to pin down his definition of algorithms 
or, as he calls them, effective procedures. He gives the 
issue a more thorough treatment than most, the bulk of 
which is included in the following (p. 60): 
By an effective procedure we mean one meeting 
the following conditions: 
1. There must be exact instructions, finitely 
long, explaining how to execute the 
procedure. These instructions should 
demand no cleverness on the part of the 
person (or machine) following them. The 
idea is that your secretary (who knows no 
mathematics) or your computing machine 
(which does not think at all) should be 
able to execute the procedure by 
mechanically following the instructions. 
2. The procedure must avoid random devices 
(such as the flipping of a coin), or any 
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such device which can, in practice, only 
be approximated. 
On page 61, he continues, 
Of course the above description can hardly be 
considered a precise definition of the word 
'effective'. And, in fact, that word will be 
used only in an informal intuitive way 
throughout this book ... But as long as we 
restrict ourselves to positive assertions that 
there does exist an effective procedure of a 
certain sort, the intuitive approach suffices. 
We simply display the procedure, show that it 
works, and people will agree that it is 
effective. (But this relies on the empirical 
fact that procedures which appear effective to 
one mathematician also appear so to others.) 
While no particular language is invoked by this 
definition, any effective procedure must be written down 
somehow. For Enderton, this can be mathematical English 
as in the following example of a step he uses in an 
algorithmic version of a proof of the unique readability 
theorem for propositional logic (p. 41): 
1. If all minimal vertices have sentence 
symbols, then the procedure is completed. 
Otherwise, select a minimum vertex which 
has an expression which is not a sentence 
symbol. 
It is acceptable because it is underwritten by Turing 
machine computability, a subject to which I shall return. 
Turing wanted to avoid just such informal natural 
language descriptions. 
It is somewhat surprising that some computer science 
textbooks (e.g., Tremblay and Sorenson, 1984, or Wirth, 
1976) do not explicitly define the term 'algorithm' at 
all, but leap in with examples and contextual usage. On 
the other hand, given their goals of teaching the 
construction of programs in particular languages or 
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particular sorts of languages, and given that people do 
not learn best by being given only a set of formal 
definitions, the lack of explicit definitions may be 
understandable. The most precise definitions in basic 
texts, as mentioned above, emphasise finiteness and 
definiteness. Since these all seem to draw on the 
detailed formulation of Knuth (1973, pp. 4-6), I include 
his definition here, at the risk of belabouring the 
point. Notice that he adds items about input and output 
and distinguishes effectiveness from definiteness. 
(Ellipses are used to omit some references to the example 
of Euclid's algorithm, called Algorithm E by Knuth). 
1) Finiteness. An algorithm must always 
terminate after a finite number of steps 
... (A procedure which has all the 
characteristics of an algorithm except 
that it possibly lacks finiteness may be 
called a 'computational method'...) 
2) Definiteness. Each step of an algorithm 
must be precisely defined; the actions to 
be carried out must be rigorously and 
unambiguously specified for each case. 
The algorithms of this book will hopefully 
meet this criterion, but since they are 
specified in the English language, there 
is a possibility the reader might not 
understand exactly what the author 
intended. To get around this difficulty, 
formally defined programming languages or 
computer languages are designed for 
specifying algorithms, in which every 
statement has a very definite meaning ... 
An expression of a computational method in 
a computer language is called a program 
3) Input. An algorithm has zero or more 
inputs, i.e., quantities which have a 
specified relation to the outputs... 
4) Output. An algorithm has one or more 
outputs, i.e., quantities which have a 
specified relation to the inputs... 
5) Effectiveness. An algorithm is also 
generally expected to be effective. This 
means that all of the operations to be 
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performed in the algorithms must be 
sufficiently basic that they can in 
principle be done exactly and in a finite 
length of time by a man using a pencil and 
paper. Algorithm E uses only the 
operations of dividing one positive 
integer by another, testing if an integer 
is zero, and setting the value of one 
variable equal to the value of another. 
These operations are effective, because 
integers can be represented on paper in a 
finite manner and there is at least one 
method (the 'division algorithm') for 
dividing one by another. But the same 
operations would not be effective if the 
values involved were arbitrary real 
numbers specified by infinite decimal 
expansion, nor if the values were the 
lengths of physical line segmehts, which 
cannot be specified exactly... 
All this leaves us with the impression that algorithms 
are a lot like programs, being finite and in some 
executable language, if not a particular language. On 
the other hand, not all programs are algorithms, because 
a program may not halt; it may consist of instructions 
to loop forever, or even one such instruction, such as 
100 GO TO 100 
or 
DO WHILE (TRUE); 
In practice, however, the term 'algorithm' is used more 
loosely, referring for example to 'the heap sort 
algorithm', without specifying a language but implicitly 
making some assumptions about the language or structure 
of the underlying architecture of the intended real or 
ideal machine, described at a certain level. These 
assumptions will be examined more closely in the next 
section, 'Comparison of Algorithms'. This leads to 
several questions if one is trying to be clear about 
algorithms. Are, for example, two algorithms that 
implement the heap sort in two different languages the 
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same algorithm or different ones? In the terminology of 
Chapter II, I propose that they are likely to be 
different at the level of the programming languages, but 
they should be the same at a higher, less detailed 
algorithmic level. 
While claiming that he uses the term 'in approximately 
its standard computer-science sense' (1984, p. 88, note 
1), Pylyshyn puts forward a rather different definition 
of algorithm than those given above. In particular, he 
removes the algorithm from association with a language or 
a program. I would not argue 
the less formal way in which the 
science, such as in the example 
not aware of any attempt to 
precisely. Niklaus Wirth (1976) 
authors whose computer science 
stating (on p. xii) that 
that it is very far from 
term is used in computer 
of 'heap sort', but 
define this sense 
I am 
very 
comes the closest of the 
texts I have surveyed, 
Programs, after all, are concrete formulations 
of abstract algorithms based on particular 
representations and structures of data. 
Later (p. xiv), however, he goes on to say that 
Although the mere presentation of an 
algorithm's principle and its mathematical 
analysis may he stimulating and challenging to 
the academic mind, it seems dishonest to the 
engineering practitioner. I have therefore 
strictly adhered to the rule of presenting the 
final programs in a language in which they can 
actually be run on a computer, 
recognising that 'the devil hides in the details' (same 
page). 
Another aspect of defining algorithms that must be 
addressed for the sake of clarity and completeness shows 
up in the title of Wirth's book: Algorithms +..Data 
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Structures = Programs. So far, especially as they have 
been defined in terms of programming languages, no 
distinction has been made between algorithms and data 
structures, or, as is implied, between process and 
representation. Despite the succinct message of the 
title, Wirth (pp. xi-xiii) recognises that things are not 
so simple. Referring to Hoare (1972), he remarks that 
this contribution 
made clear that decisions about structuring 
data cannot be made without knowledge of the 
algorithm applied to the data and that, vice 
versa, the structure and choice of algorithms 
often strongly depend on the structure of the 
underlying data. In short, the subjects of 
program composition and data structures are 
inseparably intertwined. 
At the same time, he defends his emphasis on data 
structures with the 'intuitive feeling' that objects come 
first, along with a pragmatic assumption that his readers 
have some programming experience. 
Finally, here is how Pylyshyn defines algorithms. In 
the footnote cited earlier, he rightly points out that he 
is using the term in a more general sense than that of 
Newell and Simon (1972), in which they oppose it to 
'heuristic'. We can consider algorithms to be finite 
and definite (though he does not use these exact words, 
but rather 'complete and deterministic'), even if they 
are carrying out a heuristic, or incomplete rule-of-thumb 
approach to solving a problem. He goes on, however, to 
outline a picture that contrasts algorithms as types to 
programs as tokens: 
Thus we can have different programs for the 
same algorithm (one might be in FORTRAN, 
another in PASCAL, and still another in LISP). 
Because algorithm is a more abstract notion 
than program, in a variety of ways, it is 
possible as well to have different programs in 
the same language for a particular algorithm 
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. differing in inessential respects (1984, p. 
89). 
There are a lot of difficulties here, some of which we 
have begun to address in the last chapter. While this 
section is meant mainly to present definitions of 
algorithms, let me point out two of the problems which 
will be addressed more completely later on. One is this 
use of abstraction and the implicit assumption that there 
is a level of algorithms above (or at least distinct 
from) the level of programs. At this point, Pylyshyn 
seems to be advocating a view of algorithms as the medium 
of the semantic level, perhaps, with programs the medium 
of the symbolic level. This would be quite a radical 
view of algorithms. Or is the algorithmic level 
supposed to be made up of these abstract algorithms? 
This is at odds with Newell's symbolic or program level 
on which Pylyshyn allegedly draws. The other immediate 
problem has to do with 'essential and inessential' 
differences in algorithms. This does affect Pylyshyn, 
because separating out the essence of an algorithm is one 
of his primary concerns. 
In case there is any doubt that this is the correct 
interpretation of Pylyshyn, he states it quite explicitly 
(pp. 89-90): 
I suggest that the appropriate level of 
comparison [between computer models and 
psychological theories] corresponds roughly to 
the intuitive notion of the algorithm. An 
algorithm is related to a program approximately 
as a proposition is related to a sentence. 
The two are in a type-token relation. There 
are at least as many ways of expressing a 
proposition by some sentence -- or an algorithm 
by some program -- as there are different 
languages. 
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As propositions can in theory be expressed using formal 
languages, so too for algorithms. On the same page, 
then, Pylyshyn goes on to say, 
To specify what proposition or algorithm we 
have in mind, however, requires use of 
something like a canonical notation. Thus a 
proposition is identified with a sentence in 
some formal language (for example, predicate 
calculus) whereas an algorithm is identified 
with a program in some, canonical programming 
language. (The emphasis is mine.) 
After diverging from the standard definition of algorithm 
by removing the association with a particular language, 
Pylyshyn has now brought back not only a language but the 
language, at least for psychological theorising. His 
position is that 
an appropriate canonical language is crucial to 
the expression of mental processes at the 
required level of specificity. (p. 90) 
This can be contrasted with the view advocated in this 
thesis, the view that the level of detail in which an 
algorithm is expressed, indeed what is essential about it 
and what is inessential, is relative to the question 
being asked and the context in which it is asked. The 
context must be allowed to be more precise than just 
cognitive psychology in general. 
COMPARISON OF ALGORITHMS 
One important reason for requiring an exact definition of 
algorithms is that such a definition can serve as a first 
step toward defining the equality of two algorithms or 
otherwise making comparisons between them. Of course, 
at the mathematical level, we already have a notion of 
equivalence (mathematical equivalence of functions and 
relations), but for any more detailed comparison than 
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that, something else is needed. Pylyshyn (1984) is 
after the same thing, and I have already drawn on his 
characterisation of this as 'strong equivalence'. 
The first theoretical computer science approach that 
comes to mind is likely to be the theory of complexity of 
algorithms or theory of computation. This includes the 
'big 0' notation, as used in comparison of searching and 
sorting algorithms, paradigmatically. For example, a 
sequential search requires 0(n), read 'on the order of 
n', time for searching through n unordered items. A 
sequential search is meant to be an algorithm on a 
standard von Neumann computer for finding a particular 
item in a list of like items, such as a personnel record 
for Jones in a list of personnel records. The time it 
takes to find a particular record on average is dependent 
on n, where n is the total number of records. More 
precisely, the average time to find a record would be the 
time it takes for n/2 comparisons (examining a record to 
find out if it is the record for Jones), plus some 
approximately constant overhead. Time varies propor- 
tionally to n, so typically 0(n) would be used rather 
than 0(n/2) in this case. Space as well as time can be 
measured in this manner. In the example of Jones and 
personnel records, the space requirements are also 
proportional to n, being n times the storage required for 
one record, plus some constant amount as before. 
While these measures do not spell out algorithms in terms 
of a language for a canonical machine, they depend more 
or less explicitly on the relationship of standard 
programming languages to Turing machines. Here I am 
using Turing machine to mean the abstract ideal machine, 
as it will be defined shortly, and also the intuitive 
ideal machine defined in terms of tapes and operations 
rather than sets of quadruples. (This can be contrasted 
to a usage I have come across in the psychological 
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literature which is closer to my use of von Neumann 
machines, as in 'a VAX is a von Neumann machine', meaning 
a traditional sequential computer or one with minor 
variations.) In order to justify the assertion with 
which this paragraph opens, let us take a closer look at 
a formal definition of polynomial-time decidability from 
Davis and Weyuker (1983). This is a key concept in 
defining the intractability of NP-complete problems, such 
as the travelling salesman problem. Starting with the 
definition, then, as given on page 336, we can work 
backwards to establish the sort of comparison of 
algorithms that the theory of computation gives us. The 
definition is as follows: 
Definition. A language L on an alphabet A is 
said to be polynomial-time decidable if there 
is a Turing machine M which accepts L, and a 
polynomial p(n), such that the number of steps 
in an accepting computation by M with input 
x i p(;x;). When the alphabet is understood, 
we write P for the class of polynomial-time 
decidable languages. 
Davis and Weyuker give this formulation of a Turing 
machine (pp. 97-98): 
... we imagine a device 
internal states. The 
particular instant, 
linear tape ... The 
internal state with 





scanning a square on a 
combination of the current 
the symbol on the square 
then supposed to determine 
the next 'action' of the device. As suggested 
by Turing's analysis of the computation process 
we can take the next action to be either 
'printing' a symbol on the scanned square, or 
moving one 
Finally, the 
square to the right or left. 
device must be permitted to enter 
t t a new s a e. 
We use the symbols q1, q2, q3, ... to represent 
states and we write s0, sl, s2, ... to 
represent symbols which can appear on the tape, 
where as usual sO = B is the 'blank' . By a 
quadruple we mean an expression of one of the 
following forms consisting of four symbols: 
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(1) qi sj sk ql, 
(2) qi sj R ql, 
(3) qi sj L ql 
We intend a quadruple of type (1) to signify 
that in state qi scanning symbol sj, the device 
will print sk and go into state ql. 
Similarly, a quadruple of type (2) signifies 
that in state qi scanning sj the device will 
move one square to the right and then go into 
state ql. Finally a quadruple of type (3) is 
like one of type (2) except that the motion is 
to the left. 
We now define a Turing machine to be a finite 
set of quadruples, no two of which begin with 
the same pair qi sj ... 
The alphabet of a given Turing machine M 
consists of all the symbols si which occur in 
quadruples of M except s0. 
We stipulate that a Turing machine always 
begins in state q1. Moreover, a Turing 
machine will halt if it is in state qi scanning 
sj and there is_ _no _quadruple of__, the machine 
which beg_ns_ _g i__ __sj. With these 
understandings, and using the same conventions 
concerning input and output that were employed 
in connection with Post-Turing programs, it 
should be clear what it means to say that some 
given Turing machine M computes a partial 
function f on A* for a given alphabet A. 
I have gone through these definitions in such 
excruciating detail in order to provide one exact 
definition of Turing machines and also to make clear just 
how detailed such a formulation must be for the formal 
theory of computation, in contrast to the looseness with 
which 'Turing machine' is frequently used. At the same 
time, it should be clear that the usual comparisons of 
algorithms or programs using terms such as 'O(n)' or 
'polynomial time' are built upon the foundation of such 
an ideal mathematically defined machine. That these 
comparisons turn out to be useful in the practical 
implications for real programs is a testimony to the 
intimate relationship between current real computers and 
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the ideal Turing machine. In fact, as we have seen, the 
definition of a Turing machine is that of a completely 
formal mathematical object -- a set of quadruples; the 
intuitive machine, with its tape and scanner, provides a 
more accessible view of the mathematical object that 
somehow helps us to understand it. 
In practice, as noted earlier, complexity times are often 
given in terms of operations on a different canonical 
machine: a register or von Neumann machine. Pylyshyn 
points out that table lookups with hash coding (a search 
method whose main virtue is constant time on a von 
Neumann machine) are 0(n x n) on a Turing machine. The 
notion of strong equivalence of algorithms that he 
develops is based on complexity profiles, so according to 
the theory he outlines hashing cannot be implemented on a 
Turing machine! 
Automata theory or theory of computation is related to 
formal semantics in that both provide a mathematical 
basis for reasoning about programs. Formal semantics 
approaches have been developed in order to clarify and 
solidify the foundations of programming languages; 
consequently they include a means of translating from a 
(usually high level) programming language into the 
'semantic' domain of abstract mathematical entities or 
into a canonical ideal machine language. Following 
Pylyshyn's example, and drawing on Stoy (1977) and Gordon 
(1979), denotational and operational semantics will be 
considered in turn. Denotational semantics and to a 
certain extent operational semantics as well, are aimed 
at precise, machine independent concepts to support 
reasoning about programs. This reasoning is meant to be 
construed in a weak sense, as the concerns are with 
proving program correctness (equivalence of a program 
with a mathematical formulation of the function it is 
supposed to carry out) or program equivalence (whether or 
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not two different programs in the same or different 
languages compute the same mathematical function). 
While Pylyshyn sees promise in denotational semantics for 
separating out the essential from the inessential, 
defining a stronger sort of equivalence of algorithms, 
this approach really is only concerned with weak 
mathematical equivalences. Stoy (pp. 12-13) gives the 
following description: 
We give 'semantic valuation functions', which 
map syntactic constraints in the program to the 
abstract values (numbers, truth values, 
functions, etc.) which they denote. These 
valuation functions are usually recursively 
defined: the value denoted by a construct is 
specified in terms of the values denoted by its 
syntactic subcomponents, and it is this 
emphasis on the values denoted by all these 
constructs that gives the approach its name. 
There may or may not be an obvious way of 
working out the results of these functions in 
any particular case: that is, the defining 
equations may or may not suggest a way of 
implementing the language. 
All that is canonical is the mathematical translation 
function from a language to mathematical objects. 
Pylyshyn claims this says something about the 
'appropriate level or grain of comparison' (1984, p. 91) 
of algorithms, but it is a side effect of the method that 
this level or grain is very close to the syntax of the 
(usually high level) language being investigated, if 
indeed the equations are taken as more than abstract 
objects. 
While recognising that equating denotational semantics 
with high level language design and analysis on the one 
hand, and equating operational semantics with 
implementation concerns, on the other, is overly 
simplistic, Stoy himself succumbs to the confusion. He 
states (p. 24) that 
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Operational definitions ... contain extra 
implementation details which, unless they are 
explicitly relevant to a particular problem, 
serve merely to complicate further an area 
which is already complex. 
But this is not necessarily true because it is possible 
(as indicated in the previous chapter) to define 
algorithms at any level of detail. Any such algorithm 
can be seen as running on some ideal machine. This 
concept of extending the range of what is usually meant 
by ideal machine will be elaborated in the later sections 
of this chapter and formalised in Chapter V. 
Perhaps operational semantics are more appropriate for 
our purpose of explicating algorithms and algorithmic 
equivalence. In the world of theoretical computer 
science, one gets the idea that operational semantics is 
the old-fashioned way of looking at programs. Using 
such a method, a language is given its formal semantics 
by providing a translation to a (typically) lower level 
ideal machine language, likely to be the standard machine 
code for a particular machine, or perhaps something more 
portable. (These days it would probably be 'C'). PL/1 
and ALGOL 68 were defined in this way. Stoy (p. 19) 
remarks on the operational approach 
that the method tends to be regarded as one 
which gives the result only of specific 
computations. Starting with some particular 
program, and some particular input data one may 
'crank the handle' of the defined abstract 
machine and obtain the particular final result. 
This job is, however, precisely what the 
computer is for. It is much more useful for 
us to be able to consider the class of all the 
computations that can possibly be evoked by the 
program, or even by a class of programs. When 
we do this, we are in effect considering the 
function that the program and its 
implementation together define. We are, in 
fact, moving towards a function approach. 
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For the purposes of cognitive science, however, insofar 
as the purposes include describing and explaining at 
various levels the activities and states of a complex 
system, it is inadvisable to stray too far from the 
actual system in question. Of course, as we have seen, 
the abstract mathematical approach can tell us something, 
but only a limited amount. Operational semantics, 
therefore, seems closer to what we need, at least as the 
basis for equivalence of states and perhaps algorithms. 
(At the same time there is nothing preventing expressing 
generalisations in mathematical functional terms where 
appropriate.) Still, even operational semantics is too 
weak! While Pylyshyn sees in it a means of making 
stronger comparisons than strictly mathematical ones, the 
comparisons are only weak mathematical ones, unless the 
states of the canonical machine are abstractions (in a 
precise sense that will be elaborated in the next 
sections) of the system that is being described. While 
operational semantics distinguishes between, for example, 
an algorithm that computes 2x by adding x to itself and 
one that computes 2x by calculating x + x + 7 - 7, 
comparisons can only be made at the one level defined by 
computations for the one canonical machine. These weak 
comparisons are perfectly suited to the computational 
theoretical goals of correctness and weak equivalence 
proofs, and this is confirmed by the sensible shift to 
the less operational versions of programming language 
semantics. 
The feature of having a single ideal machine or canonical 
form in terms of which to compare algorithms is common to 
all the approaches surveyed here. This is a severe 
drawback for the purposes of comparing algorithmic 
descriptions of complex systems, because it forces all 
comparisons to be made at a single level of detail. 
Except in circumstances where both algorithms can be 
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seen at an appropriate level as running on the one 
canonical machine, one or both of the 
algorithms/descriptions must be distorted to fit the 
canonical form. Of course, as has been noted again and 
again, this is not a problem for the original purposes 
for which these techniques were developed, i.e. 
complexity and tractability of algorithms on von Neumann 
machines or proofs of correctness or mathematical 
equivalence of programs and functions. 
A NEW DEFINITION OF,ALGORITHMS 
First, a comment about terminology is in order. I have 
chosen to continue to use the term 'algorithm', because I 
think the new definition about to be presented captures 
the spirit with which the term is currently used 
throughout much of cognitive psychology and even computer 
science. From now on this usage shall be distinguished 
from the definitions given earlier of algorithms as 
effective procedures or programs in some particular 
language. These shall hereafter be called by their more 
narrowly defined names: effective procedures or 
programs, whichever is appropriate. 
For an example, let us return to the exclusive-or 
function. In particular, to be clear, consider the 
following effective procedure in PASCAL: 
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PROGRAM XOR; 










The new definitions 
initially in terms 
and concepts will be presented 
of this example and, where 
appropriate, contrasted to 
theory. 
concepts from computational 
One of the most basic concepts is the state of 
an ideal machine. To convey the idea, the example 
program might describe a machine that starts off in the 




NEXT INSTRUCTION: READLN(X); 
In front of the colons are labels; values follow the 
colons. The value 'U' stands for undefined. I am 
using it here as a shorthand to represent what may either 
be a specific value which represents an undefined value 
(such as -11111111) or an arbitrary value. Davis and 
Weyuker (p. 23) define a slightly different state of a 
program P, relying on their rigorously defined languages, 
as 
a list of equations of the form V = m, where V 
is a variable and m is a number, including 
exactly one equation for each variable that 
occurs in P. 
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This definition differs from the one I want to give, and 
it is instructive to emphasise the differences. 
Primarily, Davis and Weyuker's state includes exactly 
those variables and values mentioned in the program, no 
more and no less. A state is therefore tied to a 
particular program. This is clear in their terminology, 
for they say 'state of a program P' or 'state of P'. On 
the other hand, one of my main objectives is to define a 
state independent of a particular program. It is best 
thought of as the state of an ideal machine, such as a 
Turing machine, but allowing other possibilities as well. 
Which values are included and what labels' they are given 
then depend on the ideal machine and the context; this 
should become clear as we progress. 
The first definition I would like to suggest is that of 
an ideal machine state or simply a state as a set of 
ordered pairs, where each ordered pair consists........... o ...._....a. 
label followed by a -value. Informally, such a state 
will be shown, as above, as a collection of labels and 
values separated by colons. The set notation for the 
example is {(x,u), (y,u), (z,u), (next instruction, 
READLN(X))). A descriptive term for a state is a 
snapshot, but once again care should be taken to 
distinguish my use of 'snapshot' as a synonym for an 
ideal machine state from the theoretical computer science 
usage. Davis and Weyuker (p. 24) 
define a snapshot or instantaneous, description 
of a program P of length n to be a pair 
(i,sigma) where 1 <_ i <_ n + 1, and sigma is a 
state of P. (Intuitively the number i 
indicates that it is the ith instruction which 
is about to be executed; i = n + 1 corresponds 
to a 'stop' instruction.) 
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It should be noted that the state illustrated above is 
not a state of a program at all in Davis and Weyuker's 
terms, though it is (a notational variant of) a snapshot. 
Of course the important distinctions are not those of 
terminology. The first crucial move is the dissociation 
of states from a particular language or a particular 
program. The second is the (almost) complete 
flexibility over what counts as a label and a value and 
which labels and values are to be included in a 
particular state; as we shall see later, this will 
facilitate viewing algorithms from many different levels 
of detail. Notice also that the 'NEXT INSTRUCTION' 
label-value pair has no special status in the new 
definition. The idea is to generalise the use of the 
ideal Turing machine as a basis for theoretical computer 
science to a multiplicity of different but related ideal 
machines as a basis for theoretical cognitive science. 
The second definition is for what I shall call an 
algorithmic sequence; that is a sequence ,,,of states 
defined over the same set of labels through time. For 
example the program given earlier gives rise to the 
following algorithmic sequence, as one possibility. 
(Each group of label-value pairs is a state; time runs 

























NEXT INSTRUCTION: U 
The constraint on states to be 'defined over the same set 
of labels' ensures that labels are consistent across 
states. In formalising these definitions in Chapter V, 
we will speak of states and algorithms over sets of 
labels. The ideal machine is better thought of as 
comprising not only labels, but also possible state 
sequences or, alternatively, transitions between states. 
In short an ideal machine is just another name for an 
algorithm. The definition of an algorithmic sequence 
can be contrasted to Davis and Weyuker's computation (p. 
25)- 
A computation of a program P is defined to be a 
sequence (i.e. a list) sl,s2, ..., sk of 
snapshots of P such that si + 1 is the 
successor of si for i = 1,2, ..., k-1 and sk is 
terminal. 
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Here again the main difference is what is implicit in the 
latter definition. Each snapshot must contain all 
variables mentioned in P, along with the next 
instruction. The term 'successor' is also defined in 
terms of the next instruction, with explicit cases 
identifying the possible changes from one state to the 
next in terms of the next instruction from the last 
snapshot. The algorithmic sequence shown above is 
actually very close to a computation in this sense, with 
respect to the exclusive-or program given earlier. To 
avoid confusion, here are two examples of sequences which 
may arise from the execution of the same program but 
would not be considered computations by Davis and 


















Just as two computations are presumably considered the 
same if they are identical, two algorithmic sequences are 
the same if and only if they are equal by usual n-tuple 
equality, giving us our third definition. Once again, 
there is no language automatically associated with such a 
sequence. Given a certain level of detail and 
perspective along with the input, a program may be seen 
as giving rise to an algorithmic sequence, or as 
abbreviating a set of them, given a set of inputs. 
There is another informal sense in which two sequences 
might be considered to be the same. That is when one is 
an abstraction of the other or when they have a common 
abstraction or implementation. 
More generally, an algorithm is a set of algorithmic 
sequences_ defined over the same set-of labels. If a 
mathematical definition of a function is given as a set 
of ordered pairs, then an algorithm so defined is a set 
of sequences of states which includes each input in the 
first state of some sequence and the output is part of 
the final state of that sequence. Although we are 
defining them here as sets and sequences and other 
mathematical entities, the equivalence of interest at 
this level is stronger than that of the mathematical 
functional level which only concerns input and output. 
There is also some notion of time (in number of steps) 
and space (in number of values), although it is not 
absolute. On this view, both the algorithmic and 
mathematical levels of the second chapter deal with 
mathematical objects. The difference lies in the sort 
of equivalence at each level: weak functional, perhaps 
behavioural, equivalence at the top level and stronger, 
albeit still mathematical, 'algorithmic' equivalence at 
the middle level. 
We now have the building blocks for a rigorous definition 
of abstraction of algorithms or levels of algorithmic 
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abstraction in terms of detail. While talk of levels 
and abstraction permeates cognitive science, to my 
knowledge there has been little attempt at a formal 
definition of this kind of abstraction. Another sort of 
formal abstraction is the case where algorithms are 
equated with programming languages and there is a 
hierarchy of languages, such as a graphics language built 
on top of FORTRAN built on top of VAX assembler language. 
In a case like this, descriptions are constrained to the 
available languages, and even then the relationship 
between the states described at a higher level and those 
at the lower level may be tenuous, depending on the 
compilation or translation process. For the purposes of 
accurate description at various levels of a given 
complex physical system and the states through which it 
passes, something different is required. 
Illustrations of abstraction for algorithmic sequences 
have already been presented. Recall the six-step 
illustration above, which showed a sequence of states 
corresponding to the PASCAL program for exclusive-or. 
The next example sequence shown was an abstraction of 
this, having fewer states and fewer label-value pairs, 
and the next gave a further abstraction, presenting the 
algorithmic sequence with little more detail than the 
input and output values. But what exactly are the legal 
abstraction operations? For now, let us look at another 
example. The complete definitions of abstraction will 
be given in Chapter V. Here is a sequence consisting of 
six steps defined over the set of labels (0, 1, 2, 3, 4). 
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0: U 2: U 
1: U 3: U 
4: U 
0: 0 2: U 
1: U 3: U 
4: U 
0: 0 2: U 
1: 1 3: U 
4: U 
0: 0 2: 0.96 
1: 1 3: 0.02 
4: U 
0: 0 2: 0.98 
1: 1 3: 0.02 
4: 0.98 
0: 0 2: 0.98 
1: 1 3: 0.01 
4: 0.99 
The labels are simply numbers. (It is not crucial to 
the point being made here, but the algorithmic sequence 
might be a description of a typical connectionist model 
of exclusive-or. This underlying model will be 
considered more fully later on.) The results of one 
possible legal abstraction operation are shown in the 
following. ('0' has been changed to 'X', '1' to 'Y', 
'2' to 'X OR Y', '3' to 'X AND Y' and '4' to 'OUTPUT'.) 
94 
0: U 2: U 
1: U 3: U 
4: U 
0: 0 2: U 
1: U 3: U 
4: U 
0: 0 2: U 
l: 1 3: U 
4: U 
0: 0 2: 1 
l: 1 3: 0 
4: U 
0: 0 2: 1 
l: 1 3: 0 
4: 1 
0: 0 2: 1 
l: 1 3: 0 
4: 1 
This operation is rounding; the values associated with 
labels 2, 3 and 4 have been rounded off. Another valid 
abstraction operation is the changing of labels, as 
demonstrated in the following: 
X: U X OR Y: U 
Y: U X AND Y: U 
OUTPUT: U 
X: 0 X OR Y: U 
Y: U X AND Y: U 
OUTPUT: U 
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X: 0 X OR Y: U 
Y: 1 X AND Y: U 
OUTPUT: U 
X: 0 X OR Y: 1 
Y: 1 X AND Y: 0 
OUTPUT: U 
X: 0 X OR Y: 1 
Y: 1 X AND Y: 0 
OUTPUT: 1 
X: 0 X OR Y: 1 
Y: 1 X AND Y: 0 
OUTPUT: 1 
I think of this as a sort of 'lateral abstraction', 
because it seems more like a shift on the same level than 
a move to a higher level of abstraction. There is no 
change in the amount of detail, only in the perspective. 
The change is quite vivid, showing not only that this 
specific algorithm may be seen as a calculation of the 
exclusive-or function for inputs zero and one, but also 
saying something about how the output is reached. In 
particular, it shows the calculation of 'X OR Y' and 'X 
AND Y' as intermediate steps. Getting only slightly 
ahead of ourselves, one can begin to see how a state- 
based algorithmic sequence such as this might be used to 
compare such diverse models as traditional and 
connectionist ones. At this level of abstraction, for 
example, a distinction can be made between the states 
generated by effective procedures for calculating 
exclusive-or by first calculating 'or' and 'and' and 
other versions, such as a procedure which uses an 
equality check ('X XOR Y' is true if and only if 'X = Y' 
is false; this will work as long as the inputs are 
restricted to ones and zeroes). 
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In the next sequence the labels have been changed again 
('X' to ' INPUTI ' and 'Y' to 'INPUT2') and now only three 
label-value pairs are shown in each state, illustrating 



















Next we have the results of applying the 'selection of 
steps' operator, followed by the result of an application 








INPUT : 0,1 
OUTPUT: U 
INPUT : 0,1 
OUTPUT: 1 
To review, the abstraction operations that have been 
introduced are changing labels, rounding, selection of 
states, selection of values and grouping of values. 
Another kind of abstraction for algorithms, as opposed to 
sequences, is 'selection of sequences'. One algorithm is 
an abstraction of another if the first is a subset of the 
second. All of these combine to give a coarser view at 
the top, most abstract level and a finer, more detailed 
view at the bottom level. In addition, taken together 
they give an explicit path of derivation relating the 
various levels. Although this introduction has been in 
terms of abstraction, the process is intended to be 
reversible, giving levels of abstraction viewed one way 
and details or explanations (or implementations) when 
viewed the other way. The added details of a lower 
level can be seen as an explanation if they provide the 
answer to a question in terms of the higher level, such 
as 'How is exclusive-or calculated?' or 'Are the inputs 
always received in a certain order?' 
Before developing some more complete examples, it should 
be noted that some possible abstraction operations are 
not allowed. In general, these are movements to a less 
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coarse description, or to a description that contradicts 
a lower level description. The idea is that details are 
removed, not added. So while the removal of steps or 
states is a legal abstraction operation, the addition of 
states is not a valid move. Changing labels is neutral 
in this respect. Providing more precision for a value 
(the opposite of rounding) is not allowed in general. 
The abstraction/implementation relationship is defined 
more completely and precisely in Chapter V. 
DETA,ILED_EXAMPLES__OF_EXCLUSIVE-OR ALGORITHMS 
AND, ABSTRACTION 
To see how this new perspective on algorithms facilitates 
their comparison, consider four simple mathematically 
equivalent ways of computing exclusive-or. Before 
converting them to fit the new framework, we will look at 
some more traditional presentations in the form of PASCAL 
programs, Turing machines and connectionist diagrams. 
First, there is the PASCAL version we have already seen; 
it shall be referred to as 'the first PASCAL version' or 
'the equality check version'. For convenience it is 
repeated here. 
PROGRAM XOR; 











This has already been contrasted to a possible PASCAL 
version (henceforth 'the second PASCAL version', 
Boolean version') which is now made explicit. 
PROGRAM XOR; 
,VAR X, Y, Z: INTEGER; 












Z2:=(X2;Y2) & NOT (X2 & Y2); 







The third example is somewhat different. Like the 
PASCAL programs, it is arguably an effective procedure. 
In fact, it is a Turing machine in Davis and Weyuker's 
terminology, or it can be seen as a Turing machine 
program. 
For the exclusive-or example, the tape begins at state qi 
with the input in two squares and the 'tape head' 
positioned at the first input. At the completion of the 
computation, the device is in state q9 and the tape head 
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is positioned at the square containing the output, with 
the rest of the tape blank. Here, along with some 
comments to help clarify what is going on, is the entire 
Turing machine or Turing machine program. 
ql 0 R q2 In case the first item on the tape is a 
zero (0), move to the right and into the 
state of 'we have a 0 and a ...?' 
ql 1 R q3 In case the first input on the tape is a 
one (1), move to the right and into the 
state of 'we have a 1 and a ...?' 
q2 0 B q5 Here we know we have a 0 first and we 
learn there is a 0 in the next position as 
well. The proper final answer is 0, so 
all that needs to be done is to blank out 
the second 0, which is accomplished in 
this instruction, and to reposition the 
tape head; this will happen as a result 
of the next instruction starting with q5 B 
q2 1 B q4 Again, we know we have a 0 first, but in 
this case we learn there is a 1 in the 
next position. The proper answer is 1, 
so we must alter the first character. 
But first the second position must be 
blanked out. 
q3 0 B q5 Here we had a 1 and now meet a 0. The 
second input is blanked out and we go to 
the state where the tape head is about to 
be repositioned at the first input, which 
is identical to the output. 
q3 1 B q6 Here we had a 1 and now encounter another 
1. The answer will be 0, so we must 
alter the first character after blanking 
out the second. 
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q5 B L q9 This is the case where all that remains 
is to reposition the tape head at 
the beginning; the initial square already 
contains the correct answer. 
q4 B L q7 Here we go back to the original square, 
but it remains to change it from a 0 to a 
1. 
q6 B L q8 Similarly, we return to the first input, 
but now it must be changed from a 1 to a 
0. 
q7 0 1 q9 This instruction changes the first square 
from a 0 to a 1. 
q8 1 0 q9 This instruction changes the first square 
from a 1 to a 0. 
A state transition diagram may help to elucidate this 
sort of program. In Figure 3.1 the states are 
represented by circles containing the qi's. The possible 
characters being scanned and the action to be taken are 
given along the arcs, which represent the possible 
transitions between states. The Turing machine is 
considered to halt when it reaches a state and tape 
square for which there is no further transition, in this 
case q9. It may also help to note these descriptions of 
each state. 
In ql, we are in the initial state. 
In q2, we have read a 0 so far. 
In q3, we have read a 1 so far. 
In q4, we have read a 0 and a 1, so the answer will 
be 1. 
In q5, we have either two 0's or a 1 and a 0. In 
either case the answer is already correct in 
the first square. 




In q7, we have a 0 and a 1, the second of which has 
been blanked out. All that remains is to 
change the 0 to a 1. 
In q8, similarly, we have two 1's, the second of 
which has been erased. All that is left is to 
change the 1 to a 0. 
In q9, we are in the final state. 
The fourth and fifth exclusive-or examples share a 
typical connectionist diagram, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The large and growing literature on connectionism 
(otherwise known as parallel distributed processing or 
neural nets, among other things) is- introduced by 
Rumelhart and McClelland (Rumelhart, McClelland, and the 
PDP Research Group, 1986 -- Chapter 2 of this volume, 'A 
General Framework for Parallel Distributed Processing' is 
particularly appropriate in the context of these 
examples; also see McClelland, Rumelhart, and the PDP 
Research Group, 1986; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1988). 
The circles or 'nodes' or 'units' represent simple 
processors. In this example, each one will compute the 
function which sums up weighted inputs, and then outputs 
a 1 or a 0, depending on whether the weighted sum exceeds 
a threshold or not. Typically, all the processors in a 
connectionist model compute the same function. Also 
typically, it is a nonlinear threshold or smoothed 
threshold-like function. 
The input and output for each processor are represented 
by arrows. Where these arrows connect two nodes, they 
are sometimes called connections. Since it is usually 
the configuration of these connections and their weights 
(more on these in a moment) that are emphasised in the 
current research on these systems, it is not unreasonable 




Nodes or units which receive input from outside the 
system (the bottom two in Figure 3.2) are called input 
nodes or input units. Similarly, those that send output 
outside the system are called output nodes or output 
units. Together they are called 'visible' nodes or 
units. In contrast are 'hidden' units, such as the 
middle two in the figure. These hidden units are worth 
noting, because the recent resurgence of interest in 
connectionist systems is largely due to the discovery of 
'learning algorithms' for systems with hidden units. 
Such systems are much more powerful than those without 
hidden units, in terms of the functions which they are 
capable of computing. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the same diagram, but this time 
including the weights and thresholds which distinguish 
two different algorithms at certain levels of 
description. (Figure 3.4 is taken from Rumelhart, 
Hinton and McClelland, 1986, p. 64 in Rumelhart, 
McClelland and the PDP Research Group, 1986). The 
numbers alongside the connections in these figures 
represent the weights. Each processor in these examples 
(again this is typical though by no means required for a 
connectionist system), as stated earlier, takes weighted 
inputs. That is, before applying the threshold 
function, the input values are multiplied by their 
weights. This may be part of the transmission of the 
value or part of the function itself. It is generally 
held that 'programming' a connectionist system amounts to 
adjusting these weights, while the connection 
configuration and activation and output functions remain 
fixed for a particular system. (Even for such a simple 
function as exclusive-or, it is no small task to 
determine the correct settings for the weights.) In fact 
it is so difficult in general that it is usually done 
automatically, using learning algorithms, as mentioned 
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Thresholds = 0.90 
FIGURE 3.3 
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Thresholds = 0.01 
FIGURE 3.4 
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above. In this way, the automatic program or learning 
algorithm is given the configured system, along with the 
desired inputs and outputs, in the example the mapping 
(0,0) --> 0, (0,1) --> 1, etc. It then calculates the 
weights required to produce this output. A large 
proportion of connectionist research is concerned with 
these learning procedures, their analysis and extensions, 
and the results of applying the resultant 'trained' 
systems to hitherto untried inputs. There is also a 
great deal of interest in relating these learning methods 
to human psychological and biological learning 
capacities. The emphasis on learning, however, will not 
be shared by this thesis. There is enough to be said 
about the description of these complex systems in their 
more stable, 'programmed' states. Theories of cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience may well benefit from 
research into learning algorithms, but it is useful to 
consider less complicated cases as well. 
The systems in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, then, take inputs 
that can be represented as zeroes and ones and produce 
outputs represented as zeroes and ones, computing 
exclusive-or. While calling the Turing machine example 
a 'program' may seem to stretch the term a little, it is 
even more difficult to justify the use of 'program' or 
'effective procedure' to describe these systems. Such 
systems are built or simulated using conventional 
hardware with, e.g., a subroutine for each node, yet they 
are frequently contrasted to von Neumann or Turing- 
machine based computation. Nevertheless, it is not 
completely unnatural to refer to these as rather 
different 'algorithms' for computing exclusive-or. Of 
course, it is one of the fundamental motivations of this 
thesis to develop a framework for comparing theories and 
algorithms of all these different types. Using the new 
definitions of algorithms and algorithmic abstraction 
with these examples, let us see how far we get. 
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COMPARISON OF EXAMPLES 
Because the explanation and description of complex 
physical systems are our main concerns, let us assume the 
various descriptions given as examples of exclusive-or 
are accurate descriptions of physical systems in that 
they are abbreviations for states actually attainable by 
those systems, described at some level of detail 
according to the precise definitions given in this 
thesis. Even so, what is the exact algorithm, in terms 
of state sequences, is open to debate without the actual 
system -- or a lower level description -- to check. 
Consider the algorithmic sequence for inputs 0 and 1 
using the first PASCAL version. As in the earlier 
discussion of this example, one level of description 

























NEXT INSTRUCTION: U 
Under this view of the algorithm, it is clear that the 
next instruction is explicitly represented somehow 
(notice we do not say how) in the system. It may be all 
in one place, as in a next-instruction register, or it 
may be pointed to by such a register with the entire 
program explicitly stored. All that is required of 
values is that they be directly measurable from the 
physical system, or built up through the legal 
abstraction operations. A value may even be a 
measurement of a 'process' represented by some pattern of 
activity or it may be inactive, represented by an 
instruction on a sheet of paper, perhaps the instruction 
for a person or a device with an optical scanner. We 
need this stronger description of states in order to talk 
sensibly about the system as being in a state such as the 
state of comparing the two values. Viewing the program 
as software, there is no intrinsic constraint that forces 
it to be an accurate description of the states of a 
physical system -- even if that system is a computer 
executing a program generated from that software. The 
compilation of the software into the basic operations of 
a machine could conceivably produce a system that goes 
through states such as the following. It reads a part 
of the input character for X, then it reads a part of the 
input character for Y. One is curved and one is 
straight, so it outputs '1'. In that case, I claim, it 
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is wrong to say that the system gets one complete input, 
then the other, in sequence. In fact it may not read 
the entire input at all. Software, under this view, is 
merely a more or less accurate theory of the workings of 
a complex system, a computer. It is at least a correct 
predictive theory (predicting the correct output given 
the input), but it may not be a very good explanatory 
theory (that is, a theory which is stronger than 
mathematical equivalence, one that explains something 
about how the output is reached). The accuracy of 
software in a traditional computer system as a theory of 
the states through which the system passes depends on the 
compilation (or interpretation in the compiler theoretic 
sense) and execution of the result. 
Comparison of Algorithms Represented by--the Two PASCAL 
Programs 
At the level of input and output, the two PASCAL versions 











Further similarity can be seen, since they get their 
inputs in the same order and they retain the input 














If we go into much more detail, however, the differences 
begin to emerge, even without considering stored 
instructions. For example, under the usual 
implementations of PASCAL, at some point the logical 
value 'X = Y' will be computed for the first version, as 
will the logical values of 'X2 OR Y2', 'X2 AND Y2' and so 
on for the Boolean version. A comparison at such a 
level follows, making use of the PASCAL variables and 
logical equations to determine labels and values in the 
ideal machine states. 
Version 1: 
X: U X = Y: U 
Y: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = Y: U 
Y: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = Y: U 
Y: 1 Z: U 
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X: 0 X = Y: FALSE 
Y: 1 Z: U 
X: 0 X = Y: FALSE 
Y: 1 Z: 1 
Version 2: 
X: U X = 0: U XZ: U 
Y: U Y = 0: U YZ: U 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: U X2: U 
Y: U Y = 0: U Y2: U 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: U X2: U 
Y: 1 Y = 0: U Y2: U 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
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X: 0 X = 0: TRUE Z2: U 
Y: 1 Y = 0: U Y2: U 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: U Y2: U 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X - 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: U 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 OR Y2: U 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
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X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 OR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: U 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 OR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: FALSE 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 OR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: FALSE 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
(X2 OR Y2): U 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): U 
Z2: U Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X 2 OR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: FALSE 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
Z2: U Z2: FALSE: U Z: U 
116 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 OR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: FALSE 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
Z2: TRUE Z2 = FALSE: U Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 AOR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: FALSE 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
Z2: TRUE Z2 = FALSE: FALSE Z: U 
X: 0 X = 0: TRUE X2: FALSE 
Y: 1 Y = 0: FALSE Y2: TRUE 
X2 OR Y2: TRUE 
X2 AND Y2: FALSE 
NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
(X2 OR Y2) AND NOT (X2 AND Y2): TRUE 
Z2: TRUE Z2 = FALSE: FALSE Z: 1 
Of course, considering effective procedures as algorithms 
includes assumptions about the order of execution (here, 
generally, top to bottom, right to left, with the usual 
precedence of parentheses and logical operations). This 
is one of many ways in which the definition of algorithms 
as sequences of states overcomes the ambiguity of a list 
of instructions. Rather than saying this program is an 
algorithm at the theoretical level and can be implemented 
in many ways, the order of operations (e.g.) being 
inessential to the algorithm, the view presented here is 
that the various sequences of states derivable from this 
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program may or may not be important for a given 
explanation, depending on the context and question. 
They may or may not be accurate with respect to a given 
physical system. 
So far we have only considered the algorithmic sequence 
for '0 xor 1'. Looking at the collection of all 
possible sequences, at the level of only the inputs X and 
Y and the outputs Z, we can say that these two sets of 
algorithms can be viewed as computing exclusive-or. If 
we ask whether or not they retrieve their inputs in the 
same order, a different level of description is required. 
Furthermore, we can ask how it is that exclusive-or is 
calculated in each case. The answer provided above may 
be sufficient, but we may want to ask, in the case of the 
first version, 'Exactly how is the comparison between X 
and Y carried out?' In the case of the second version, 
we may want to ask, 'Exactly how is the logical "and" 
function evaluated?' In some scenarios, such as the 
logic student required to program exclusive-or from other 
available logic operators, these questions do not arise. 
In other possible contexts, it is conceivable that these 
questions would be crucial. Perhaps the first program 
runs smoothly, but the second program apparently fails 
each time a logical 'and' is performed. Granted, the 
two scenarios reasonably are framed at different levels 
of abstraction, in terms of detail, as they should be. 
But both are concerned with manipulating and 
understanding a real system, so it should not be said 
that the perspective of one is correct and essential 
while the perspective of the other is concerned with mere 
detail. 
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Compar, o,f ,Algorithms ,Repre,sented,,,, by ,,,the ,PASCAL 
Programs, .4n.d..Turing --Machine 
It is very natural to consider the Turing machine 
algorithm in terms of states. For the case where the 
inputs are first a '0' (from left to right on the tape) 
and then a '1', the algorithmic sequence can be given as: 
Q-STATE: ql TAPE: 0 
Q-STATE: q2 TAPE: 1 
Q-STATE: q4 TAPE: B 
Q-STATE: q7 TAPE: 0 
Q-STATE: q9 TAPE: 1 
A more detailed level of description might be that of the 
following: 
Q-STATE: ql TAPE: 01 
TAPE POSITION: 1 
Q-STATE: q2 TAPE: 01 
TAPE POSITION: 2 
Q-STATE: q4 TAPE: OB 
TAPE POSITION: 2 
Q-STATE: q7 TAPE OB 
TAPE POSITION: 1 
Q-STATE: q9 TAPE: 1B 
TAPE POSITION: 1 
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This sequence includes a wider view of the tape, better 
capturing the left and right operations. Again, we are 
assuming that this is a correct description of a physical 
system. 
In order to compare such a sequence with the PASCAL 
generated versions, we must find a common denominator, 
i.e., a common ideal machine for describing them both. 
This was accomplished without much ado for the two PASCAL 
versions. The two had identical variable names and the 
algorithmic sequences were chosen to emphasise their 
similarity at the less detailed level; at a certain 
level of detail from a certain perspective they fit 
easily into the same labels and values. 
In order to find a common level of comparison for this 
more difficult case, let us start with the fairly high 
level view where the two PASCAL versions merge, the 
algorithmic sequence given by: 
X: U Y: U Z: U 
X: 0 Y: U Z: U 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: U 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: 1 
Note that X, Y and Z are listed separately here, compared 
to the combined tape above. Starting from that Turing- 
machine-based sequence, we can abstract away to look at 
only the tape, and then go down a level or two to 
consider X, Y and Z separately, where X is the first 
square of the tape, Y is the second, and (interestingly) 
Z is again the first square. We get the algorithmic 
sequence shown by: 
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X: U Y: U Z: U 
X: 0 Y: U Z: U 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: U 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: 1 
Juxtaposed with the sequence generated from the PASCAL 
versions at a similar level of description (given below), 
several points can be made. 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: 0 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: 0 
X: 0 Y: B Z: 0 
X: 0 Y: B Z: 0 
X: 1 Y: B Z : 1 
First, there is no sequencing of the retrieval of input 
for the Turing machine; it is just there to begin with. 
Of course the PASCAL program could have been a procedure 
and could have had similar given input (this was not done 
because the ordering of inputs will make a useful 
comparison in the next section). So we have a 
difference in the input. We also have a potential 
difference in the values taken on, especially if 'U' is 
filling in for arbitrary values, although there may be a 
standard 'undefined' symbol, such as hexadecimal F's (all 
binary ones) in IBM machines. 
Next, abstract from the PASCAL version by selecting the 
last two steps. Compare this to the first and last 
states of the Turing machine algorithm: 
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PASCAL versions: 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: U 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: 1 
Turing machine version: 
X: 0 Y: 1 Z: 0 
X: 1 Y: B Z: 1 
In the Turing machine sequence we see the state where the 
input is given, followed by the state at which the answer 
is reached. The interesting difference is that the 
Turing machine algorithm is what we might call 
'destructive', destroying the input representations in 
the process of computing the answer. Finding a common 
level of description in terms of states makes it easy to 
make such comparisons even across such different 
'languages' as PASCAL and Turing machines. Although, as 
is widely known, Turing machines and PASCAL-running VAXes 
are theoretically equivalent mathematically, it should be 
remembered that the types of effective procedures suited 
to them or natural to them are rather different. This 
point is not new, although Turing machines and von 
Neumann machines are considered similar, even equivalent, 
in the psychological literature. In any case, 
difficulties arise when claims are made about the 
suitability of particular programs to particular hardware 
devices. There is a grain of truth in this distinction, 
and this approach to comparison of algorithms in terms of 
different levels of ideal machine state sequences is an 
attempt to isolate and build on that grain of truth. 
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Comparison of Connectionist and Other Algorithms 
In Figure 3.5, the connectionist diagram of Figure 3.3 is 
repeated, this time with numbers on the nodes for 
reference. One way of looking at this as representing 
an algorithm is to take the output values of each node as 
the values to watch. For inputs zero and one (input to 
nodes 0 and 1, coincidentally), we might get either of 
















0: 0 1: 1 2: 0.98 
3: 0.02 4: 0.98 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 0.98 
3: 0.01 4: 0.99 
0: U 1: U 2: U 
3: U 4: U 
0: U 1: 1 2: U 
3: U 4: U 
0: 0 1: 1 2: U 
3: U 4: U 
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Thresholds = 0.90 
FIGURE 3.5 
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0: 0 1: 1 2: 0.97 
3: 0.03 4: 0.97 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 0.98 
3: 0.01 4: 0.98 
As a general comparison with the earlier algorithms, I 
will mention three main points. These are rounding, 
nondeterminism and sequencing. I have chosen to 
represent the output values as they are often represented 
in connectionist simulator programs. They could have 
been rounded to give only zeroes and ones, but then it 
would be impossible to see the development of the 
strength of the result. While it is not a very gradual 
development in this example, it can be in many 
connectionist models. 
One might imagine that many different instances (runs) of 
a single physical system calculating exclusive-or and 
describable in this way will have slightly different 
values. In other words there is a certain amount of 
nondeterminism in the path from the starting point to the 
finishing point for this system for computing exclusive- 
or described at this level. That is, a state is not 
uniquely determined by the state preceding it, as in the 
deterministic PASCAL-inspired algorithms. If state 
changes are recorded from connectionist systems each time 
an output value changes by a set amount, the set of all 
possible sequences will most likely define a 
nondeterministic algorithm or ideal machine. This is 
not a problem, but perhaps it is a contribution to the 
difficulty of comparing connectionist and classical 
theories. While this real or simulated 'random' element 
clearly violates some definitions of effective 
procedures (as we have seen -- see the definitions of 
Enderton and Knuth for example), it is consistent with 
others, in particular Rumelhart and McClelland's usage 
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(as in their debate with Broadbent reviewed in the last 
chapter). In fact, deterministic Turing machines and 
nondeterministic Turing machines turn out to be (weakly) 
equivalent. (For a proof of this, see Davis and Weyuker, 
e.g.) In the new framework it can be seen that whether a 
system is determinstic or nondeterministic depends on the 
level of description. In this case, it may turn out that 
if we knew more about the underlying system and more 
about the initial conditions for a particular run, a 
level of description might be possible which includes 
label-value pairs for which any state could be 
distinguished deterministically from the previous state. 
To illustrate this point more simply, consider what we 








in the set 
Z: U 
Z: 1 
containing the following four 
X : 1 Y : 0 Z: U 
X: 1 Y: 0 2,: 1 
X: 0 Y: 0 Z: U 
X: 0 Y: 0 Z: 0 
X: 1 Y: 1 Z: U 
X: 1 Y: 1 Z: 0 
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This perfectly deterministic algorithm (for once all the 
sequences have been included) can be abstracted (by 
selection of values) to the nondeterministic algorithm 
comprising these four sequences: 
X: 0 Z: U 
X: 0 Z: 1 
X: 1 Z: U 
X: 1 Z: 1 
X: 0 Z: U 
X: 0 Z: U 
X: 1 Z: U 
X: 1 Z: 0 
Whereas rounding could perhaps be used to find a common 
level of comparison with the earlier algorithms, by 
covering up the (not very) gradual approach to a 
solution, there is an arguably deeper difference. This 
is the order of the input. If it is true that at this 
level, the input can come into the system in any order, 
then this is different to the clear sequencing of the 
inputs in the other descriptions. This is not so 
surprising for a system typically described as parallel. 
In our new way of describing algorithms, this parallel- 
ness shows up as an indeterminacy in the path from inputs 
to outputs. 
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Given these differences, the search for a common level of 
comparison should start with rounding to zeroes and ones 
and also with selection of steps, leaving out the 
indeterminate steps to get the input in the first place. 
This gives us the following algorithmic sequence. 
0: 0 1: 1 2: U 
3: U 4: U 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 1 
3: 0 4: U 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 1 
3: 0 4: 1 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 1 
3: 0 4: 1 
It could be generalised for all the possible sequences. 
A mere change of labels reveals that the first 
connectionist version at this level of description is 
surprisingly similar to one of the earlier sequences we 
have seen. It is a reasonable description of both 
systems to say that they compute 'X XOR Y' by first 
computing 'X OR Y' and 'X AND Y' . The two sequences do 
not yet line up exactly. This could be achieved by 
abstracting with selection of steps from the figure by 
omitting the ultimate (or penultimate) step. The second 
PASCAL version would require selection of the appropriate 
values, in this case X2, Y2, Z2, (X2 OR Y2) and (X2 AND 
Y2), and changing the notation, substituting '1', '0', 
'X', 'Y' and 'Z' for 'TRUE', 'FALSE', 'X2', 'Y2' and 
'Z2', respectively. 
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Similarly, the second connectionist model can be redrawn 







0: U 1: 0.99 2: U 
3: U 4: U 
0: 0.02 1: 1 2: U 
3: U 4: U 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 0.02 
3: 0.97 4: U 
0: 0 1: 1 2: 0.01 
3: 0.99 4: 0.98 
Changing the labels once again we have: 
X: U Y: U X > Y: U 
Y > X: U NOT (Y = X) : U 
X: U Y: 1 X > Y: U 
Y > X: U NOT (Y = X): U 
X: 0 Y: 1 X > Y: U 
Y > X: U NOT (Y = X) : U 
X: 0 Y: 1 X > Y: 0 
Y > X: 1 NOT (Y = X) : U 
X: 0 Y: 1 X > Y: 0 
Y > X : 1 NOT (Y = X) : 1 
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Thresholds = 0.01 
FIGURE 3.6 
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We can conclude that at this level of description, the 
algorithm might be equivalent to some PASCAL version 
using inequality checks -- at its appropriate level of 
description, of course. 
In conclusion, the apparent similarity of the two PASCAL 
programs or that of the two connectionist systems is only 
skin deep. It is influenced by the striking similarity 
in notation as well as the implicit notion of states in 
each, something like theoretical computer science's 
states of a program in the former case and states of 
activation vectors in the latter. Under the old 
definition of algorithms as effective procedures, it is 
not even clear that the connectionist diagrams are 
algorithms at all. The new definition of algorithms in 
terms of sequences of more liberally defined states 
provides a framework for more meaningful comparisons 
based on strong equivalence at many levels of 
description. Under this definition, enhanced by 
abstraction operations, evidence can be given for 
grouping the equality-check PASCAL program with one 
connectionist system and the Boolean PASCAL program with 




A MORE COMPLEX EXAMPLE: 
QUICKSORT 
Before formalising the definitions of the last chapter, 
let us look at a more substantial example than exclusive- 
or. I have chosen Quicksort as that example for a 
number of reasons. It is a member of the family of 
sorting procedures (methods for putting sets of items in 
order) typically taught to and used by computer 
scientists. Because of this, there are a lot of text- 
book definitions which can be compared to each other and 
to sorting in general. In addition, there is a parallel 
flavour that is obscured by the usual renditions, but 
which I have come to think of as essential to Quicksort. 
It also has the right degree of complexity to be 
realistic, yet not so much that the main theoretical 
points will be overwhelmed. To avoid extraneous detail, 
only one set of inputs will be considered, with few 
exceptions. Therefore the basic algorithms will be 
singleton sets, containing only one sequence of states 
each. The arguments would contain no essential 
differences for generalised algorithms containing 
corresponding sequences for different input sets. 
The remainder of the chapter will proceed as follows. 
An overview of Quicksort will be given first. Then, two 
standard sequential procedures drawn from textbooks will 
be compared, using techniques suggested by the 
definitions of the previous chapter. One of the 
procedures appears to be at a much higher level than the 
other, so it will be interesting to see if they are 
directly comparable at some level of description or not, 
and how this shows up in the new framework. A new high 
level version of Quicksort will then be given, one that 
suggests a parallel description. Finally, some more 
detailed differences will be noted between the original 
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two algorithms based on the textbook examples. The 
focus throughout is on comparison of algorithms, but it 
is also intended that the descriptive and explanatory 
role of algorithms at different levels will be elucidated 
along the way. 
AN OVERVIEW OF QUICKSORT 
Quicksort was introduced and described by C.A.R. Hoare 
(1961 and 1962). Like any conventional sort procedure, 
it takes as input a set of unordered, or rather 
incorrectly ordered, items, and produces the same set in 
a predefined order as its output. The example I shall 
concentrate on is taken from a first-year computer 
science text (Brookshear, 1988). The input is the 
sequence 'JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE 
JOHN'. The output under alphabetical ordering is of 
course 'ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE 
TOM'. Perhaps due to the pervasiveness of von Neumann 
machines and the design of sorting procedures to fit 
them, the input is always given as ordered as well 
(though obviously not in the predefined sort order). 
Another constraint placed on Quicksort by this context is 
the desirability of sorting 'in place', using only the 
space required to store the original set of items plus a 
small fixed overhead for bookkeeping. From the outset, 
more detailed bottom-up concerns belie much of the 
alleged total autonomy of traditional algorithms. Hoare 
named his new sort 'Quicksort' because of the speed at 
which it can be executed on standard machines when the 
items to be sorted can fit into internal memory. It is 
sometimes called partition-exchange sort, for reasons 
which should become obvious. 
What happens between input and output? One of the input 
items is chosen as a pivot. This choice can be made in 
a number of ways. Simply taking the first input item 
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will do. Using the pivot as the dividing point, the 
rest of the input is divided into two lists. The first 
list contains only items less than the pivot and the 
second list contains only items greater than the pivot. 
Some variation is possible with respect to those items 
exactly equal to the pivot. The pivot itself is not in 
either list, but goes in between them in the final 
ordering. By recursively applying Quicksort to the two 
new lists, we get an ordered list, followed by he pivot 
(in order), followed by another ordered list, completing 
the function. The recursion is stopped by the trivial 
cases of lists of zero items or one item only, which are 
already in order. Many variations on this are possible, 
such as randomly choosing the pivot or sorting small 
lists (less than some constant length) by some other 
method more suited to short lists. 
The description thus far anticipates some aspects of my 
more parallel version of Quicksort in its lack of 
reliance on sublist ordering. However, as noted above, 
an essential aspect of traditional Quicksort is the 
clever way that the list is segmented and recombined in 
place. Using the example with JANE as pivot, two place 
markers are introduced. One starts at the beginning of 
the list and the other starts at the end. The beginning 
marker is advanced toward the end, one item at a time, 
moving along until the item marked is greater in value 
than the pivot (or until it reaches the end marker). In 
the example, the marker stops changing when it is 
pointing to 'TOM' Similarly, the end marker is moved 
towards the beginning until an item is encountered that 
has a value less than the pivot (or the beginning marker 
is reached). After the markers have both been moved in 
this manner, either they are pointing to the same item or 
they are not. In the example, they are not: 
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JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN 
(pivot) 
Here, the two marked items 'TOM' and 'CHERYL' are 
exchanged and the markers left in place. This ensures 
that everything before (and including) the first pointer 
is less than the pivot and everything after (and 
including) the second pointer is greater than the pivot. 
The process is repeated until the two pointers mark the 
same spot. Only one more pass is needed for the 
example, giving: 
JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN 
(pivot) ** 
Because the first sublist is less than the pivot, 
'GEORGE' belongs with that sublist. Another clever 
aspect of the traditional sorting-in-place procedure is 
that the (doubly) marked item can now be exchanged with 
the pivot. Applying this action to the situation above 
has the effect of moving 'GEORGE' to the correct sublist 
and placing 'JANE' in the correct position for final 
output, partitioning the original list into two sublists 
to be sorted recursively in the same way: 
GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN 
( new sublist ) (new sublist) 
Let us now take a look at two more precise formulations. 
BROOKSHEAR'S QUICKSORT 
Brookshear (p. 169) gives the following effective 
procedure in pseudocode. (The list is viewed as 
vertical with the beginning at the top.) The ranges of 




if (the list contains fewer than two entries) 
then (declare the list sorted) 
else (select the first entry in the list 
as the pivot, 
place pointers at the first and last 
entries of the list, 
while(the pointers do not coincide) 
do (move the bottom pointer up 
to the nearest entry less 
than or equal to the pivot 
but not beyond the top 
pointer, 
move the top pointer down 
to the nearest entry 
greater than the pivot but 
not beyond the bottom 
pointer, 
if (the pointers do not 
coincide) 
then (interchange the names 
indicated by the 
pointers)), 
interchange the pivot entry with the 
entry indicated by the common 
pointers, 
sort (the portion of the list above 
the pivot), 
sort (the portion of the list below 
the pivot)) 
An appropriate level of description to convey this 
information applied to the example input can be given 
using states, each of which consists of an ordered list 
of names, along with indices for specifying the pivot and 
top and bottom markers. There is some leeway here; for 
example the names themselves could be used for the pivot 
and markers. I have chosen to use the name for the 
pivot and integral indices for the markers. This 
reflects the procedure's description of top and bottom 
'pointers' as opposed to list and pivot 'entries'. 
Labels correspond in general to pseudocode nouns 
following definite articles, though list items are 
grouped together. The 'WHOLE LIST' is also included to 
keep track of the whole list for this run in addition to 
the list being sorted by the current version of the 
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procedure. The multiple views of the list, assuming 
there may be just one such list in a particular 
realisation, brings in an abstraction operation not yet 
described. This is 'duplication'; it simply allows 
viewing the same lower level description in two ways at a 
higher level. Complete details are given in Chapter V. 
Returning to the example, the initial state can be given 
as: 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 




(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
The next state gives the situation after selecting the 
first name as the pivot and placing pointers at the top 
and bottom. (Changed values are underlined for 
legibility; this is not meant to be part of the state.) 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 10 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Since the top and bottom pointers are not coincident, 
they are moved in sequence, bottom pointer first, giving: 
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LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 8 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST 2: 
(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 4 BOTTOM: 8 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST 2: 
(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Since TOP and BOTTOM are different, an interchange is 
carried out between the two names indicated by them: 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 4 BOTTOM: 8 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Already, the kind of detail masked by this level of 
description can be seen. Exactly how comparisons are 
performed and even exactly which comparisons are 
performed are not shown. The former is not given by 
Brookshear either; the latter is implied in his 
discussion of the procedure but not given explicitly in 
the pseudocode. It is not clear from the discussion or 
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pseudocode whether the top pointer should start at the 
pivot or after it, something which the state descriptions 
at this level require and show precisely. 
The top and bottom pointers do not yet coincide, so the 
while loop is repeated, again shifting the bottom and 
then the top marker: 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 4 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 7 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
The end of loop condition has been satisfied, so the 
pivot is placed in its final position. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 7 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: (GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
SUBLIST2: (TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Now all that remains is to sort the two new lists. 
According to Brookshear's procedure, the first sublist is 
sorted first. The following states provide a 
description of the process. 
Initial state: 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
PIVOT : U TOP : U BOTTOM : U 
SUBLIST1 U 
SUBLIST2 : U 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Set the pivot and pointers: 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL__BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move the bottom pointer (no change is made in the state), 
and then move the top pointer: 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 6 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Exchange the pivot ('GEORGE') with the item pointed to by 
both pointers ('BILL'): 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 6 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: (BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
SUBLIST2: ( ) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Next sort the new first sublist, starting by initialising 
the pivot and pointers: 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP 1 BOTTOM: 5 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Then move the bottom pointer: 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 3 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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The top pointer is shifted one place to BOB: 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 2 BOTTOM: 3 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
An exchange is carried out: 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 2 BOTTOM: 3 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move the bottom pointer: 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 2 BOTTOM: 2 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
The top pointer remains the same; an exchange takes 




(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 2 BOTTOM: 2 
SUBLIST1: (ALICE) 
SUBLIST2: (BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALI,CE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Since the new first list consists of just 'ALICE' and is 
less than two items long, it is considered to be sorted 
already. Attention turns to the second sublist. The 
next state shows the values after initialisation of the 
pivot and pointers for this list: 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BOB TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 3 
SUBLIST1: ( ) 
SUBLIST2: (CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
This list '(BOB CHERYL CAROL)' is handled similarly, and 
so is the sublist at the end '(TOM SUE JOHN)'. A more 
detailed version of this example is given in Appendix A. 
The same type of states are used, but it also includes 
states reflecting the 'return' from each recursive call 
to an earlier state. The sequence of states included in 
this section form a legal abstraction of the algorithm 
given in Appendix A. 
In addition to establishing a basis for comparison, this 
section provided an introduction to Quicksort at a 
typical level of description. In fact, Quicksort is 
often introduced to students with informal state diagrams 
showing the items to be sorted, the pivot and two 




Now let us turn to a much more detailed and precise 
formulation of Quicksort from Volume 3 of Donald Knuth's 
The Art of Computer Programming (1973, pages 117 - 119). 
It is presented in MIX assembly language as defined by 
Knuth in Volume 1 (1968). I shall include it here, 
almost in its entirety, omitting only the timing 
information for each line and the final straight 
insertion sort intended for small lists.' The comments 
include references to steps (Q1, Q2, etc.) and variables 
('1' for left, 'r' for right, 'i' and 'j' for pointers -- 
much like TOP and BOTTOM in Brookshear's version). 
These and the MIX registers and storage locations are 
described in Appendix B, which also contains the detailed 
algorithm or state sequence for the example using input 
'JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN'. 
It is not necessary to understand this somewhat daunting 
chunk of code completely. The relevant points should 
become clear in the discussion afterwards. Unless the 
reader is familiar with assembler languages, I suggest 
reading only the description in the appendix and the 
comments at the right in the procedure below, at least on 
the first time through. If even more details are 
required than are provided here, they can be found in 
Volumes 1 and 3 of Knuth's series. 
Without further ado, the program: 
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A EQU 2:3 
B EQU 4:5 








































First component of stack entry 
Second component of stack entry 
Q.1. Initialize.,Set stack empty. 
1 <- 1. 
r <- N. 
Q2. Begin new stage.j <- r + 1. 
K <- K1, R <- R1 
i <- 1 + 1. 
To Q3 omitting 'i <- i + 1'. 
Q6.. Exchange. 
Ri <-> Rj 
Q3._Compare_Ki_:K. i <- i + 1. 
Repeat if K > Ki 
Q4.Comp4re K : Kj.j <- j - 1. 
Repeat if K < K j' . 
Q5_. _,Test,___i : j . 
To Q6 if j > i. 
R1 <- Rj. 
Rj <- R. 
Q7. Put on-stack.. 
r14 <- r - j - M 
rIl <- j - 1 - M. 
JANN 1F Jump if r - j j - 1. 
J1NP 8F To Q8 if M ? j - 1 > r - j. 
J4NP 3F Jump if j - 1 > M? r j. 
INC6 1 (Now j - 1 > r - j > M.) 
ST2 STACK,6(A) 
ENTA -1,5 
STA STACK,6(B) (1, j - 1) _> stack. 
ENT2 1,5 1 <- j + 1. 
JMP 2B To Q2. 
J4NP 8F To Q8 if M ? r - j ? j - 1 . 
1. J 1 NP 4B Jump if r - j > M? j 
INC6 1 (Now r - j ? j - 1 > M.) 
ST3 STACK,6(B) 
ENTA 1,5 
STA STACK,6(A) (j + 1, r) _> stack. 
ENT3 -1,5 r <- j - 1. 
JMP 2B To Q2. 
LD2 STACK,6(A) Q8. Take off stack. 
LD3 STACK,6(B) 
DEC6 1 (1, r) <= stack. 
J6NN 2B To Q2 if stack wasn't empty. 
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FINDING A COMMON ABSTRACTION 
How does one begin to compare two such disparate 
procedures? First, what is alike about them? The 
framework introduced in this thesis allows a more formal 
statement of the question: Is there an abstract algorithm 
that can be implemented by either of the more detailed 
algorithms based on Brookshear's effective procedure and 
Knuth's program for Quicksort? What would it look like? 
Of course a trivial common abstraction is the one that 
describes sorting the example input by any means. The 
first state contains just the input and the second and 
final state contains just the output. Is there some 
algorithm at a lower level of detail that will still be 
an abstraction of both given algorithms? 
As a starting point, we can try to describe the Knuth- 
based algorithm in the terms of the Brookshear-based one. 
While it has a shorter sequence, there is a sense in 
which the former algorithm seems to be a more detailed 
description, including details of comparisons and stacks 
(see the next section) for example. In Appendix C, we 
have a valid abstraction of the Knuth-based algorithm 
using the LIST, PIVOT, TOP, BOTTOM and SUBLIST labels 
inspired by Brookshear. (The particular abstraction 
operations are detailed in that appendix.) A common 
abstraction can be constituted by selecting the states 
wherein this description of the WHOLE LIST coincides with 
the WHOLE LIST of the Brookshear algorithm in Appendix A. 
Selecting the first states containing each new WHOLE LIST 
results in the following algorithm. (Again, value 
changes are underlined for clarity. Only the label- 
value pair for the WHOLE LIST is given, as all of the 




(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
This new sequence says nothing about how the two sublists 
separated by 'JANE', in the third state above, are sorted 
to produce the final ordering of the fourth and last 
state. In addition, it says nothing about which sublist 
is sorted first or indeed if they are sorted in sequence 
or in parallel. In the constraints of the framework, of 
course, any lower level description is given in terms of 
definite sequences of states, but these may reflect 
simultaneous (at a given level of description) or 
interleaved changes to both lists. Nor does the above 
algorithmic sequence say anything about how the names to 
be exchanged are found; the details of the pointer 
movements have been suppressed. 
To put this back into a procedural description, the 
algorithm including the above sequence could be 
abbreviated by the following pseudocode procedure, where 
states contain only the whole list and are changed 
whenever that list changes. 
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procedure newsort 
if (the list contains fewer than two entries) 
then 
(declare the list sorted) 
else 
((select the first entry in the list as 
the pivot), 
repeat 
(find the first entry in the list, 
starting from the beginning, that 
is greater than the pivot and find 
the first entry in the list, starting 
from the end, that is less than or 
equal to the pivot) 
if (both searches are successful 
and the found items are out of 
order) 
then (interchange them) 
until (only one search succeeds or both 
succeed, with the found items in 
order), 
interchange the pivot entry with the 
entry found, if any, that is less 
than or equal to it, 
newsort (th,-- portion of the list above 
the pivot) 
and newsort (the portion of the list below 
the pivot)) 
The use of 'and' above is intended to indicate that 
parallel processing is allowable. The 'repeat ... 
until' construct is a loop similar to 'while' except that 
the test (in this case that 'only one search succeeds or 
both succeed, with the found items in order') is not 
carried out until the body of the loop has been executed 
at least once. Newsort captures what is common to the 
two textbook Quicksort procedures and covers other 
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variations as well. The search for interchangeable 
entries can be carried out in many different ways, 
possibly even in parallel. The two sublists may be 
sorted in parallel, in the first-then-second order (as 
suggested by Brookshear's procedure), in shorter-then- 
longer order (as suggested by Knuth's program), or 
longer-then-shorter or second-then-first and so on. 
A further abstraction is possible by mapping the ordered 
lists to unordered sets. While Quicksort is defined in 
terms of ordered input and ordered output, a more general 
algorithm can be defined which requires only the output 
to be ordered. Using duplication, we can view the WHOLE 
LIST in our earlier four-state sequence as unordered 
input and ordered output, as in 
INPUT: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
OUTPUT: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
INPUT: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
OUTPUT: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
INPUT: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
OUTPUT: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
INPUT: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
OUTPUT: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
This suggests an interesting variation on Quicksort that 
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could be realised physically with balls in urns for input 
(borrowing the illustrative device used in probability 
theory) and ordered output. Such an algorithm could be 
abbreviated by the following procedure. Note that we 
now have a random choice of pivot as in the original 
Quicksort formulation. 
procedure newsort2 
if (the input contains fewer than two entries) 
then 
if (the input contains exactly one entry) 
then 




((select an entry from the input as the pivot), 
(divide the remaining entries into two sets 
depending on whether they are less than or 
equal to the pivot or greater than the pivot, 
keeping a count of how many entries are in the 
less-than-or-equal set), 
(place the pivot in the output position one place 
past the count of how many entries are in the 
less-than-or-equal set), 
(sort the two sets created above)) 
The 'division of remaining entries' could have a fast 
physical realisation describable as parallel. Imagine a 
device with chutes for each ball and a check that the 
entry (a value on each ball -- a label or weight perhaps) 
is greater than a variable value. The pivot is chosen 
and the device set to check for the pivot's value. The 
remaining balls are rolled down the chutes and shunted 
into the appropriate bins, at least one of which has a 
counter at its entrance. 
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It is not so obvious how to abstract away from the choice 
of the initial entry as pivot in the von-Neumann-inspired 
algorithms presented earlier, nor is it obvious how to 
abstract away from the variations possible with respect 
to handling of other entries of equal value to the pivot. 
The realisation above however, suggests an efficient 
alternative for multiple equal entries. At the 
algorithmic level, this could be described in terms of a 
third set. When the entries are divided, they are 
placed in either of three sets depending on whether they 
are greater than the pivot (as before), or strictly less 
than the pivot, or equal to it. A count need only be 
kept for the less-than set. Finally, the pivot and all 
entries in the equal set are placed in consecutive output 
positions starting at one past the count of entries in 
the less-than set. 
By considering Quicksort as state sequences divorced from 
the implicit constraints of the usual realisations, we 
have arrived at a rather different version with a 
possible realisation that is describable as highly 




if (the input contains fewer than two entries) 
then 
if (the input contains exactly one entry) 
then 




((select an entry from the input as the pivot), 
(divide the remaining entries into three sets 
depending on whether they are less than, 
greater than, or equal to the pivot, keeping a 
count of how many entries are in the less-than 
set), 
(place the pivot and all entries in the equal 
set in consecutive output positions starting at 
one past the count of entries in the less-than 
set), 
(sort the two remaining sets created above)) 
A COMPARISON OF LOWER LEVEL ALGORITHMS BASED ON 
THE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES OF BROOKSHEAR AND KNUTH 
It should be clear by now that any two Quicksort 
algorithms are not likely to be the same, although they 
probably have a common abstraction that contains more 
than just input and output. Whether this is actually 
true for a pair of algorithms is an empirical question. 
There is a huge amount of variation possible at the 
levels of detail implied by the usual descriptions of 
effective procedures and programs. 
Let us now take another look at the algorithms based on 
Knuth's MIX program and Brookshear's effective procedure. 
A quick glance reveals that the MIX program is in a sense 
the 'lower level' one, specifying more detail. It would 
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not be a surprise if it were suggested that the MIX 
program is one of many possible implementations of 
Brookshear's higher level effective procedure. Some 
might even say that Brookshear's version is at the 
algorithmic level and that Knuth's is at the hardware 
implementation level -- it is close to machine code after 
all, concerned with registers, storage addresses and the 
like. 
In the new framework developed here, however, the Knuth 
version, when taken as an abbreviation for a sequence of 
states, is not obviously an implementation of 
Brookshear's version, at least when the states are taken 
to include a level of detail similar to that implied by 
their respective textbook descriptions. There is some 
flexibility in the choice of detail to include. I shall 
use the storage areas explicitly mentioned in both cases 
as a guide to determine which label-value pairs to put in 
each state. A new state is added to a sequence for each 
statement or step that potentially affects one of these 
label-value pairs. More detail is possible. As an 
example, for the MIX program, I could have added the 
special registers for comparisons and jumps (not 
specified in the program but described elsewhere by 
Knuth), or even the storage of the statements of the 
program itself in machine code, along with an indication 
of the next statement to be executed. (This information 
is also discernible from Knuth's specification of MIX.) 
Before examining the differences, note that there are at 
least two ways in which the Knuth algorithm could provide 
an explanation of some higher level algorithms. Even at 
the relatively gross level of description shown earlier 
in this chapter, representing just the items to be sorted 
whenever one of them is changed, more detail could be 
given about exactly how an exchange is carried out. 




(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
(This could be abstracted from the sequences in Appendix 
A or C, or many other possible sequences.) Now compare 
this to a possible abstraction as defined above of the 
corresponding Knuth sequence. It begins: 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
This tells us something about how the exchange is carried 
out, or at least prompts a hypothesis. The two 
exchanged items are not switched simultaneously; rather, 
'CHERYL' is copied across first. Of course, there may 
be some nondeterminism allowing the possibility of 
different methods of exchange even for this same input. 
But looking only at this case, more details are provided 
than in the previous one. Indeed, if we go back to the 
program and view it as an abbreviation for such state 
sequences, there is no such nondeterminism: this case 
will always be handled in this way. We might also 
theorise that there must be a still more detailed 
description of this system, revealing that 'TOM' is 
stored away so as not to be lost before the final state 
above. An examination of the algorithm in Appendix B 
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shows that it is indeed saved away in a place represented 
by rX. 
Another example of detail given by the Knuth algorithm 
that could provide an explanation for a higher level 
algorithm is its handling of some comparisons between two 
values. r14 and r15 are compared by copying the value 
in r15 into rX and then subtracting the value in r14 from 
the value in rX. Of course, the movement of values in 
the example in Appendix B and other cases only provides 
supporting evidence for this theory. Even stronger 
evidence would be provided by a more detailed algorithm 
which revealed the interaction of the machine code 
statements equivalent to ENTX 0,5 (in MIX assembly 
language, this means 'Enter into rX the value contained 
in r15, adding 0 to it first') and DECX 0,4 (in MIX: 
'Decrement the value in rX by the value in r14, 
subtracting 0 from it first') with these values. 
Other comparisons are not spelled out in so much detail 
in the appendix. The comparisons governed by the 
instruction CMPA and implicit in jump instructions, such 
as JANN 1F or J1NP 8F, are examples of these. In MIX, 
CMPA INPUT, 5 means 'Compare the value in rA to the input 
value at a position determined by the value in rI5'. A 
comparison indicator is set to LESS, EQUAL or GREATER, 
and it is used to control some jumps or branches, such as 
JG for 'Jump if greater'. JANN 1F means 'Jump if the 
value in rA is not negative, moving control to the first 
instruction in the forward direction labelled by 1H'. 
J1NP 8F means 'Jump if the value in rIl is not positive; 
go to the next instruction in the forward direction 
labelled by 8H'. 
Returning to differences that illustrate contradictions 
between the algorithms in Appendices A and B, we can see 
that neither is a straightforward implementation, or 
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more detailed version, of the other. Four examples are 
described here, though there may be more. 
The first is the order in which sublists are handled 
after an initial list has been divided by the choice of 
pivot. In the algorithm based on Brookshear, the first 
sublist (top to bottom in his terminology, left to right 
in Knuth's) is always dealt with first. The Knuth-based 
algorithm sorts the shorter sublist first. It also 
allows arbitrary choice of the minimal number of items in 
a sublist to be sorted by some other method. This is 
obscured in the sample sequence in Appendix B by setting 
M (the minimum number of list elements), to 1 for more 
direct comparison with the other algorithm. 
Both algorithms contain some detail about the movement of 
pointers, or the values taken on by TOP, BOTTOM, r14 and 
rI5. The Brookshear-based algorithm changes the value 
of BOTTOM before TOP, considering the items at the end of 
the list first. Directly opposed to this (and not just 
a more detailed version of the same algorithm from this 
perspective), the Knuth-based algorithm starts at the 
left (or beginning) of the list of items. The sets of 
values taken on by the pointers in each algorithm are 
different as well. In the Brookshear-based algorithms, 
the top pointer is never allowed to pass below the bottom 
one and vice versa. (Perhaps starting at the bottom is 
related to this.) This is not the case for the Knuth- 
based algorithm, where r14 and rI5 can pass each other by 
(and do in the example given). Indeed, r14 and rI5 can 
take on values pointing just outside the list of items to 
be sorted. These positions are filled in with very low 
and very high values (represented by -INF and +INF, 
respectively) and so are treated much like the other 
values. 
Another interesting difference in the two algorithms is 
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their handling of the recursion inherent in Quicksort. 
The Brookshear-based algorithm leaves the stack (or 
whatever it is that explains the recursion) implicit. 
At the level given, even small sublists (of length one or 
zero) are treated individually (although the two null 
sublists at either end of a list of length one are not). 
Now in common computer science parlance it might be said 
that such inefficiencies (assuming a conventional von 
Neumann system realisation) are 'implementation details' 
and can be cleaned up when the sort is programmed, or may 
even be remedied by a clever compiler. It is worth 
emphasising that in the terminology introduced in the 
last chapter, however, such a modified, version would 
constitute a different algorithm, and one that is not 
necessarily a strict implementation of the one 
abbreviated by Brookshear's effective procedure. Extra 
states can be added at a lower level; none can be taken 
out. At a higher level, on the other hand, a more 
abstract algorithm may omit the states related to the 
trivial lists of length one or zero. 
The Knuth-based algorithm is an example of the more 
'efficient' kind of recursion handling alluded to 
earlier. The stack states are given explicitly (see 
Appendix B) , so it can be seen that not every sublist is 
stacked. Lists of length one or zero are not stacked. 
Neither is the next list to be processed. In the entire 
example in Appendix B, only one list '(GEORGE BOB ALICE 
CHERYL CAROL BILL)' is ever stacked. This contrasts 
with the fourteen lists which are stacked in the 
Brookshear-based algorithm. This efficiency is apparent 
of course only with respect to the relative time and 
space of the algorithmic level of concreteness. The 
Knuth-based algorithm could be realised in a physical 
system that took years to stack a list; in that case it 
would be much slower than the usual classroom realisation 
of the Brookshear-based algorithm. 
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CHAPTER V 
ALGORITHMS FORMALLY REVISITED 
DEFINITIONS 
Having seen how the new definitions of algorithms might 
be employed, a much more rigorous formulation of the 
framework can be tackled. In order to lay a solid 
foundation, Davis and Weyuker's (1983) version of a 
standard formalism is used as a guide. The detailed 
treatment of the preliminaries, covering sets and n- 
tuples, functions, quantifiers and some basic proof 
techniques is omitted here, as the reader can refer to 
this source or any of the many texts which include these 
basic ideas. In addition, Davis and Weyuker's version 
of alphabet and string definitions will be used. Once 
again, most details are omitted here, but the fundamental 
definition is (p. 3): 
An alphabet is simply some finite nonempty set 
A of objects called symbols. An n-tuple of 
symbols of A is called a word or a string on A. 
Instead of writing a word as (al, a2, a3,..., 
an) we write simply ala2a3...an ... The set 
of all words in the alphabet A is written A* 
... We do not distinguish between a symbol a 
in A and the word of length 1 consisting of 
that symbol. 
Strings in A can be concatenated to produce other strings 
in A. So for al and a2 in A, al ; a2 = ala2; this 
signifies the concatenation of al and a2. These 
definitions are useful in giving a formal foundation for 
nice mnemonic labels, such as the ones already used in 
the examples. 
Theoretical computer science provides a formal way (or 
rather many equivalent formal ways) of abstracting away 
from the time and space limitations of physical computing 
devices. In contrast, the goal of this project is to 
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abstract in the different way, away from details, as 
defined in Chapters II and III (and further developed in 
this chapter). Since the motivation and focus is on 
algorithms as descriptions of existing or hypothetical 
physical systems, finite space and time are constraints 
that apply at all levels of description. While this 
prevents some of the elegant generalisations which ignore 
finite space and time, in many ways the mathematical 
formulation is more straightforward. There is no 
halting problem for these finite algorithms. 
Algorithms 
To begin, we define our alphabet A = {'A', 'a', 'B', 'b', 
' C ' , ' c ' , . . . , ' Z ' , ' z ' , ' 0 ' , fl ' , ' 2 ' , ' 3 ' , ' 4 ' ' 5 ' , 
'6', '7', '8', '9', '. '&', ' '). A label (as we 
have been using the term, and not as Davis and Weyuker 
use it) can therefore be defined simply as an element of 
A*. 
For values we start by allowing integers. Through 
techniques such as G8del numbering and formally defined 
strings, it has been shown that finite sequences of 
numbers and characters can be encoded and represented by 
single nonnegative integers. The number -3.975 could be 
represented by the Gtdel number for the sequence (1, 
3975, 3), for example, where 1 indicates the value is 
negative, and 3 indicates the number of digits to the 
right of the decimal (or whatever) point. For 
convenience and without loss of rigour values can be 
written as they have been in preceding chapters, using 
strings (as defined over an alphabet -- A will do for 
both labels and values, but a different set could of 
course be used for each), sequences of values and decimal 
points. Values that can only be specified with an 
infinite number of digits, such as the fully expanded 
decimal value of pi or 1/3, are not legal. 
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So we can say all labels, are drawn from A* and all values 
are drawn from the set of nonnegative integers, which we 
can call N+ (from N, the set of natural numbers, plus 
{o)). While the sets of possible labels and possible 
values are themselves infinite, any particular algorithm 
will use only a finite subset of these. 
A set of labels is defined to be a finite nonempty subset 
of A* A state 
ordered pairs (1, 
value, including 
contained in L. 
v, as in earlier 
over a set of labels L is a set of 
v), where 1 is a label and v is a 
exactly one such pair for each label 
We can also write a pair (1, v) as 1: 
chapters. The string delimiters (the 
inverted commas in 'x', for example) can be omitted from 
the label if the context is clear. Cases in which the 
context may not be clear include labels which contain 
commas. 
An algorithmic sequence over -a set of -labels L is defined 
to be a sequence or list (order is important) of one or 
more, but at most finitely many, states over L. 
Finally, an algorithm over a set of labels L is a finite 
set of algorithmic sequences over L. The constraint of 
finiteness is again a result of considering only 
descriptions of real physical systems. Discrete values 
in such descriptions can never be arbitrarily large, nor 
can infinitely many variations of a value be discerned 
due to limitations of meters (for more on this, see 
Chapter VI). 
Such an algorithm defines an ideal machine. It can be 
defined exactly as an algorithm is defined, as a set of 
sequences of states. Alternatively, it can be seen as a 
set of valid states along with (possibly nondeterministic 
and context-sensitive) legal transactions between them. 
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Abstraction 
At the heart of the theory of strong equivalence of 
complex systems is abstraction. It is defined in three 
parts, for states over a set of labels, for algorithmic 
sequences of such states and for algorithms in general. 
Abstraction and implementation are inverses of each 
other, and the terms are used here to refer to 
abstraction and implementation in terms of detail, not in 
terms of concreteness. 
Most of the abstraction operations or 'relations were 
introduced in Chapter III, though less formally. Two 
new ones are discussed here. The first is duplication 
which we saw in Chapter IV. This is the only operation 
whereby the more abstract algorithm is in some sense 
bigger than the implementation. In these cases, the 
same lower level value may be seen in different ways from 
a higher level, e.g. a compressed value of <2, 3> might 
be separated to 2 and 3 at a higher level. By allowing 
an abstraction on states which duplicates one label-value 
pair, different functions or views of the duplicated 
value can be taken at still higher levels. The second 
new abstraction operation is the combination of states, 
defined as part of abstraction of sequences. Two 
adjacent states can be combined by combining the 
corresponding values from each state. Like the other 
abstraction operations, these have been defined as simple 
relations; more complex abstractions can be defined by 
combining them. 
A state M1 over a set of labels L1 is defined to be an 
abstraction of a state M2 over a (possibly distinct) set 
of labels L2 (and M2 an implementation of M1) if and only 
if one, or more, of the following cases holds. 
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(All functions in the cases are defined for valid states 
{(11, vl), (12, v2), ..., (ln, vn)}). 
Case1. This is 'selection of values' (or more precisely 
of label-value pairs) for an individual state, in the 
more procedural language of Chapter III. 
M1 is a subset of M2. 
In other words, M1 = fL(M2), where fL is a function 
defined as 
fL({(11, vl), (12, v2), ..., (ln, vn))) _ C(li, vi), such 
that (li, vi) is in M2 and li is in L), for some nonempty 
set L which is a subset of L2, the set of labels of M2. 
For example, let M1 = {('x', 0), ('z', 0.5)) and let M2 = 
{('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('z', 0.5)). Then M1 is an 
abstraction of M2, and M2 is an implementation of M1. 
L = {'x' 'z'}. 
Case,,,,,,,2. This is 'change of labels', or 'lateral 
abstraction'. Zero or more of the labels in M1 and M2 
are different, while the values are exactly the same and 
remain paired with their corresponding labels. 
More formally, M1 = fg(M2), where fg is a function 
defined as 
fg({(11, vl), (12, v2), ..., (ln, vn)}) = {(g(ll), vl), 
(g(12), v2), ..., (g(ln), vn)), for some function g which 
defines a one-to-one correspondence between L2 and L1. 
In an example similar to the one for Case 1, let M1 = 
{('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('x ; y', 0.5) and let M2 be the 
same as above, {('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('z', 0.5)). Then 
M1 is an abstraction of M2 once again, and M2 is an 
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implementation of M1. M2 is also an abstraction of M1 
by change of labels, and M1 an implementation of M2. 
The function g maps labels of M2 to labels of M1 
according to the correspondence: 
'x' -> 'x' 
' 
y 
' > I y I 
'z' -> 'x : y 
Similarly, g-1 maps labels of M1 to labels of M2 by the 
reverse correspondence: 
' x ' -> ' x ' 
1 y, -> 1 y 1 
'x ' Y' -> 'z' 
Case 3. This is 'generalised rounding', covering any 
transformation of individual values between states. 
M1 = fg,lj(M2), where fg,lj is a function defined by 
fg,lj(((11, vl), (12, v2), ..., (ln, vn))) = the union of 
((lj, g(vj))) and ((li, vi), li in L1 = L2, li not equal 
to lj), for exactly one lj in L1 = L2, and for some 
function g from N+ into N+. 
If M1 = (('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('z', 1) } and M2 = 
(('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('z', 0.5)), then M1 is an 
abstraction of M2 (where g(0.5) = 1 and lj = 'z'), and M2 
is an implementation of M1. M2 is also an abstraction of 
M1 by this case, where g(1) = 0.5 and lj = 'z'. 
Case 4. This is 'grouping of values' (and corresponding 
grouping of labels). 
M1 = flj,lk(M2); flj,lk is a function defined by 
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flj,lk(((11, vl), (12, v2), .. ., (ln, vn))) = the union 
of ((lj ; ',' ; lk, <vj, vk>)) and ((li, vi), li in L2 
not equal to lj or lk)), for exactly one lj and one lk in 
L2, such that lj does not equal lk. 
An example is M1 = (('x, y', <0, 1>), ('z', 0.5)) and M2 
= (('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('z', 0.5)). M1 is an 
abstraction of M2, and M2 is an implementation of M1, 
where lj = 'x' and lk = 'y'. 
Case 5. This is 'duplication', allowing the abstract 
algorithm to show one implementation value twice. The 
repeated value is paired with a label formed by appending 
a '2' to the end of the label of the original value. 
M1 = flj(M2), where flj is a function defined by 
flj(((11, vl), (12, v2), . . ., (ln, vn)}) = the union of 
((lj ; '2', vj)) and M2, for exactly one lj such that 1j 
is in L2. 
For example, if M1 = (('a', 1), ('a2', 1), ('b', 2)) and 
M2 = (('a', 1), ('b', 2)), M1 is an abstraction of M2 by 
duplication. M2 is also an abstraction of M1, but by 
selection of values. 
Case 6. This is 'chain of abstraction for states'. 
There exist states Mil, Mil, ..., Min (n in N), such that 
M1 is an abstraction of Mil by one of Cases 1 - 5, Mil is 
an abstraction of Mil by one of Cases 1 - 5, ..., and Min 
is an abstraction of M2 by one of Cases 1 - 5. This 
allows arbitrarily (but finitely) many combinations of 
the first five cases. 
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M1 = f(M2), where f is the composition of the appropriate 
defining functions of Cases 1 - 5. 
For example, let M1 = (('input', <0, 1>), ('output', 1)) 
and M2 = (('x', 0), ('y', 1), ('z', 0.5)). That M1 is 
an abstraction of M2 can be shown in this way: Let Mil = 
(('x, y', <0, 1>), ('z', 1)). M1 is an abstraction of 
Mil by Case 2 (change of labels). Let Mi2 = (('x', 0), 
('y', 1), ('z', 1)). Mil is an abstraction of Mi2 by 
Case 4, grouping of values and labels. Finally, Mi2 is 
an abstraction of M2 by Case 3 (generalised rounding). 
The definition of abstraction from states to states forms 
the basis of abstraction from and to sequences and 
algorithms in general. The rather minimal constraints 
of state abstraction are strengthened by the requirement 
of uniformity of state abstraction across sequences on 
their own and within algorithms. 
An algorithmic sequence S1 is defined, to be an 
abstraction of an algorithmic sequence S2 (and S2 is, an 
implementation of Si) if and only if one, or more, of the 
following holds: 
Case 1. This is 'selection of states'. 
S1 has strictly fewer states than S2, and any states 
occurring in S1 also occur in S2 and they occur in the 
same order. S2 is not an abstraction of S1 by this 
case; there is at least one state in S2 that is not in 
S1. 
Case 2. This is 'uniform state-by-state abstraction'. 
If S2 = (M1, M2, . . ., Mn), then S1 = F(S2), for some 
function F defined by 
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F((M1, M2, ..., Mn)) = (f(Ml), f(M2), ..., f(Mn)), for 
some function f which defines f(Mi) as a valid state 
abstraction of Mi, for each state Mi of S2. 
Case 3. This is 'combination of states'. 
Si contains one less state than S2, and for exactly two 
adjacent states M2a and M2b of sequence S2, there exists 
state Mla in sequence Si such that 
M2a = {(11, vl2a), (12, v22a), (ln, vn2a)), 
M2b = {(11, vl2b), (12, v22b), (In, vn2b)), and 
Mla = {(Ii, <vi2a, vi2b>), i = 1, ..., n).' 
All other corresponding states in Si and S2 are equal, 
and they retain their order relative to each other and to 
the combining (or combined) states. 
Case 4. This is 'chain of abstraction for algorithmic 
sequences'. 
There exist algorithmic sequences Sil, Si2, ..., Sin, 
such that Si is an abstraction of Sil by Case 1, 2 or 3, 
Sil is an abstraction of Si2 by Case 1, 2 or 3, ... , and 
Sin is an abstraction of S2 by Case 1, 2 or 3. This 
allows arbitrarily (but finitely) many combinations of 
the first three cases. 
An algorithm Al is defined to be an abstraction of an 
algorithm A2 (and A2 is an implementation of Al) if and 
only if either of the following holds: 
Case 1. This is 'selection of sequences'. 
Al is a subset of A2. 
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Case 2. This is 'abstraction over sequences'. 
Al is not a subset of A2, but for every algorithmic 
sequence S1 in Al, S1 is an abstraction of S2 for some 
algorithmic sequence S2 in A2. 
THEOREMS 
A number of theorems follow directly from the 
definitions. A sampling of such theorems is included 
here with proofs to show how the formal multilevel theory 
of algorithms can be expanded and enriched, and to give 
the flavour of the proofs. 
Theorem (trivial abstraction): Every algorithm, 
algorithmic sequence and state over a set of labels is an 
abstraction (and implementation) of itself. 
Proof of the-theorem: Working backwards from states to 
algorithms, let S be a state over a set of labels M. 
Then S is a subset of S, so S is an abstraction of 
itself, by Case 1 of the definition of state abstraction. 
If Segl and Seq2 are algorithmic sequences and Segl = 
Seq2, then for every state S in Segl, S is an abstraction 
of itself (from the portion of the proof just given 
above) and therefore of the corresponding state in Seq2. 
By uniform state-by-state abstraction, then, Segl is an 
abstraction of Seq2 = Segl. 
For algorithms, for every algorithm A, A is a subset of 
A, and therefore an abstraction of A (by Case 1 of the 
definition of algorithmic abstraction). 
Theorem (another kind of trivial abstraction): The empty 
set is an abstraction of every algorithm. 
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Proof of the theorem: Again, this follows from Case 1 of 
algorithmic abstraction, since {) is a subset of A, where 
A is an arbitrary algorithm. 
Theorem: The union of two algorithms defined over the 
same set of labels is again an algorithm, and the 
resultant new algorithm is an implementation of each of 
the two original algorithms. (The union of two states 
over the same set of labels is not a valid state at all, 
in general.) 
Proof of the theorem: Let Al and A2 be algorithms over 
some set of labels M. Then both Al and A2 contain only 
sequences over M. Let A3 be the union of Al and A2. 
A3 contains only sequences over M, since any one of its 
elements is also an element of either Al or A2 (or both). 
Therefore, A3 is an algorithm over M. Since Al and A2 
are subsets of A3, they are abstractions of A3 and A3 is 
an implementation of each of them. (The parenthetical 
claim is proved with an example. Let M = {'x') be a set 
of labels. Then {('x', 0)) is a state over M, as is 
f('x', 1)). The union of these two states gives {('x', 
0), ('x', 1)), which is not a valid state over M: it is 
not in one-to-one correspondence with M and it has two 
pairs with the same first element, or label.) 
Theorem: The empty set is not a valid state over any set 
of labels. 
Proof of the theorem: Let S be a state over a set of 
labels M. Assume S is empty. By definition, S 
contains an ordered pair for each member of M, so M must 
be empty. But this contradicts the definition of a set 
of labels as a finite nonempty subset of A*. The 
assumption must have been false; S cannot be both empty 
and a state over M. 
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Theorem: Given any two algorithms A and B, there exists 
an algorithm C such that C is an abstraction of A and C 
is an abstraction of B. 
Proof of the theorem: Since the empty set is an 
abstraction of all algorithms (including A and B), let C 
= 0. 
This trivial abstraction is somewhat unsatisfying. We 
can prove something stronger as it turns out. 
Theorem: Given any two nonempty algorithms A and B, 
there exists a nonempty algorithm C such that C is an 
abstraction of A and C is an abstraction of B. 
This too turns out to be quite simple, once we prove the 
following lemma. 
Lemma: {({('x', 1)})} is an abstraction of every 
nonempty algorithm. 
Proof of the lemma: Let C1 be a nonempty algorithm. 
Choose an element Segl from Cl. (Cl is an algorithm and 
therefore finite, so choice is uncontroversial. If more 
detail is desired, a rule can be specified, such as 
'choose the pair with the first label, according to the 
numeric ordering of labels'.) Then C2 = {Segl} is an 
abstraction of Cl, because it is a subset of C1. 
We can continue to 'abstract up' to {({('x',1)})}, by 
applying selection of states, selection of values, change 
of labels and rounding (the latter three as part of 
uniform state-by-state abstraction) to the sequence of 
C2. 
Seql must be equal to (S1, S2, ..., Sn), where n>O and 
each Si is a state over M. Then (S1) is an abstraction 
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of Segl (by selection of states), so C3 = {(S1)} is an 
abstraction of C2 and of Cl (by chain of abstraction). 
Now, looking more closely at the state itself, Si = 
{(11, vl), (12, v2), ..., (lm, vm)} for 11, 12, lm 
in M and vl, v2, ..., vm in N+. By selection of values, 
we have Si' = ((11, vl)), and Si' is a subset of Si. 
Therefore, Si' is an abstraction of Si and C4 = 
{({(11, vl)})} is an abstraction of C3 and of Cl. 
C5 = {({('x', vl)})} is an abstraction of C4, by change 
of labels, using the correspondence 'x' <-> 11. 
Finally, we can find a very gross rounding function g 
which maps all v in N+ onto 1, and in particular maps vl 
onto 1. When this function is applied to the values for 
'x' in the state in the sequence of C5, we get 
{({('x', 1)})} as an abstraction of C5, and therefore of 
Cl, the arbitrary nonempty algorithm that was our 
starting point. This ends the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of,,, the, ,theorem: Let C = { ({ (' x' , 1) }) } . By the 
lemma, C is an abstraction of A and B, and the proof is 
complete. 
An informal restatement of the two preceding theorems is 
that any two systems are equivalent at some level of 
abstraction. It is most likely possible to prove still 
more complex common abstractions exist for more complex 
cases. 
Most importantly, the framework provides a mechanism for 
proving the equivalence of algorithms and for showing 
whether or not one is an abstraction of the other. In 
the next two sections we see that the framework is not 
too weak to be meaningful and that it provides the means 
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for proving a restricted (finite) version of Church's 
Thesis. 
The following results will come in useful for the next 
section. First, a notational definition: 
Definition: If S is an algorithmic sequence, then ;S; is 
the number of states in S. 
Theorem: Let S1 and S2 be algorithmic sequences such 
that S1 is an abstraction of S2. Then ;51; is less than 
or equal to ;52;. 
Proof of the theorem: Let S1 have m states and S2 have 
n states. Consider the four cases of the sequential 
abstraction relationship. 
Case 1. Selection of states. 
In this case the n states of S1 all occur in S2, and at 
least one other state is in S2 as well, so m < n. 
Case 2. Uniform state-by-state abstraction. 
A precondition for this case is that m = n. 
Case 3. Combination of states. 
Here, S1 has one less state than S2, so m = n - 1, and 
m < n. 
Case 4 allows any finite combination of the above. S1 
is an abstraction of some sequence Sil, which is an 
abstraction of Si2, ..., which is an abstraction of S2. 
By the first three cases above, we can conclude that at 
each stage 
171 
£ :Sil; i :Si2i <_ ... £ !Sin: <_ iS2i 
Therefore, ;S1; is less than or equal to ;S2;, which is 
what we set out to prove. 
Corollary: If S1 is a sequential abstraction of S2 and 
S1; _ ;52;, then for any intermediate abstraction S, 
S; _ ;S1; = ;S2;. 
Proof of-the corollary: This is a simple consequence of 
the theorem, with an intermediate sequence of states 
being squeezed between the more and less abstract 
sequences. 
More explicitly, we know from the theorem that n <i ;S 
and that ;S; <_ n, where n = ;51; = ;52;. So ;S; must be 
n as well. 
Theorem: _Let S1 and S2 be algorithmic sequences, where 
S1; = ;52; and S1 is an abstraction of S2. Then the 
abstraction can be defined by Case 2 of the definition of 
sequential abstraction (uniform state-by-state 
abstraction). 
Proof of the theorem: Consider each of the other cases 
in turn (if not in order) of the definition of sequential 
abstraction. 
Case 1. For this case to hold, S1 must have strictly 
fewer states than S2, but this is not true. 
Furthermore, by the above corollary this sort of 
abstraction cannot occur in any chain of abstraction 
between S1 and S2, because ;51; = ;S21. 
Case 3. Similarly, here S1 must have one less state than 
S2. The same argument holds as for Case 1. 
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Case 4. This is the combination case, allowing a finite 
chain of sequential abstractions. We have already seen 
however that no chain can include Case 1 or Case 3 
abstraction, leaving only single or multiple instances of 
Case 2 (uniform state-by-state) abstraction. But it 
turns out that these are equivalent. To complete the 
proof, then, we prove the following lemma, 
Lemma: Let S1 and S2 be algorithmic sequences such that 
S1 is an abstraction of S2 by Case 4 of the definition of 
sequential abstraction, comprising multiple instances of 
uniform state-by-state abstraction. Then S1 is an 
abstraction of S2 by just one instance of uniform state- 
by-state abstraction. 
Proof of the lemma: By Case 4 of the definition of 
sequential abstraction (for multiple abstractions) and 
the assumptions of the lemma, there exist algorithmic 
sequences Sil, Sit, ..., Sin, such that S1 is an 
abstraction of Sil by uniform state-by-state abstraction, 
Sil is an abstraction of Sit by uniform state-by-state 
abstraction, ..., and Sin is an abstraction of S2 by 
uniform state-by-state abstraction. By Case 2 of the 
same definition (for uniform state-by-state abstraction), 
if Mij is the jth state of S1, Milj is the jth state of 
Sil, etc., then Mij is a state abstraction of Miij, which 
is a state abstraction of Mi2j, . . . , which is a state 
abstraction of M2j, for j from 1 to ;Si;. But this fits 
the definition of state abstraction by Case 6 (finitely 
many multiple abstractions), so each Mlj is an 
abstraction of each M2j, using the uniform functions, or 
subsets of them. So S1 is an abstraction of S2 by a 
single instance of uniform state-by-state abstraction. 
(This can be thought of as pushing the chain of 
abstraction back to the state description and away from 
the sequence description of abstraction.) This 
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completes the proofs of both the lemma and the preceding 
theorem. 
MORE THEOREMS: NOT EVERYTHING IMPLEMENTS EVERYTHING 
In terms of the framework built up throughout this thesis 
and, in particular, the definitions given in the previous 
section of this chapter, the theorem that not everything 
can be implemented by everything may be stated as 
follows. 
Theorem. There exist algorithms Al and A2 such that Al 
is not an implementation of A2. 
If this is true, then we also have the easy corollary 
which comes from simply reversing (the content of) Al and 
A2: 
Corollary. There exist algorithms Al and A2 such that Al 
is not an abstraction of A2. 
Proof of, the _coro,llary. This follows from the 
definitions of implementation and abstraction, plus the 
theorem to be proved. 
Proof of-- the, theorem. To prove the theorem, all that is 
required is an example of such a pair of algorithms Al 
and A2, along with a demonstration that the first cannot 
be viewed as an implementation of the second. 
Let Al = {} 
Let A2 = (Seg2), where Seq2 = ({'x', 0}). 
A2 is not a subset of Al, nor is it true that Seq2 is an 
abstraction of some algorithmic sequence in Al. 
Therefore A2 is not an abstraction of Al and Al is not an 
implementation of A2. 
174 
Only slightly less straightforward is the proof for 
sequences. 
Theorem. There exist algorithmic sequences Seg1 and 
Seq2 such that Seg1 is not an implementation of Seq2. 
= Proof_,.of ..the. theorem. Let Seg1 = (Si) and let Seq2 
(S2, S3), where Si, S2 and S3 are states. 
If we assume Seg1 is an implementation of Seq2, then Seq2 
is an abstraction of Seg1. By an earlier result we know 
that that implies ;Seg2; is less than or equal to ;Seg1;. 
But that would mean 2 is less than or equal to 1, a 
contradiction. 
It is more complicated to show the following: 
Theorem. There exist algorithmic sequences Seg1 and 
Seq2 where ;Seg1; _ ;Seg2; and Seg1 is not an 
implementation of Seq2. 
Proof... of the_ theorem. 
Let Seg1 = ({('x', 0)}, {('x', 0)}). 
Let Seq2 = ({('x', 0)}, {('x', 1)}). 
The question of whether Seq2 is a legal abstraction of 
Seg1 reduces to the question of whether or not there 
exists a uniform state-by-state abstraction from Seg1 to 
Seq2. This reduction is a direct consequence of the 
final theorem of the earlier section, 'Theorems', of this 
chapter. Paraphrasing, that theorem states that two 
algorithmic sequences with the same number of states, one 
implementing the other, are related by one instance of 
uniform state-by-state abstraction. 
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What remains to be shown, then, can be given as a lemma: 
Lemma. Seq2 is not a possible (sequential) abstraction 
of Segl by uniform state-by-state abstraction, where 
Segl = ({('x', 0)}, {('x', 0)}) and 
Seq2 = ({('x', 0)}, {('x', 1)}). 
First, a more general result can be shown. Call it 
The State-by,-State, Fun,ct on ............... .L,emma,: If S1 is a 
(sequential) abstraction of S2 then there exists a 
function F, such that if S1 = (M11, M12, ..., M1n) and 
S2 = (M21, M22, ..., M2n), then M11 = F(M21), M12 = 
F(M22), ..., Mln = F(M2n). 
.Proof of..... he......,,,,$tate-by,-State, _Function Lemma. This 
follows directly from the definitions of uniform state- 
by-state sequential abstraction and the six cases of 
state abstraction. The first five cases of state 
abstraction are defined by showing the function from the 
implementation state to the abstract state. The sixth 
case (a chain of abstractions of any of the first five 
sorts) gives the relation as a composition of functions, 
which is again a function. The uniformity constraint of 
the sequential abstraction definition ensures that the 
same function F applies for each Mli = F(M2i). 
Proofo.f the _f irst, 1emma. Seq2 = ({ (' x' , 0)), 
(('x', 1))) and Segl = ((('x', 0)), {('x', 0))). By the 
State-by-State Function Lemma, there exists a function F 
such that F((('x', '0'))) {('x', '0')} and 
F((('x', '0'))) _ {('x', '1')}. So either F is not a 
function (a contradiction) or Seq2 is not an abstraction 
of Segl by uniform state-by-state abstraction. This 
completes the proof of the first lemma. 
The proof of the main theorem is now complete as well. 
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ALGORITHMS AND COMPUTABILITY: WEAK EQUIVALENCE 
The class of functions computed by algorithms is the same 
as that computed by Turing machines with finite tapes or 
programs with bounded input, and where the functions are 
defined for each of the finitely many finite inputs. 
Note that nothing is said about inputs that are not 
covered by the definition. We might call this class the 
class of bounded_computable_, functions or the class of 
functions computed by f,n,ite tape,. automata. Finite tape 
automata can be distinguished from finite state automata 
in that the latter tend to be defined for an infinite set 
of inputs. In the theoretical computer science and 
philosophical literature, finite tape automata and finite 
state automata are often (erroneously) equated. Davis 
and Weyuker (1983, p. 149) contrast them to general 
Turing machines: 
At the opposite pole, one can imagine a device 
which moves from left to right on a 
finite input tape, and it is just such devices, 
the so-called fi,n,i,te..-,,,automata, that we will 
now study. (My emphasis first, and then 
theirs). 
Yet it is hard to find an example in their text of a 
finite language accepted by such a machine. More 
typical is the standard example of anbm, where n and m 
are any integer and a and b are in the alphabet. 
Putnam also equates finite tape machines and finite state 
machines (Putnam, 1967; p. 409 in Putnam, 1975), 
commenting parenthetically that 
Of the many useful equivalent definitions of 'finite automaton', the most useful for present 
purposes is the one that results if the 
definition of a Turing Machine is modified, by 
specifying that the tape should be finite. 
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Indeed Chomsky's famous demonstration (1957, p. 21) that 
'English is not a finite state language' would be rather 
different (and trivial to prove, given that all his 
example input sets are infinite) if stated in terms of 
finite tape machines. 
The functions computed by finite tape automata are not 
even a subset of the computable functions, strictly 
speaking, due to the latter being defined over infinitely 
many inputs. Somewhat surprisingly considering their 
finite restrictions, the class of functions described by 
algorithms is better seen as a subset of partially 
computable functions. To leave an output undefined in 
automata theory usually equates to the ideal system not 
halting for that input. But our notion of implementation 
leaves open a definition for other inputs at a lower 
level of detail. So even casting the class of functions 
computed or described by algorithms as a subset of 
partially computable functions does not capture the 
finite multilevel flavour of algorithms very well. What 
we have is a notion of 'undefined' such that for a given 
input value and a given algorithmic description of a 
system that leaves its output undefined, we cannot say 
what happens (whether the underlying system halts or not, 
e.g.) or even if it is possible to input that value into 
the system -- at that level of description. 
PROVING STRONG EQUIVALENCE 
The starting point for this section is Davis' version of 
Church's Thesis (from Davis and Weyuker, 1983), put in 
terms of his theoretical programming language S, though 
any suitably defined language will do (p. 54): 
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... we have reason to believe that any 
algpri,thmfor,,,,, computing_..... .,on, numbers........ ,can,,,,,be. 
carried ..out by,,,,, a_,,,proggram of S ... The last 
italicized assertion is a form of what has come 
to be called Church's thesis. 
They add, as noted in Chapter III, 
... since the word 'algorithm' has no general 
definition separated from a particular 
language, Church's thesis cannot be proved as a 
mathematical theorem. 
It is not necessary to know all the details of the formal 
definition of S; it is a procedural language which 
abstracts away from time and space. From Davis and 
Weyuker, pp. 15 - 16: 
We will use certain letters as variables whose 
values are numbers. (In this book the word 
number will always mean non-negative integer, 
unless the contrary is specifically stated.) 
In particular, the letters 
X1 X2 X3 ... 
will be called the input v,ar_iables of S, the 
letter Y will be called the output variable of 
S, and the letters 
Z1 Z2 Z3 ... 
will be called the local variables of S ... 
Unlike the programming languages in actual use, 
there is no upper limit on the values these 
variables can assume ... 
In S we will be able to write 'instructions' of 
various sorts; a 'program' of S will then 
consist of a list (i.e., a finite sequence) of 
instructions. 
Output and local variables are initialised to 0, and 
there are three kinds of instructions, any of which can 
have a label. They are illustrated as (p. 16): 
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V <- V+1 Increase by 1 the value of the 
variable V. 
V <- V-1 If the value of V is 0, leave it 
unchanged; otherwise decrease by 1 
the value of the variable V. 
IF V = 0 GOTO L If the value of V is nonzero, 
perform the instruction with label L 
next; otherwise proceed to the next 
instruction in the list. 
More complex instructions, or macros, are based on these, 
and all can be formally defined. Macros are best seen 
as abbreviations; the numbers and computations (see 
below) are defined for the more basic underlying program. 
Granted, the new definition of algorithms evolved up to 
this point is rather different to Davis' definition in 
terms of S or any other such language. Still, the two 
notions have a lot in common, and each has its uses (see 
Chapter III, 'Algorithms', for more detail). However 
algorithms in the new multilevel, state sequence 
framework are not included under the above proscription 
against mathematical theorems: what they provide is 
first and foremost a common framework, intended primarily 
to cut across boundaries of specific languages, machines 
or complex systems in general. The consequent evolved 
algorithm carries its own constraints; it is doubly 
finite, in time and in space. With this proviso, we can 
prove a strong equivalence theorem, like a very 
restricted version of Church's Thesis. 
As a first iteration, consider the exact wording above: 
'Any algorithm for computing on numbers can be carried 
out by a program of S'; look initially at 'Any algorithm 
for computing on numbers The changes from Church's 
Thesis are concealed in the changed definition of 
'algorithm'. '... for computing on numbers ...' can 
stay; the new algorithms have numbers at their centres 
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too, and indeed they were modelled closely on the numeric 
foundations of S. '... a program of S ... ' is completely 
defined and presents no theoretical problem, though the 
sheer amount of detail in its complete definition must be 
managed with care. That leaves '... can be carried out 
by ...' as in 'Any algorithm for computing on numbers can 
be c_arr,ied, ,,,out_, by a program of S. ' For Dav i s , this 
means simply that we can write a program that computes 
the function as (weakly) defined by the algorithm. Not 
having or wanting a particular language, and with a 
stronger equivalence in mind, some adjustments are 
required. 
What about 'Any algorithm (in the new sense) for 
computing on numbers is an abstraction of the set of 
computations* of a program of S', where computations* are 
defined as follows? Recall from Chapter III that a 
computation of a program is a list of snapshots in order 
of their occurrence. Each snapshot contains the line 
number of the instruction to be executed next, along with 
the current values of all variables in the program. 
There are a few minor niceties to be tidied up; line 
numbers are included in computations, and the label or 
variable-value pair notation is slightly different. The 
* is meant to signify these minor changes. This can be 
defined precisely as the mapping f from computations to 
computations*, where 
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f(((i1, {V1 = vii, V2 = v12, Vm = vim)), 
(i2, {V1 = v21, V2 = v22, ..., Vm = v2m}), 
(in, {V1 = vn1, V2 = vn2, ..., Vm = vnm}))) 
({('V1', vi1), ('V2', v12), ..., ('Vm', vim)), 
{('V1', v21), ('V2', v22), ..., ('Vm', v2m)), 
{('V1', vn1), ('V2', vn2), . ., ('Vm', vnm))) 
The function is not reversible, and neither is the Strong 
Equivalence Theorem. This is because an arbitrary 
program of S may require unboundedly large amounts of 
time and space. Another way of stating the new theorem, 
reflecting the view of programs as abbreviations of 
algorithms, is 'Any algorithm can be abbreviated by a 
program of S.' This is less precise, however, until the 
particular abbreviation has been defined. It can be 
defined in terms of abstraction and snapshots to be 
equivalent to the earlier formulation. Also note that 
we cannot say that 'Any algorithm is an implementation of 
the set of computations* of a program of S', because the 
manner of defining computations of S places severe 
constraints on the amount of detail allowed; all and 
only those variables mentioned in the program are 
included in a computation or snapshot. We can always 
include more detail in the program than in any given 
algorithm; it is not so clear that we could fit a 
program to an algorithm without introducing some extra 
variables. 
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Let us turn, then, to the proof of the theorem, which the 
preceding discussion anticipates. The form to be 
tackled is 
The Strong Egu va,len,ce Theor.em. Any algorithm A for 
computing on numbers is an abstraction of a finite subset 
of the set of computations* of a program P of S. 
Note that a finite subset of the computations* of a 
program of S is an algorithm, so abstraction is defined. 
The set of all computations* for a program of S is always 
(countably) infinite, since S's input variables can take 
on any nonnegative integral value. The finite subset 
that figures in the proof is the one that has a 
computation* for each sequence of A, with input values 
corresponding to the initial states of the sequences of 
A. 
Only a sketch of the proof will be given here because a 
complete version would require painstaking (and perhaps 
painful) review of all the i-dottings and t-crossings of 
the complete formal definition of S. The sketch of the 
proof is straightforward and convincing enough that the 
added detail would not add very much. S is a procedural 
language, so it is helpful to think in terms of one's 
favourite procedural language or pseudocode. 
Given an arbitrary algorithm A, a program P of S can be 
written which has a separate path for each valid initial 
state. Once a path is chosen, there are separate 
subpaths for each valid subsequent state, and so on. At 
each step in the path, variables are filled in with 
values reflecting the desired state from A. The 
structure of the program is like the structure of a 
forest of trees; each path from a root (initial state) 
to a leaf (final state) defines one sequence from A. 
There is one complication to be dealt with, that of 
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nondeterminism. In the case that there is more than one 
occurrence of the same initial state or states, a 
variable not occurring in the abstract state (a new one 
for each nondeterministic branch) can be used to decide 
the case. The initial value of this variable should be 
part of the input, from the perspective of the program P. 
As an example, let the algorithm A be 
{({('X',0),('Y',o)),{('X',1),('Y',1)),C('X',2),('Y',2))), 
({('X',0),('Y',0)),{('X',2),('Y',2)),{('X',4),('Y',4)))). 
or less formally, 
X: 0 Y: 0 
X: 1 Y: 1 
X: 2 Y: 2 
X: 0 Y: 0 
X: 2 Y: 2 
X: 4 Y: 4 
The program P can be constructed according to the 
guidelines given above. A pseudocode version of P 
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follows which, I claim, could be given an equivalent in 
S. Of course without knowing the exact S program, we do 
not know the exact computations or computations*. The 
idea should be clear, however. More variables would be 
needed in S (to handle the conditionals, e.g.), and there 
would be more snapshots in the computations (states in 
the computations*), reflecting their changes. This is 
inconsequential as far as the proof goes, since 
extraneous states and variables can be removed by 
selection abstractions. Following computations of S, a 
state is given for the initial state preceding the 
'execution' of the first instruction. Thereafter, since 
the conditionals obscure the line-by-line equivalence 
between P and a program of S, one state is included for 
every variable assignment. (Variables are used as in S, 
with Xi for input and Zi for internal variables, i being 
a member of N.) 
IF (X1 = 0 AND X2 = 0) THEN 
Z1 <- 0 
Z2 <- 0 
IF X3 = 0 THEN 
Zi <- 1 
Z2 <- 1 
Z1 <- 2 
Z2 <- 2 
ELSEIF X3 = 1 THEN 
Zl <- 2 
Z2 <- 2 
IF X4 = 0 THEN 
Z1 <- 3 
Z2 <- 3 
ELSEIF X4 = 1 THEN 
Z1 <- 4 
Z2 <- 4 
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In this procedure X1 and X2 represent the 'input' in the 
initial state(s) of A. X3 and X4 are used to decide 
between the possible second and third states, a decision 
that cannot be determined from the level of description 
of A itself. But it is left to the local variables to 
take on the appropriate values that will be reflected in 
the abstraction. Z1 and Z2 are given the input values, 
analagous to the initial state. Z1 will be seen later as 
X and Z2 as Y in A. In the remainder of the procedure, 
Z1 and Z2 take on all the possible values of X and Y in 
A. The sketch of the proof requires abstracting X and Y 
from the computations* of P. 
A finite subset of the relevant computations* of P is: 
{({('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 1), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', L), 
('Z2', 1)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 2), 
('Z2', 1)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 0), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 2), 
('Z2', 2)}), 
({('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 2), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
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{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3' , 1), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 2), 
('Z2', 2)}, 
'X1', 0), ('X2' 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4' , 0), ('Z1', 3), 
('Z2', 2)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2' 0), ('X3' , 1), ('X4', 0), ('Z1', 3), 
('Z2', 3)}), 
({('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4', 1), ('Z1', 0) 
('Z2', 0)), 
'X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4' , 1), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)), 
'X1', 0), ('X2' 0), ('X3' 1), ('X4', 1), ('Z1', 0), 
('Z2', 0)}, 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4', 1), ('Z1', 2), 
('Z2', 0)), 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3' 1), ('X4', 1), ('Z1', 2), 
('Z2', 2)), 
'X1', 0), ('X2', 0), ('X3', 1), ('X4' 1), ('Z1', 4), 
('Z2', 2)), 
{('X1', 0), ('X2', 0) , ('X3', 1), ('X4', 1), ('Z1', 4), 
('Z2', 4)})} 
We still must show that A is an abstraction of a finite 
set of the computations* of P. If we start with the 
subset of all computations* of P in which the first n Xi 
are equal to the values for the n labels in some initial 
state of A (as above), throw out the extra variables not 
needed by A (using selection of values for each state in 
each sequence) and change the variable names (change of 
labels) to match the originals from A, the process is 
almost complete. We have only to remove the first state 
of each sequence, along with any interim states giving 
more details of value changes than in the algorithm 
(selection of states) to finish the task. 
These stages can be illustrated for the example. After 
applying selection of values, choosing only to show 
values of 'Z1' and 'Z2', to each state (snapshot) in each 
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sequence (computation*) of the algorithm (finite set of 
computations*), we have: 
{({('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)), 
(('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 1), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 1), ('Z2', 1)), 
{('Z1', 2), ('Z2', 1)), 
{('Z1', 2), ('Z2', 2))), 
({('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)}, 
{('Z1', 2), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 2), ('Z2', 2)), 
{('Z1', 3), ('Z2', 2)), 
{('Z1', 3), ('Z2', 3))), 
({('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)), 
{('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)}, 
{('Z1', 0), ('Z2', 0)}, 
{('Z1', 2), ('Z2', 0)}, 
{('Z1', 2), ('Z2', 2)), 
{('Z1', 4), ('Z2', 2)), 
{('Z1', 4), ('Z2', 4)))). 
After applying change of labels, mapping 'Z1' -> 'X' and 
'Z2' -> 'Y', we have: 
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(({('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 1), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 1), ('Y', 1)}, 
{('X', 2), ('Y', 1)}, 
{('X', 2), ('Y', 2)}), 
({('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
(('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 2), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 2), ('Y', 2)}, 
{('X', 3), ('Y', 2)}, 
{('X', 3), ('Y', 3)}), 
({('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 0), ('Y', 0)}, 
{('X', 2), ('Y', 0)), 
{('X', 2), ('Y', 2)), 
{('X', 4), ('Y', 2)), 
{('X', 4), ('Y', 4)})}. 
Finally, application of selection of states to each 
sequence (omitting the first state of each sequence and 
the states corresponding to changes in the value 
associated with 'x') produces the starting point A, 
completing the sketch of the proof: 
{({('X',0),('Y',0)),{('X',1),('Y',1))., C('X',2),('Y',2))), 
({('X',0),('Y',0)),{('X',2),('Y',2))., C('X'4),('Y',4)))) 
To go in the opposite direction, from programs in S to 
algorithms, is simpler so long as we stay with the one 
level of description defined by the notion of a 
computation. The set of all computations for a program P 
of S is an at most countably infinite set of 
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computations. Computations are by definition finite, so 
if P does not halt for some input set, there will be no 
computation for that set. Each computation can be turned 
into a computation* by the mapping f given above and, 
therefore, into an algorithmic sequence. Any finite set 
of such computations* defines an algorithm. More 
formally, we have just sketched a proof of: 
Theorem. Any finite subset of the set of computations* 




This chapter begins with several observations about the 
new framework. These include comments on its flexibility 
and means of constraining it, as well as a summary of the 
relationship between software and hardware with analogies 
in the relationship between mental states and physical 
states. Next, classical and connectionist models are 
characterised before reconsidering levels in light of 
connectionism and algorithms. Algorithms are compared 
to the similar notion of virtual machines as defined by 
Sloman and, finally, some implications for explanation 
are explored. 
GENERAL, OBSERVATIONS 
We now have in hand a formal multilevel framework for 
describing complex systems in a way that is independent 
of their usual descriptions in terms of particular 
languages or architectures. The obvious primary 
implication of this is that it enables us to make strong 
and direct comparisons between all sorts of systems and 
states of systems. The systems of interest need not be 
distinct: the relationships among multiple levels of 
description of a single system can be elucidated. 
States take centre stage. These states are actual 
states through which the system (at some level of 
description) passes. They can be contrasted to states 
of a remote ideal machine whose interim states (between 
input and output) cannot be aligned with possible states 
of the actual system. While maintaining the importance 
of weak input-output (or mathematical) equivalence of 
system descriptions (or algorithms), the new framework 
provides a clear notion of strong equivalence. Two 
systems under such a description are the same when the 
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possible paths from input to output are the same. These 
paths, or algorithmic sequences, are equivalent when they 
contain the same states in the same order. Equivalence 
in terms of attainable state sequences captures the 
essence of informal use of 'algorithms' or the 
algorithmic level', especially when these are taken to be 
the focus of cognitive psychology. This approach is 
particularly appropriate to cognitive modelling, since 
the results of experimentally sampling real cognitive 
systems (i.e. people), or simulations, can be expressed 
as sequences of states. System states are as 
indisputable as anything can be as a basis for describing 
complex systems and incorporating strong equivalence of 
algorithms into cognitive science (as expressed in 
Pylyshyn, 1984, e.g., and see Chapter III). 
The flexible multilevel framework for strong equivalence 
can accommodate a surprising number of generalities about 
a system. For example, it can be shown that the number 
of states in a sequence is a valid abstraction of that 
sequence. To prove this, let S be the arbitrary 
sequence 
({(11,vll), (12,v21), ..., (ln,vnl)}, 
{(11,v12), (12,v22), ..., (ln,vn2)}, 
{(l1,vlm), (12,v2m), ..., (ln,vnm)}). 
Combining states one at a time, from top to bottom, gives 
the valid chain of abstractions of S: 
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Si = (f(11,<vll,vl2>), (12,<v21,v22>), ..., 
(1n,<vnl,vn2>)}, 
f(11,vl3), (12,v23), ..., (1n,vn3)}, 
f(ll,vlm), (12,v2m), ..., (ln,vnm)}). 
S2 = (f(ll,<<vll,vl2>,vl3>), (12,<<v21,v22,v23>),..., 
(ln,<<vnl,vn2>,vn3>)}, 
f(ll,v14), (12,v24), ..., (ln,vn4)}, 
f(ll,vlm), (12,v2m), ..., (ln,vnm)}) 
and so on, culminating in the abstraction S' (a one-state 
sequence) where S' = 
(f(11, <<...<<vll,vl2>,v13>,...,vlm-1>, vlm>), 
(12,<<...<<v21,v22>, v23>, ..., v2m-1>, v2m>), 
(ln, <<...<<vnl, vn2>, vn3>, ..., vnm-1>, vnm>)}). 
Selecting the label-value pair for 11, we get another 
valid abstraction S" = 
(((11, << ... <<vll, v12, vl3>, ..., vlm-1>, vlm>)}) 
Now we can define a function on the value of 11 which 
maps such nested values to the number of constituent 
values, giving S" ' _ (((11, m)}), proving the assertion. 
Furthermore, if the average number of steps across 
sequences in an algorithm is known, the function that 
maps every number to that average can be used to get 
193 
another abstraction giving the average number of steps. 
As an implementation of an algorithm to determine the 
average, this would be rather unsatisfactory in most 
contexts (see below on constraining the framework), but 
it does illustrate the flexibility of the framework. 
It does not, however, cover everything. In spite of 
this, it can be used to facilitate the expression of 
aspects of system description that lie outside its 
domain. An important example of this is the constraint 
on absolute resources from the physical level of 
concreteness. It may be that a step or a sequence is or 
must be carried out within predetermined time limits or 
using a fixed amount of space or storage. Another 
example in cognitive science is the causal relations 
between states or parts of states. If program rules are 
included in state descriptions, for instance, are the 
rules meant to cause the behaviour underlying later state 
descriptions? In most cognitive science and computer 
science applications this is likely to be the case, 
although pre-compilation software rules could appear in a 
state description and not have a causal role in the 
behaviour of a system running the compiled version 
(unless the evolving system were under consideration -- 
the original rules have a part to play in causing the 
compiled rules). 
A large part of the motivation for developing the theory 
of strong equivalence was a foundational one. The 
framework provides a fundamental definition of algorithms 
as system descriptions and of the interrelationship 
between various descriptions. It can be used to clarify 
comparisons between particular models, between models and 
that which is being modelled and between classes of 
models. Putting such comparisons in the framework, even 
partially, gives a useful perspective and a formal, solid 
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foundation in place of often muddled speculation about 
levels of description and explanation. 
The overwhelming detail of describing all the states in 
all the sequences of even simple systems may appear to 
render this approach useless for more practical 
applications. To some extent this must be true, and its 
full practical utility in systems analysis remains to be 
seen. Translating just a small number of paths at a 
small number of levels of description for a small number 
of possible inputs proved surprisingly interesting in the 
course of developing the thesis. The usual descriptions 
of classical and connectionist theories often wear their 
state sequences on their faces. If it is hard to tell 
what level of description or what sequencing (or lack of 
it) is meant to be implied by a program or theory, that 
in itself is of interest. Once theories or portions 
thereof have been translated into the formal framework, 
they can be characterised and strongly compared with a 
rigour previously only possible for (weak) comparisons 
with respect to a single ideal machine (a Turing machine 
or a LISP machine, e.g.). 
By making states the building blocks from which all 
sequences (and therefore algorithms) are constructed, 
processes exist only implicitly as changes between 
states. This emphasis on states was motivated in part 
by considering the concept of 'software states' (see 
Chapter III). Ignoring for the moment the case of 
specially constructed systems (or evolved systems), 
higher level descriptions in terms of states and 
processes are unlikely to map neatly to lower level 
descriptions in terms of other processes and states, 
except perhaps using weak mathematical equivalence. For 
a stronger equivalence, and in particular one which 
allows the preservation of states through which a system 
can actually be said to pass, it is problematic to 
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determine what is a process and what is a state in a 
manner that will maintain alignment of states across 
level boundaries. A state containing a '1' and a '0' 
may be a process at a more detailed level. Core memory, 
for example, can be described as processes which 
represent ones or zeroes depending on the direction of 
current. Yet ones and zeroes are standard low level 
descriptions of data in computers. At a higher level, 
programs are often taken to be processes, but they are 
arguably static, explicit representations. 
In contrast, states facilitate a uniform framework for 
description at every level, with states at one level 
being expanded to more detailed states or sets of states 
at lower levels of detail. By using them as the basis 
of algorithms, the implied processes may be thought of as 
being expanded into sequences of states at the lower 
levels, with new interim processes being potentially 
subdivided further and further, until they are ultimately 
changes in molecular states, for example. 
The framework is intended to be flexible enough to cover 
common computational language, insofar as it refers to 
states that are legal abstractions of a detailed 
algorithm taken from values measured from a physical 
computer system. In other words, we can say, 'The 
system is calculating exclusive-or' if it is somewhere 
between the initial and final states of any algorithmic 
sequence that has the appropriate initial and final 
states and that is part of an algorithm containing other 
sequences which represent states in the calculation of 
exclusive-or for other inputs. At any particular point 
in time, if we could freeze the system, we may at best be 
able to say it is in state i or between state i and state 
i+1. If the whole system can be viewed in abstraction 
as an exclusive-or calculator, then it is appropriate to 
say 'it is calculating exclusive-or' or perhaps even 
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(depending on the algorithm), 'it is calculating "or" and 
"and" as it calculates exclusive-or'. In contrast, as 
was mentioned in Chapter II, it is an empirical question 
whether a system running a particular program goes 
through the states implied by that program taken 
independently. For example the program fragment 
end 
may be compiled by an optimising compiler and then run. 
The optimised system may take on the states of the 
following sequence (parenthetical comments associate 
states with lines of the program): 
i:U x:l y:U (x = 1) 
i:U x:2 y:U (x = 2) 
i:1 x:2 y:U (do i = 1,3) 
i:l x:2 y:3 (y = i+x) 
i:2 x:2 y:3 (do i = 1,3) 
i:2 x:2 y:4 (y = i+x) 
i:3 x:2 y:4 (do i = 1,3) 
i:3 x:2 y:5 (y = i+x) 
This sequence reflects the common optimisation operation 
of removing expressions that do not depend on the loop 
variable (x does not depend on i, in this case) from the 
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body of the loop. If this is the case, then the 
algorithmic sequence implied by the above program (by the 
method of translation described earlier, using statement 
execution to determine change of states and program 
variables to determine values in states) is 
i:1 x:U y:U (do i = 1,3) 
i:1 x:1 y:U (x = 1) 
i:1 x:2 y:U (x = 2) 
i:1 x:2 y:3 (y = i + x) 
i:2 x:2 y:3 (do i = 1,3) 
i:2 x:1 y:3 (x = 1) 
i:2 x:2 y:3 (x = 2) 
i:2 x:2 y:4 (y = i + x) 
i:3 x:2 y:4 (do i = 1,3) 
i:3 x:1 y:4 (x = 1) 
i:3 x:2 y:4 (x = 2) 
i:3 x:2 y:5 (y = i + x) 
For the optimised sequence described above, the statement 
'the system is in a loop' would only be accurate after 
the second step and not for the entire algorithm. 
Furthermore, the optimised sequence is not a 
straightforward abstraction of the unoptimised sequence. 
There is a simple common abstraction: 
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i:1 x:2 y:U 
i:1 x:2 y:3 (y = i + x) 
i:2 x:2 y:3 (do i = 1,3) 
i:2 x:2 y:4 (y = i + x) 
i:3 x:2 y:4 (do i = 1,3) 
i:3 x:2 y:5 (y = i + x) 
Here, i and x can be thought of as inputs and y as the 
output. State changes are associated with changes to 
either i or y, in keeping with x's role as a constant. 
Recalling the search for software states from Chapter 
III, we can conclude that while software or programs may 
imply algorithms at various levels, it is an empirical 
question whether or not any given system -- even one that 
can be said to run that program -- actually goes through 
those implied states. If the more detailed description 
can be seen as an implementation of the less detailed 
one, the functions defining their relationship may be 
very complex indeed. It seems misleading to say there 
are software states or computational states at all; 
there are simply states of a system (real or 
hypothetical) described in more or less detail. If a 
particular set of rules (in a machine language for 
instance) is stored in the system and used to control the 
processing, then these rules, along with an indication of 
the currently active one, will show up explicitly at some 
levels of description. 
Programs or effective procedures are best thought of as 
abbreviations for algorithms which may or may not be 
realised in the hardware. Because of the variety of 
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possible relationships between programs and algorithms it 
is necessary to be clear about this intended use of a 
program and also to be clear about the translation that 
is assumed (e.g., a state is made up of a subset of the 
variables plus the current program line, or whatever). 
Consistent with some common usage (see the discussion of 
Pylyshyn in Chapter III, for example), a given algorithm 
can be abbreviated by many different programs. 
Algorithms may include explicit rules or not (so 
'connectionist algorithms' are no longer problematic). 
They place constraints on the states a system goes 
through and say something about relative time and space 
requirements. At the same time, they can be implemented 
in more detail in an arbitrarily large number of ways and 
can be realised in an arbitrarily large number of 
physical devices. 
In summary, the relationship between hardware and 
software is quite tenuous. A program is best viewed as 
a weakly predictive theory of the output of the machine 
running the program (or its compiled or interpreted 
version), a specification of output given input. From 
the mathematical level perspective, a program defines the 
relationship between input and output by means of a 
formal language, implying nothing at all about the 
interim processing; this is truly the 'what' without the 
'how'. At the algorithmic level, a program can be relied 
on to give the minimal sequential information in addition 
to the input-output relationship; the input precedes the 
output on the relative time line. In general it is 
wrong to assume that the program gives an accurate 
picture of the states through which the system passes at 
any more detailed level than that. Assuming the program 
is actually executable, the hardware or physical 
machinery realises the input-output relation and minimal 
ordering (input before output) in absolute space and time 
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on each occasion that the program is run. Clearly there 
are many possible algorithmic implementations of the 
function specified by the program as well as many 
possible hardware realisations (including a different 
realisation for each execution). At the same time, 
there are arbitrarily many algorithmic descriptions of 
the states through which the machine passes, each of 
which may be taken as specifying the input-output 
relationship from the mathematical perspective as well. 
If the computational metaphor -- the mind is software to* 
the body's hardware -- is taken seriously, then the 
implications for cognitive science of the picture just 
painted are profound. Theories of mental life couched 
in terms of programs or functional roles of Turing 
machine states (or states of any other single canonical 
machine) may be predictive, weak equivalents of cognitive 
functions, but that is the best they can be. We could 
not claim that a person was in mental state x (held a 
belief, felt a pain, etc.) any more than we could claim 
he or she was in the Turing machine state of reading the 
tape. The best we could do would be to say that at the 
end of the day the person behaved as if he or she were in 
state x, as if he or she held that belief or as if he or 
she read the infinite tape. 
Mental states described by abstract states that are parts 
of sequences in algorithms have no such restrictions to 
instrumentalism. We can say that a person was in a 
mental state x if that state is part of a sequence of 
states that is a valid abstraction of a much more 
detailed sequence of states, perhaps in terms of 
neurophysiological measurements or classical physics. 
Given the precise abstraction functions for describing 
the relationship of the two such levels of description, 
the mental state is an abstraction of one or more lower 
level states. (One could say 'physical states', but 
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they are usually already abstractions away from the 
physical level of concreteness to the algorithmic level.) 
If both levels are correct descriptions of a physical 
system, then the higher level mental states are 
coincident in (relative) time with the lower level states 
and, in fact, supervene on them. That is, given the 
functional correspondence between the two descriptions, 
it can be shown that any change in the higher level 
description requires a corresponding change in the lower 
level one. 
To prove this, it can be demonstrated that any higher 
level state supervenes on the one or two states one level 
down and to which it is related by a single abstraction 
function. In the first case, the abstract state (call 
it Ml) is a function of a single lower level state M2, 
because all state abstractions are defined to be 
functions. So if Ml changed (to M1' which does not 
equal M1) and M2 remained the same, we would have M1 = 
f(M2) = Ml' for some function f, and this cannot be. 
In the second case, Ml is abstracted from two lower level 
states, M2a and M2b, as part of a sequential abstraction. 
Let M2a = 
11: v12a 12: v22a ... ln: vn2a 
and let M2b = 
11: vl2b 12: v22b ... ln: vn2b 
By definition of combination of states, M1 = 
ll:<vl2a, vl2b> 12:<v22a,v22b>... ln:<vn2a, vn2b> 
If Ml' is also an abstraction of M2a and M2b by 
combination of states, then it too must be 
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ll:<vl2a, vl2b> 12:<v22a, v22b> ... ln:<vn2a, vn2b> 
which is identical with M1. 
To complete the proof, it remains only to note that this 
sort of supervenience is transitive, so that if a state 
supervenes on the state(s) from which it was derived one 
level down, then it supervenes on the states from which 
it (or they) were derived and so forth, until the lower 
level in question is reached. 
Of course it may be that a change in higher level states 
results from a change in perspective. This amounts to 
using different abstraction operations to derive the 
higher level from lower level states. In this way one 
value or another, or any combination, can be singled out 
as the focus of a more abstract state. (This is just one 
possible abstraction operation -- selection of values; 
any of the others could be used instead.) In terms of 
mental states, we might say that a person recalled x, or 
felt y, or recalled x and felt y at the same time. Each 
of these descriptions may be different abstractions from 
different perspectives on the same lower level states 
and, assuming that this is the case, each mental state 
description supervenes on the common lower level state 
descriptions. 
The multilevel theory can also be used to describe how 
two states or sequences of states can be the same at one 
level of detail and different at another. To borrow an 
example from Putnam (1988), speakers of English and Thai 
might both be described as thinking about cats at one 
level, while at a more detailed level, there are obvious 
differences in their cat concepts, including how they 
would say the word for cat in their respective languages. 
It is true that at extremely detailed levels of 
description, exactly the same sequence is never carried 
out twice, by people or by machines. The configuration 
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of jobs being controlled by the operating system of a 
mainframe computer may never be the same twice. The 
locations in memory (virtual or otherwise) may not be 
either. The same situation is likely to occur with 
respect to human nervous systems: the configuration of 
thoughts, concerns, movements and qualia vary constantly, 
yet at appropriate levels of detail we do think and mean 
the same things twice. A framework for systematically 
abstracting away from detail while preserving connections 
to physical states is essential if anything like 
functionalism is true or useful (even if 'only' for 
simulation and explanation and not for instantiation of 
psychological states). Otherwise we are restricted to 
talking about only one level at a time with any rigour. 
But is the proposed multilevel theory too unconstrained? 
In particular, consider the generalised rounding and 
combining-states abstraction operations for states and 
sequences, respectively, and the subset abstraction 
operation on algorithms. The abstraction operations for 
states blur the explicit-implicit representation 
distinction as well as the related process-data 
distinction. By combining label-value pairs and using a 
complex deduction function, a state 
x1: A --> B x2: A x3: C 
can be abstracted to 
y: B 
describing (as just one of many possibilities) an 
inference from A -> B and A (and some other stuff, C) to 
B. Using duplication of the combined pairs, for 
example, anything implicit in a state at one level can be 
made explicit in a more abstract state, subject to the 
constraints of the functional relationship between such 
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states. Nothing has changed in the physical system (if 
there is one), only in the description. I do not see 
any good reason to restrict such flexibility in general. 
We can define 'an explicit representation' in the 
framework as being a single labelled value, automatically 
tying the idea to a particular level of description. 
One argument against placing a priori restrictions on the 
flexibility of the framework is that quite a lot of 
flexibility is required just to allow the descriptions 
normally given to computer systems. These descriptions 
ignore such complexities in detail as virtual memory and 
data compression. Graphics applications provide a nice 
example. A straight line in a graphics system may be 
represented in a file as two end points perhaps 
describable by a state 
type: 'line' end1: 00342 end2: 00399 
At any given time, the line may be displayed on the 
screen by lighting up a subset of the screen's pixels 
(which might be described at one level as a matrix of 
pixels filled in with 1's for 'lit-up' pixels and 0's 
otherwise). Either of these states may be considered as 
abstractions or implementations of the other, acid why 
not? Which is more detailed or more explicit depends on 
the context and the question. A graphic artist pointing 
to the display and asking, 'How does the machine 
represent that line?' might consider the file 
descriptions as providing the implementation, while a 
programmer asking 'How would the image change if I 
modified this end point?' might see the particular 
display as the implementation of a more general 
programmed description. 'How can I change this endpoint 
without the line going off the screen?' might require a 
third perspective, based on points in a design space that 
does not necessarily match up with the display screen. 
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(The design space could be three-dimensional while the 
screen shows only two dimensions.) 
On the other hand, if there were theoretical reasons in a 
particular context for limiting the power of abstraction 
operations, such restrictions are more likely to be 
formulable in the new formal framework than in the usual 
vague language of levels and implementation. In 
cognitive science, it makes sense to disallow functions 
that require information about all possible outcomes of 
an algorithm. This would prevent viewing some systems 
as driven by large tables. Related further restrictions 
could be placed on any constant used in abstraction 
functions, forcing higher level values to depend more 
directly on lower level ones. This would avoid the 
result that any algorithm has an abstraction that 
includes a fixed set of rules (see below). 
Constraints on algorithms also arise in context from the 
physical and mathematical levels of concreteness. The 
mathematical level does not add much to a coarse input- 
output algorithm, though it may abstract away from limits 
of finiteness or otherwise put the input-output 
relationship in different terms. The physical level 
constraints on resources are another matter. See Rosen 
(1985) for an example of a more detailed foundation for 
the direct abstraction of an algorithmic level 
description (or model in his terms) from a physical 
system (or natural model). According to him, an 
abstraction or model is the result of observation or 
measurement of a physical system. By grouping the 
measured values by simultaneity in time and by meter 
across time, something like an algorithmic sequence is 
obtained. So we can say that a new state in a sequence 
might be motivated by a change in value or by the passage 
of a given amount of time regardless of measurable value 
change. The only constraint on the meter is that it 
206 
produce a function of any more basic, individual, 
measurements it takes, as in the abstraction operation of 
generalised rounding; further abstractions can be made 
by applying functions uniformly across sequences. 
Similarly, states can be combined by a meter, calculating 
a difference between values at times ti and ti+1, for 
example. In these cases, a more detailed algorithmic 
description of the system is possible in terms of the 
more basic values measured. The amount of detail is 
limited by the technology of the meters, e.g., how 
quickly they can act or to what degree values can be 
differentiated. 
As noted earlier, absolute time and space restrictions 
may be added to an algorithmic description. If each 
step requires at least n seconds and the whole sequence 
takes up at most 10n seconds, then a sequence of more 
than ten steps is not the right description in the 
context. 
In order to focus on such thorny problems as the 
relationship between software and hardware, implicit and 
explicit representations and levels of description of 
algorithms, learning and development issues have been 
ignored. Where do they fit into the picture? While 
not singled out as such, a lot of learning (especially 
machine learning, including automatic programming and 
connectionist learning algorithms) is covered 
automatically by the framework. A connectionist system, 
such as one of the exclusive-or examples from Chapter 
III, is likely to be trained (or programmed) and run on a 
conventional von Neumann system. The training process 
can also be described in terms of algorithms at various 
levels of description, with changing weights at some 
levels or with changing exclusive-or calculations 
(becoming more and more accurate as time passes). 
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Within the new framework, learning and development are 
just state changes like everything else. There is no 
mystery about reflection or changing the process instead 
of the data. Of course, there are valid questions about 
how the learning takes place at a more detailed level or 
if it can be realised under appropriate time and space 
restrictions, but again, this is no different to 
questions regarding any kind of state changes over time. 
A system that evolves over time can be treated as a 
longer, more complex algorithm. Another possibility is 
to treat systems attained at various stages in the 
development process as separate, comparing them like any 
two distinct systems. 
It should be noted, however, that the framework as it 
stands requires that all states and sequences in an 
algorithm be defined over the same set of labels. In 
some cases a description of a developing system could use 
a combination of all the appropriate labels from each 
stage of development, and perhaps this is no worse than 
the cumbersome detail of the whole framework. However, 
this may not produce a valid abstraction of an evolved or 
evolving physical system. As in systems not 
characterised by learning, the framework says nothing 
about causation. Important causal theories about how a 
system got to be the way it is (such as evolution-based 
theories or developmental ones) can be stated with 
respect to descriptions in the framework, but they lie 
outside its domain by definition. 
CHARACTERISATION OF CLASSICALANDCONNECTIONIST THEORIES 
Theories categorised as either classical or connectionist 
fall into the algorithmic level of concreteness. That 
is to say, they generally make more than just behavioural 
or input-output claims; they place constraints on the 
relative time sequence of steps, for example. While 
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they may be viewed as defining a mathematical 
relationship between input and output, they place 
restrictions on theories that are lower level in terms of 
detail and also on those higher level theories (again in 
terms of detail) that may be valid abstractions of them. 
In addition, they may be implemented in arbitrarily many 
ways, by spelling out the details differently, and they 
may be realised in physical hardware in arbitrarily many 
ways, so long as the lower level detailed descriptions of 
such implementations or realisations are valid 
algorithmic implementations. 
Using state-based algorithmic descriptions, some general 
distinctions do emerge between classical and 
connectionist theories, but it should be emphasised that 
these are generalisations. There are no hard and fast 
rules for defining a distinct equivalence class of 
connectionist or classical theories or systems. With 
that caveat in mind, the differences are as follows. 
Connectionist algorithms, at ,,,their u,sua,l,,,,,,l,evels, of 
description (in terms of state changes over activation 
vectors typically) tend to be more,,, nondeterministic and 
to have changes to more values in each transition from 
state to state. The latter characteristic may be 
shortened to more ,distributed,,, changes. Classical 
algorithms, on the other hand, tend to be more 
deterministic with less distributed changes.,. at their 
usual levels, of description. 
The underlined phrases bear further examination. 'At 
their usual levels of description' captures the largely 
valid stereotype of the distinction between connectionist 
algorithms as theories in terms of numeric activation 
values associated with nodes that stand for features or 
subconcepts (Smolensky, 1988), as opposed to classical 
theories in terms of, say, inferences from a set of 
natural-language-like beliefs. 'Determinism' is the 
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ordinary notion whereby a given state completely 
determines the next state. In a deterministic system, 
there is only one path from a particular initial state to 
a final state. In a connectionist system, it is more 
likely that there will be many paths from a particular 
input state to a particular output state. (In classical 
system descriptions, there tend to be fewer paths.) In 
general, the next state cannot be predicted from a given 
state. Nondeterminism is of course closely related to 
parallelism. The important point to notice is that a 
set of algorithmic sequences can be seen to be 
nondeterministic, or to have distributed value changes, 
whereas it may or may not be physically realised in 
hardware usually described as parallel. It is a mistake 
to refer to an algorithm as sequential or parallel. 
'Distributed change' is closely related to distributed 
representations in the usual connectionist phraseology, 
whereby a change to a single value (a concept, e.g.) at 
one level is seen to be a change to many values 
(subconcepts, e.g.) at another. In contrast, classical 
systems tend to describe fewer changes at a time. If 
more than one value does change in a single state 
transition in a classical description, it is likely to 
happen on a much smaller scale than in a connectionist 
system. That is, a smaller number of simultaneous 
changes will occur a smaller number of times. 
It is interesting to note that after stripping away 
concerns with causation and semantics and then applying 
the uniform framework of state transitions, we arrive at 
a characterisation of connectionist systems that is a 
simple shift of perspective from the usual one. Rather 
than parallel distributed processing (PDP) systems, they 
are seen to be nondeterministic distributed-change (NDC?) 
algorithms. This shift of perspective clarifies the 
nature of implementation. While one might expect a 
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parallel system to be realised in parallel hardware, a 
nondeterministic algorithm may turn out to be implemented 
in a deterministic algorithm at a lower level of detail. 
This would happen, for example, when values 
distinguishing all input-output paths at the lower level 
were just those abstracted away from at the higher, 
nondeterministic level. Similarly, we normally think of 
distributed representations as being inherently lower 
level than local representations, but using the 
duplication abstraction operator, it is possible to have 
many views (subviews?) of a value at a higher level. 
This is what a multilevel description of a data 
compression system is likely to involve. At the same 
time, since we do appear to have parallel brainware 
constraining materialist theories of psychology from 
below, it makes sense to have a nondeterministic level of 
description (at least one) between the level of molecular 
states and any possible deterministic symbol system 
level. 
How do differences in nondeterminism and distribution of 
change relate to the more common characterisation of 
connectionist systems in terms of flexible generalisation 
and absence of explicit rules, among other things? 
Neither sort of classification provides hard and fast 
rules, and both trade on the increased complexity of 
analysis required for typical connectionist systems, as 
well as the fact that these algorithms tend to be viewed 
from many levels at once -- including activation state 
changes along with a more classical level and the input- 
output-only level (either mathematical or a coarse level 
of algorithmic detail). 
A recent summary of the appealing features of 
connectionist systems from a philosophical vantage point 
is given by Clark (1989, p. 184). The list is presented 
as a set of constraints on systems of philosophical and 
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psychological interest which PDP systems can satisfy, 
rather than as any strict division between connectionist 
and classical theories. I repeat it here, regrouped and 
with my comments interspersed. 
> A powerful learning capacity, 
> Continuity with the kind of architectures 
dictated in evolutionarily basic cases (i.e., 
the constraints imposed by the gradualistic 
holism of evolutionary change) 
These two items lie outside the scope of this thesis, 
strictly speaking. Developmental issues of both these 
kinds (individual learning and evolution of the species) 
are fascinating and important. They can also confuse 
the explication of levels of description of a particular 
system at a particular stage in its development. 
> A capacity to deal with unanticipated 
situations (e.g., to generalize along 
unexpected dimensions) 
Any computer model is designed to handle certain inputs 
in a specified way. Other inputs, if they are allowed 
at all, can be said to give rise to 'unanticipated 
situations'. What happens in these cases is determined 
by a more detailed implementation of the algorithm. The 
more detailed algorithm that shows what happens at the 
appropriate level of interest may be considered to be of 
theoretical interest or it may be irrelevant 'mere' 
implementation. It is customary to view connectionist 
systems as having more (and more detailed) levels of 
theoretical interest. They are often viewed as 
implementations of classical theories with debate arising 
over whether the implementation is of theoretical 
interest or not. 
There is more to say about the idea of 'unanticipated 
situations' and flexibility in general. One advantage of 
212 
viewing algorithms as sets of sequences of states at 
various levels is that irrelevant implementation details 
can be omitted altogether. We can define an exclusive- 
or algorithm as follows (sequences are separated by 
horizontal lines): 
x: 0 y. 0 ' x xor y' . U 
x : 0 y. 0 ' x xor y' . 0 
x. 0 y: 1 ' x xor y' . U 
x 0 y: 1 ' x xor y' . 1 
x. 1 y 0 ' x xor y' U 
x 1 y 0 ' x xor y' . 1 
x l y l ' x xor y' : U 
x l y. l ' x xor y' : 0 
Here there are no surprises. If x and y are input as 
0.5, the algorithm has nothing to say about it. Taken 
as a theory of the behaviour of a system, the algorithm 
makes no prediction. If it is possible somehow to input 
0.5's to the system, then we can say that the outcome is 
dependent on the implementation, or a valid and 
appropriate description at a lower level. It is 
somewhat misleading to say that the system may 
'generalize along unexpected dimensions' or, as is common 
in computer manuals, that the results are unpredictable. 
At the levels of detail suitable to answer the question 
'What happens if you input 0.5's?' in this context, the 
result is predictable and the 'generalisation' expected. 
Again, if that level is not part of the theory then it is 
irrelevant, possibly misleading, mere implementation. 
If however it is part of the theory, then the detailed 
algorithm should be included in the theory and the 
situation is no longer totally unanticipated. 
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There is nothing magical about such details that are 
specified at one level as opposed to another. They are 
built into the system and there is no guarantee they will 
be natural, desirable additions to the theory or 
something rather less welcome. If the result of entering 
0.5's to the exclusive-or system is an output value of 0 
or 0.5, we could argue that these are sensible 
generalisations, but this would be dependent on the given 
context. The system may be incapable of producing any 
output outside the 'valid' range of 0's or l's. In some 
cases it may be better to have some indication of 
'invalid input' to indicate that the input has gone 
beyond the level at which the theory is intended. 
Because connectionist theories tend to be viewed at 
several levels and are set up to be seen in that way, and 
because their input and output ranges tend to be very 
restrictive, many detailed variations or generalisations 
seem sensible. These may be incorporated into a 
multilevel theory even if they were not there to begin 
with. The fact that such systems are frequently 
described in terms of units and connection weights, along 
with the complexity caused by their nondeterminacy and 
distributed change at that level, makes them difficult to 
analyse at a glance. This no doubt adds to the 
impression that their outputs are sensible 
generalisations along unexpected dimensions even though 
the theory predicted them all along. 
> General flexibility in the use and recovery 
of stored data, 
> The capacity to shade meanings according to 
context, to create schemata on demand, and so 
on 
As above, apparent flexibility can result from the 
possible input and output modes and from the multiple 
levels of theoretically interesting descriptions. Some 
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examples drawn from database-like PDP systems are also 
typical examples of classical relational database 
capacities. Retrieval of an item by its attributes, or 
content addressability, is one commonly cited feature of 
both. Some generalisations built into connectionist 
systems, such as probabilistic attribute values, are not 
usually built into relational data models (though they 
could be). At the same time, generalisations available 
in most relational database systems include counting 
('How many x's have attribute y = "a"?') and more complex 
logical combinations of attributes ('List all x's with 
attribute y = "a" or attribute y = "b"'), as well as 
simple mechanisms to add more attributes or more 
individuals. As database and schemata systems, 
connectionist versions can be viewed at (at least) two 
levels, with one level approximating a traditional system 
(which is likely to be a valid abstraction in the new 
framework) and another being a finer-grained, more 
nondeterministic algorithm with distributed change. At 
the lower level of activation values, there is no 
surprise or subtlety other than that caused by the 
complexity of the system. It is only from the relative 
differences in the two levels that we get shades of 
meaning. 
None of this is meant to belittle the stereotyped higher 
or lower classical or connectionist perspectives. What 
this comparison does show is that all levels are 
potentially of interest. Beyond that, it shows that a 
further advantage of a multilevel approach is that it 
provides greater opportunity for comparisons between 
levels. 
> Rule-describable behavior without explicit 
fixed rules 
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While any algorithm can be given an implementation which 
incorporates a fixed set of rules (ignoring for the 
moment any bottom-up constraints) by appending them to 
every state, the inverse is also true. That is, every 
algorithm or algorithmic sequence has a valid abstraction 
that includes a fixed set of rules. 
To prove this, we take the fixed set of rules to be a 
constant c and show that Si = 
x: vi rules: c 
x: v2 rules: c 
is a valid abstraction of S2 = 
x: vi 
x: v2 
S2 is meant to stand in for an arbitrary sequence; any 
other would do as well. The only way an abstraction can 
have more values in each state than its implementation is 
through the duplication abstraction (or a chain of 
abstractions including duplication). Since S2 has only 
one value in each state, we duplicate that value. (In 
an arbitrary sequence, pick any value; the set of labels 
is finite so this is no problem.) After duplication, we 
have an interim algorithmic sequence S2' = 
x: vi x2: vi 
x: v2 x2: v2 
which is an abstraction of S2, and we must show that Si 
is an abstraction of S2'. We combine two steps at once, 
taking the label-changing abstraction to change 'x2' to 
216 
'rules' and finding a function that maps vl to c and that 
also maps v2 to c. Since there is no difficulty in 
finding such a constant function, Si is a valid 
abstraction of S2' and therefore of S2. 
Of course it is this sort of contrived mapping with a 
large constant element that we may want to rule out in 
constraining the flexibility of the multilevel framework. 
At the same time, we again blur the distinction between 
connectionist and classical systems; the above argument 
applies to either. The important point, once again, is 
the need for clarity about the level at which a theory is 
stated and about what it means to be an explicit 
representation at a level. 
> Robustness (a tolerance of local hardware damage), 
> Fast sensory processing, 
> Economy of storage and retrieval 
While it is true that many realisations of connectionist 
systems exhibit these traits, there is a danger of 
confusing algorithmic and physical levels of 
concreteness, especially when citing such features as 
reasons to avoid classical theories. Due to the 
relative and qualitative nature of the differences 
between classical and connectionist algorithms, Fodor and 
Pylyshyn'(1988, p.54) are right to point out that the 
standard connectionist objections to classical 
architecture 
depend on properties that are not in fact 
intrinsic to Classical architectures, since 
there can be perfectly natural Classical models 
that don't exhibit the objectionable features. 
(We believe this to be true, for example, of 
the arguments that Classical rules are explicit 
and Classical operations are 'all or none'.) 
... The objections are true of Classical 
architectures insofar as they are implemented 
on current computers, but need not be true of 
such architectures when differently (e.g., 
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neurally) implemented. They are, in other 
words, directed at the implementation level 
rather than the cognitive level, as these were 
distinguished in our earlier discussion. (We 
believe that this is true, for example, of the 
arguments about speed, resistance to damage and 
noise, and the passivity of memory.) 
Fodor and Pylyshyn's notion of cognitive level is the 
problematic middle level similar to Marr's algorithm and 
representational level and Newell's symbol level (see 
Chapter II). They claim to be stating their theory at 
the one right level of detail and relegating 
connectionist theories to mere implementation (which is 
also used ambiguously between lower levels in terms of 
detail and in terms of concreteness). The 
connectionists (notably Rumelhart and McClelland -- once 
again, refer to Chapter II) also claim the algorithmic 
high ground, pushing Classical theories to an idealised 
higher level closely akin to Marr's computational level. 
Clark too sees folk psychology as descriptive (I would 
say predictive), defining input-output relationships 
without making any commitment that interim states are 
abstractions rooted in lower level states measurable from 
a physical system. 
The answer to this dilemma is clearly stateable in the 
new framework: both classical and connectionist theories 
are algorithmic in the new sense. It is an open 
question for any two given theories whether one can be 
seen as a valid abstraction (with respect to detail) of 
the other. Both sorts of theories make claims at higher 
levels of detail most likely, as when connectionist 
theories claim emergent schemata. (In fact emergent 
structures can be defined as representations or values in 
an algorithm that is a valid abstraction of a lower level 
algorithm.) Any two given algorithms make claims at the 
mathematical level of input-output profiles as well. 
Theories of both types potentially make claims that they 
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are valid abstractions of human systems. While the gaps 
in understanding of neural algorithms remain large, more 
and more (typically connectionist) theorists are 
concerned with valid abstractions tied to physical 
systems. (For example, see Eichenbaum and Buckingham's, 
1990, hippocampus modelling and Beer's recent cockroach 
simulation reported by Sterling, Beer and Chiel, 1990.) 
That all these theories are algorithmic is true insofar 
as they make claims about interim states of abstract 
systems, including the relative time-course of the 
states. Fodor and Pylyshyn claim that something like 
the sequence 
beliefs: A and B conclusion: U 
beliefs: A and B conclusion: A 
lies behind some inferences, while connectionist claims 
tend to be in terms of variation of activation values and 
higher-level groupings thereof. The new formal 
framework provides a vehicle for clarifying just what 
these claims amount to. 
Reference to absolute time and space attributes, however, 
is an easy indication that we are out of the realm of 
algorithms. When algorithms or theories or architectures 
are compared in terms of such absolutes (speed, space or 
efficiency, for example), the red flags should go up. 
This happens frequently. Clark, e.g., says (1989, p. 
88) of the Jets and Sharks (a toy connectionist database- 
like system), 'Storing the information in a network of 
the kind just described is a very natural, fast, and 
relatively cheap way of achieving the same result.' (my 
emphasis). But as Fodor and Pylyshyn (pp. 55-56) comment, 
... absolute constraints on the number of 
serial steps that a mental process can require, 
or on the time that can be required to execute 
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them, provide weak arguments against Classical 
architecture because Classical architecture in 
no way excludes parallel execution of multiple 
symbolic processes. Indeed, it seems 
extremely likely that many Classical symbolic 
processes are going on in parallel in 
cognition, and that these processes interact 
with one another (e.g., they may be involved in 
some sort of symbolic constraint propagation). 
Operating on symbols can even involve 
'massively parallel' organizations; that might 
indeed imply new architectures, but they are 
all Classicaj in our sense, since they all 
share the Classical conception of computation 
as symbol-processing. 
Similar arguments apply to claims that connectionist 
systems have their virtues in being hard-wired or 
physically distributed. Physical constraints can be 
added onto an algorithmic description, as predictions 
from a top-down theory or descriptions drawn from bottom- 
up measurements. Fodor and Pylyshyn (p.55) assert a 
version of the latter in the following: 
... the fact that individual neurons require 
tens of milliseconds to fire can have no 
bearing on the predicted speed at which an 
algorithm will run unless there is at least a 
partial, independently motivated. theorv of how 
the operations of the functj_on 1 arch tecture 
are im lemeJted in neurons. (their emphasis). 
The recent upsurge of neurally-based theories of 
locomotion, memory and so on provides a much needed 
bottom-up component to cognitive research. Good 
theorising, like good design, requires the matching of 
constraints from the top and from the bottom, as 
advocated by P.S. Churchland (1986) as 'co-evolution of 
theories'. 
In summary, emphasising the multilevel approach against 
any uniform single-level one (as advocated here and by 
Clark, 1989, as well as by Churchland) allows an 
ecumenical view of the classical versus connectionist 
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debate. The state-based version in particular allows 
comparisons across levels and architectures, resulting in 
a focus on the many similarities between classes of 
complex systems and the difficulty of nailing down any 
general differences. Given the weak constraints on the 
abstraction-implementation relationship, it may well turn 
out that the classical, symbolic approach to cognition is 
a valid abstraction of neuronal level algorithmic 
descriptions. (Even positing fixed rules as a valid 
abstraction adds nothing.) In the flexible multilevel 
framework, it is not a very strong claim, though it is an 
interesting and empirical one. 
Smolensky (1988, p. 11) uses the terminology of Haugeland 
(1978) to distinguish the classical symbolic paradigm and 
the connectionist subsymbolic one: 
A symbolic model is a system of interacting 
processes, all with the same conceptual-level 
semantics as the task behavior being explained 
... this ystematic explanation relies on a 
systematic reduction of the behavior that 
involves no shift of semantic domain or 
dimension. 
But in fact the latter claim is true only of a subset of 
systems called 'systematic hierarchies'; these include 
the 'information processing systems' that Haugeland 
equates with cognitivism (see Chapter II for a discussion 
of Haugeland's levels and terminology). In arguing that 
connectionist models are not systems and therefore 
provide explanations and descriptions in terms of 'good 
old-fashioned numerical vectors' (p. 11), Smolensky 
ignores a third possibility. That is that connectionist 
models are suitably described as non-hierarchical 
systems. Haugeland says of systems in general (1978, p. 
247 - 8) that 
... objects with abilities that get 
systematically explained must be composed of 
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distinct parts, because specifying interactions 
is crucial to the explanation, and interactions 
require distinct interactors. Let a system be 
any object that is explained systematically, 
and the functional components be the distinct 
parts whose interactions are cited in the 
explanation. In a system, the specified 
structure is essentially the arrangement of 
functional components such that they will 
interact as specified; and the specified 
abilities of the components are almost entirely 
the abilities to so interact, in the 
environment created by their neighboring 
components. Note that what counts as a 
system, and as its functional components, is 
relative to what explanation is being offered. 
Other examples of systems (relative to the 
obvious explanations) are radios, common 
mousetraps, and (disregarding some messiness) 
many portions of complex organisms. 
The distinction between the two sorts of systems is clear 
in the following excerpt; again, note the similarity of 
connectionist explanations to the non-hierarchic variety 
of systematic explanation (p. 250 - 251): 
In explaining a system, almost all the 
abilities presupposed are abilities of 
individual components to interact with certain 
neighboring components in specified ways. 
Since intricate, interdependent organization is 
the hallmark of systems, the abilities demanded 
of individual components are often enough 
themselves rather sophisticated and 
specialized. Conversely, since systems 
typically have abilities strikingly different 
from those of any of their separate components, 
systematic organization is a common source of 
sophisticated and specialized abilities. 
These considerations together suggest that very 
elaborate systems could be expected to have 
smaller systems as functional components. And 
frequently they do - sometimes with numerous 
levels of systems within systems. For 
example, the distributor system of a car is a 
component in the (larger) ignition system, 
which, in turn, is a component in the complete 
engine system. 
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He goes on to mention a related discussion of hierarchies 
in Simon (1969). In Simon's terminology, a connectionist 
system might be viewed as a 'flat' hierarchy, with the 
main system decomposing into many interacting modules at 
the next level, modules which do not decompose much 
further. In contrast to Smolensky's claim, explanations 
given by connectionist models do fit into Haugeland's 
category of systematic explanations. Such explanations 
in terms of the functional components of a system might 
be put into the framework of state-based algorithms 
(possibly abbreviated by parallel programs) if such 
descriptions were reflected in the physical states of the 
underlying system. 
LEVELS-REVISITED 
It is worth revisiting levels, since their detailed 
treatment in Chapter II preceded the introduction of the 
new definition of algorithms and specific consideration 
of connectionism. Clark's summary of the 'received 
attitude' towards 'levels of description of connectionist 
systems', based largely on Smolensky (1988), is a good 
point of departure. Unlike the standardised multilevel 
framework in terms of states, labels and values, here 
each level has 'its own characteristic vocabulary' 
(Clark, 1989, p. 188). 
Level 1, the numerical level, fits in easily with 
algorithms as sets of state sequences. 
... the theorist can give a precise 
characterization of the state of such a system 
at a particular time by stating a vector of 
numerical values. Each element in the vector 
will correspond to the activation value of a 
single unit (p. 188). 
(Of course the new framework allows more detail than 
this: interim states a node passes through to compute 
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its activation function may be expanded at a lower level, 
for example). States may be summarised or related by 
equations over activations, or weights if these are 
included. 
Level 2, the subsymbolic level, can be seen as a change- 
of-labels abstraction from level 1, with activation 
values given new labels according to a (sub)semantic 
theory at this level. Without the semantic theory, it 
is just a renaming of the numeric level, with its 
characteristic (but not required) nondeterminism and 
distributed change. 
Level 3 is cluster analysis, or 'the partitioning trees 
created by performing a cluster analysis on a network.' 
This is Clark's addition to the hierarchy, inspired by an 
interesting analysis of NETtalk by Rosenberg and 
Sejnowski (Rosenberg, 1987; Sejnowski and Rosenberg, 
1987). 
NETtalk is a connectionist network that was trained to 
associate sounds (phoneme encodings) with input letters 
(given in the context of surrounding letters from English 
words). There is one input vector (or layer) of units 
which are not connected to each other but 'feed forward', 
each sending output to each of the units at the next 
intermediate (hidden) layer. The hidden layer has units 
which again are not interconnected to each other but feed 
forward to the output units which ultimately contain the 
phoneme encodings. 
Cluster analysis is actually a set of statistical 
techniques for finding equivalence classes, or clusters, 
among the input data (Lorr, 1983). Rather than producing 
a single level view, each method potentially suggests a 
number of different abstractions of the input and output 
relationships. In the work described in 'Parallel 
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Networks that Learn to Pronounce English Text' (Sejnowski 
and Rosenberg, 1987) an agglomerative method using 
complete linkage was used, while in another analysis 
(Rosenberg, 1987) similar results were obtained using a 
slightly different (centroid) bottom-up method. For 
each letter-to-phoneme correspondence, the activation 
values of the hidden units were averaged and these 
average vectors were 'clustered'. In the former (p. 
157) it was reported that 
the most important distinction was the complete 
separation of consonants and vowels. However, 
within these two groups the clustering had a 
different pattern. For the vowels, the next 
most important variable was the letter, whereas 
consonants were clustered according to a mixed 
strategy that was based more on the similarity 
of their sounds. 
This suggests some possible abstractions: most obviously 
the system can be seen as a two-step vowel/consonant 
classifier, taking letters as input and mapping them to a 
vowel category or a consonant one. A different 
perspective that may or may not be a valid abstraction of 
the system sees letters classified as either vowels or 
consonant-sound clusters, with more detail in the latter 
category than just a general consonant class. A 
detailed view including a middle step and the middle 
layer might show how different units contribute to 
different analyses (perhaps using the abstraction 
operator of duplication to separate out different views 
of the same unit). Such an analysis may be possible 
even without statistical analysis. As Sejnowski and 
Rosenberg state (again on p. 157), 
It was apparent, even without using statistical 
techniques, that many hidden units were highly 
activated only for certain letters, or sounds, 
or letter-to-sound correspondences. A few of 
the hidden units could be assigned unequivocal 
characterizations, such as one unit that 
225 
responded only to vowels, but most of the units 
participated in more than one regularity. 
Cluster analysis provides no guarantee that the 
abstractions indicated by one or more of its techniques 
will be valid abstractions of the more detailed 
description at the level of activation values. In the 
particular approach discussed by Clark, the various 
groups of hidden vector values were averaged before being 
subjected to analysis at all, so it may be that the 
categorised values are never actually taken on by the 
system in the strong sense required by the algorithmic 
framework. 
Level 4 is the symbolic AI level. This is meant to be 
the classical, artificial intelligence side of 
Smolensky's conceptual level (which also includes natural 
language terms and folk psychology). Clark summarises 
this level as involving 'any construct of classical AI, 
e.g., a schema, production, prototype, and so on.' (Clark 
1989, p. 194). Once again, in the new framework this is 
likely to comprise many levels or to be one of many 
possible levels, depending on the context and question at 
hand. It may include the programs or productions or 
schemata themselves in the description, or just the 
results of their application. If such descriptions are 
valid abstractions of a lower level, then they are just 
as correct as any lower level, only less detailed. In 
this way, even the so-called 'precise' numeric level may 
be correct but less detailed than a description giving 
the steps toward calculating an activation function or 
details of implementation in a von Neumann system. 
The folk-psychological level, or level 5, is the other 
half of Smolensky's conceptual level, and it is an open 
question whether or not this is a valid abstraction of 
humans or models of them in particular contexts. Clark 
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describes (but does not adhere to) a view that constrains 
a valid abstraction to include only the case in which 
'words used in a belief ascription' do have 
discrete, recurrent analogues in the actual 
processing of the system. Thus the word 
'chair' will not have a discrete analogue, 
since 'chair' will be represented as an 
activation vector across a set of units that 
stand for subsymbolic microfeatures, and it 
will not have a single recurrent analogue (not 
even as an activation vector), since the units 
that participate and the degree to which they 
participate will vary from context to context 
(p. 196). 
The new multilevel framework advocated here is less 
constrained, allowing for abstractions (including 
duplication and combination of values) of such 'pure 
distributed representations' to define sameness of belief 
at some levels of description in some contexts. 
ALGORITHMS AND VIRTUAL MACHINES 
Since Clark is a leading advocate of 'multiplicity of 
mind', a promising multilevel approach to cognitive 
science, an obvious question to ask is exactly how he 
spells out a theory of levels and their 
interrelationships. In Microcogn_ition (1989), he leans 
toward an explication in terms of 'virtual machines': On 
pages 128 - 129, he considers 
a possible multiplicity of virtual cognitive 
architectures. The idea is that for some 
aspects of some reasoning tasks, we might be 
forced to emulate a quite different kind of 
computing machine... The argument I develop 
will urge that we resist the uniformity 
assumption in all its guises. Instead, I 
endorse a model of mind that consists of a 
multitude of possibly virtual computational 
architectures adapted to various task demands. 
Each task requires psychological models 
involving distinctive sets of computationally 
basic operations. 
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If we replace 'virtual machines' and 'architectures' with 
levels or algorithms, this appears quite similar to the 
massively multilevel formal framework. While both 
approaches arise out of a reaction against uniform, 
single-level cognitivism and both draw on computational 
theory, there are some differences. For one thing, the 
state-based framework has been developed (shown to be 
formalisable and applicable) to a greater degree. To 
the best of my knowledge the situation for virtual 
machines has not progressed much beyond 1984 when 
Pylyshyn (1984, p. 91) noted of them that '... the idea 
has not been formally developed to a high degree in the 
study of semantics of programs...' I suspect one reason 
for this is the complex, often misunderstood relationship 
between software and hardware, along with the fact that 
notions of virtual machines are bound up with limiting 
ideas of programs, emulation and classical architecture. 
Mappings between virtual machines, like current 
definitions of theory reduction, require mappings between 
processes as well as between states. This tends to be 
mediated by a compiler or interpreter, ending up with at 
best a weak equivalence between like functions described 
as running on different levels of the architecture. 
Pylyshyn defines a virtual machine quite clearly in this 
vein, speaking of (1984, p. 91) 
defining an abstract virtual machine whose 
state transitions correspond, in well-defined 
ways, to the significant features of changes 
produced by commands, procedures and other 
expressions in a program's text. 
He equates the virtual machine to the available operators 
(p. 115) or to a computer's programming language (p. 
260). This is echoed more recently by Clark (1989, p. 
131): 
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The pervasive idea in computer science of a 
virtual machine is precisely the idea that a 
machine can be programmed to behave as if it 
were operating a different kind of hardware. 
and (p. 12) 
A virtual machine is a 'machine' that owes its 
existence to a program that runs (perhaps with 
other intervening stages) on a real, physical 
machine and causes it to imitate the usually 
more complexl machine to which we address our 
instructions. 
The way in which Clark applies the notion of virtual 
machines, however, turns out to be much more like the 
perspectival view advocated in this thesis. For example 
(p. 138), 
In the special kind of case in which actual 
discrete environmental structures (or mental 
models thereof) are manipulated according to 
explicitly formulated rules or heuristics, we 
have a virtual machine that recapitulates the 
processing steps of a conventional model. 
That is, the kinds of operations we perform on 
real, external symbolic structures (and hence 
the kinds we use in any mental model of the 
same) are just the operations found in a 
conventional processor, e.g., completely 
copying a symbol from one location to another, 
deleting, adding whole symbols (e.g., 'cup' to 
a list), and matching whole symbols. In these 
special cases, therefore, the conventional 
model is not any kind of approximation to the 
truth; it is the truth. 
The importance of aligning states that the system (the 
person and various external props in this case) goes 
through at various levels of abstraction show up in this 
example. Clearly Clark is after something stronger than 
1 I would say 'simpler' rather than 'complex', at 
least in computer science, where virtual machines 
allow viewing memory as one contiguous chunk, e.g. 
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the weak equivalence guaranteed by 'a program that runs 
(perhaps with other intervening stages)'. The 
conventional operations he is talking about appear to be 
transitions between actual states through which the 
system passes, viewed at an appropriate level of 
abstraction in terms of detail. Similarly, he is taking 
an equally high level and abstract view of the 
conventional system in terms of copying symbols and so 
on. 
If we go to Sloman (1984a)2 we find a more detailed 
explanation of virtual machines. Sloman states (1984a, 
p. 10), 
A virtual machine is a structure which can 
undergo various changes of state, where the 
state is defined relative to a certain class of 
descriptions, and certain transitions from one 
state to another are defined as legal. 
This differs from the definition of an algorithm defined 
over a set of labels just in that the emphasis is on 
processes (transitions are separated out and defined as 
legal, independently of their occurrence in sequences) 
and infinity or unboundedness may be allowed, along with 
weak equivalence due to programming. 
Describing the relationship between virtual machines, 
Sloman states (p. 10 - 11), 
one virtual machine can be implemented (or 
embodied) in another virtual machine which 
satisfies far more detailed state descriptions. 
The same virtual machine may be embodied in 
different physical machines. Different 
virtual machines can be embodied in the same 
physical machine. 
Clark refers to Sloman in his first mention of 
virtual machines, but it is to a less detailed 
paper (1984b). 
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Here we could substitute 'algorithm' for 'virtual 
machine' and see the similarity between the two notions, 
but implementation is also defined in terms of general 
states and transitions (out of context) and can also 
involve programming. On p. 11 we have 
Virtual machine A is implemented in B by 
specifying a mapping M, where M maps 
descriptions of the states of B into states of 
A, and maps 'legal' transitions of B into 
primitive legal transitions of A. Thus A may 
only refer to integers as possible values of 
variables, whereas B may have far more memory 
locations each capable of having a binary 
state. A collection of bits of B may be taken 
to represent a single integer of A. It is not 
necessary that every state of B correspond to a 
state of A. For instance, the process of 
giving a variable of A an integer value may 
involve changing several locations in B, in 
sequence, and some of the intermediate states 
of B need not represent any state defined in A. 
This also illustrates the fact that a primitive 
(unanalysable) transition of A may be 
represented by a succession of state 
transitions of B. 
By focussing on explicit sequences of states or 
abbreviations of such sequences, the new framework in 
terms of algorithms allows complete formalisation of the 
relationship between two levels in a much simpler, more 
straightforward way. 
Sloman also includes some programming (that I would 
consider part of the software development process) as 
part of implementation, though he is careful to separate 
it in the definition. On p. 11, he states 
Machine B implements A relative to a mapping M. 
Relative to a different mapping, B may 
implement a different machine. Usually 
implementation is done by taking a fairly 
general machine B, then producing a more 
specific machine B1 by programming it 
('specification'). B1 implements Al relative 
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to mapping M1. A different specification of B 
may produce a machine B2 which implements 
another machine A2 via a different mapping M2. 
The term 'implementation' may refer to the combination of 
program or specification and mapping, as in 
Moreover, there may be different ways of 
consistently implementing A in terms of B, via 
different programs and mappings. (p. 11). 
Sloman's definition is intended (and I believe succeeds) 
as a philosophically respectable definition of virtual 
machines as they are used in conventional practical 
computer science. Inherent in this approach is a 
relatively small number of virtual levels that can be 
defined independently of context, such as (1) the virtual 
machine defined by an individual LISP program running on 
(2) a virtual machine defined by a LISP interpreter 
running on (3) an IBM-assembler virtual machine, for 
example. This comes through in Sloman's writing as in 
(p. 12), 
There may be several levels of implementation. 
An interesting question is to what extent and 
in what way either learning processes within an 
individual or evolutionary processes can bring it about that the number of layers of 
implementation increases. 
This stands in contrast to the massively multilevel 
theory of algorithms wherein a new level can be 'created' 
by a shift in perspective and, for any given system, 
there is no pre-determined number of levels of interest. 
A new question in a new context may bring a previously 
unnoticed level into the limelight. 
The influence of conventional, classical virtual machines 
is seen further in Sloman's comment on page 16: 
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The study of different sorts of parallelism and 
their properties is now in its infancy ... The 
implications of this sort of distinction are at 
present hardly understood, though it seems 
clear that at least in the more complex 
animals, brains are of the massively parallel 
type. 
In fact, the adjustments needed to adapt Sloman's 
definition of virtual machines and implementation to 
cover parallel systems are arguably just the 
modifications of the new algorithmic framework. 
Separating out processing and programming issues leaves 
mappings between states (and between transitions only 
implicitly) in context, which are applicable to any sort 
of system at any algorithmic level. The limitations on 
number of levels in conventional virtual machine theories 
arise in Sloman's discussion but do not logically follow 
from his definition of implementation in terms of 
mappings. 
Perhaps due to the simpler, stronger equivalence of 
states at various levels underwritten by my theory, I 
disagree with Sloman's position in this paper with 
respect to the role of implementation. He maintains 
that 
Questions like whether the abstract machine A 
implemented on the physical machine B, possibly 
via many intermediate layers, really IS B, or 
whether the state Sa of A which exists at time 
t really IS the state Sb of B which exists at 
time t are non-questions. The ordinary 
conception_of_, ident ty_ _was_ not __designed to cope 
with suchcomplex relationships as _this: the 
ordinary meaning of 'is' provides no criteria 
for settling the issue. Moreover, nothing 
hangs on how it is settled. If we know-that 
the relation is one of imvlementation what more 
is there to know? (p. 12 - 13). 
Aligning states that a system goes through at different 
levels of description is important, however, if we want 
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to take more than an instrumentalist view of mental 
states. It then becomes crucial to say what 
implementation is and when a particular level of detail 
is part of a theory and when it is irrelevant 'mere' 
implementation. If, as Clark advocates (p. 141), 
cognitive science is an investigation of a mind 
composed of many interrelating virtual machines 
with correct psychological models at each level 
and further accounts required for the 
interrelationships between such levels, 
teasing out a rigorous theory of algorithms at different 
levels of abstraction and implementation is a necessary 
ingredient of any well-founded cognitive science. 
MORE IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPLANATION 
The multilevel framework itself, in a context and with 
respect to a particular question, illustrates a kind of 
explanation. To borrow an example from Clark (1989, p. 
129), suppose we have a system that computes the results 
of multiplying integers and we ask, 'How does it compute 
"8 x 7"?' Another way of stating the question is, how 
is the following sequence implemented? 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 output: 56 
The level of detail to which we must descend and the 
cases to be considered depend on the larger context -- 
why do we want to know and how much do we want to know, 
from what angle? Three possible answers in terms of 
algorithmic sequences follow. 
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temp: U output: U 
temp: 7 output: U 
temp: 14 output: U 
temp: 21 output: U 
temp: 28 output: U 
temp: 35 output: U 
temp: 42 output: U 
temp: 49 output: U 
temp: 56 output: U 
temp: 56 output: 56 
(2) inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: U output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: 49 output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: 56 output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: 56 output: 56 
(3) inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: U output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: 64 output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: 56 output: U 
inputl: 8 input2: 7 temp: 56 output: 56 
The second sequence is a simple (selection of states) 
abstraction of the first, but it is also consistent with 
an explanation in terms of a table lookup for '7 x 7', 
followed by an addition of '7'. The third algorithmic 
sequence suggests a variation on this; it is consistent 
with a table lookup for '8 x 8', followed by a 
subtraction of '8'. A more detailed description of 
either might include the entire table as a value or 
values in each state. 
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The multilevel approach can be used to demonstrate the 
dangers of top-down theorising at this stage. Even if 
we do know that there is a more detailed implementation 
of the second sequence in terms of a lookup table, it is 
premature to conclude that 
The machine that stores the answer to '7 x 7' 
and adds 7 is in all probability faster. And 
if through damage it lost its capacity to add, it would still know the answer to '7 x 7' at 
least, whereas its more conventional cousin 
would not. (Clark, 1989, p. 129). 
It could be that the table access and/or the addition are 
ultimately realised in very slow hardware. It could 
even be that the table access itself involves addition. 
What appears to be stored or data or explicit at one 
level is guaranteed to be distributed at another level 
under some description. A table may even be generated 
anew for each access or, at some level, there may be no 
table separate from the access rules. The point is that 
without bottom-up constraints as well, no conclusions 
about absolute time or physical damage can be drawn. If 
times can be associated with the steps of the given 
algorithms from measurements taken from running the 
actual system, and if these show fixed short times for 
the table lookup steps, then the speed claims are more 
reasonable. (Still, since we are dealing with 
abstractions, longer times for the addition may be 
complicated by details that are not apparent at a given 
level.) If there is evidence that addition always takes 
longer than the theoretical table lookups, for example, 
then there is more reason to claim that such lookups do 
not involve addition and may be immune to damage to 
addition. 
A related point is the difficulty of separating out 
explicit from implicit representations, and process or 
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programs from data, as all of these are level-dependent 
notions. A so-called list in a LISP program may be 
distributed across internal storage and disc space at any 
given moment under a more detailed description. Data 
structures are often mentioned as examples of explicit 
representations, as in Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 
(forthcoming, p. 6): 
At level E-1 a redescription of the lower level 
has taken place such that knowledge embedded in 
the procedure is now available to the system as 
data. It is now explicitly defined in the 
internal representations... 
But data are no more immune to level dependencies than 
anything else. And the situation may be complicated as 
we have seen, if they are explicit in a program that is 
compiled before it is run. If data compression and 
virtual memory are used and the compiled program and data 
are brought in and out of memory in pieces and put into 
different locations each time, good old solid explicit 
data structures begin to exhibit the characteristic 
features of pure distributed processing. 
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith distinguish at least three 
stages of implicit and explicit knowledge in a system. 
The main distinguishing feature is the availability of 
knowledge. At the first stage, it is only available to 
a particular process, while at other stages it is 
available to other processes or to conscious access. 
The distinction between the implicit knowledge of the 
first stage and the sort of explicit knowledge of the 
second stage is defined in terms of data and procedures. 
The authors say of implicit knowledge that 
The model hypothesizes that knowledge stored as 
part of an effective procedure is independent 
of knowledge stored in other procedures. 
Thus, until the knowledge is redescribed and 
explicitly represented ..., identical knowledge 
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components could be stored in different 
procedures without the system knowing this (p. 
6). 
And after redescription there is level E-1 where, as just 
quoted, '... knowledge embedded in the procedure is now 
available to the system as data'. 
Some potential difficulties of placing too much weight on 
representational formats can be seen by extending a 
simple computational example (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith, 
forthcoming, p. 18). A planning system that uses a stack 
to encode a series of operations is contrasted to one 
that uses a list. Of the stack system they say 'the 
system is unable to proceed from operation 1 to operation 
3 without performing operation 2 en route'. On the 
other hand, the list-based system has 'facilities for 
moving at will between items in the list. This 
representation overcomes the serial order constraint 
intrinsic to the pushdown stack'. In the algorithmic 
framework, the primary point of interest is the 
flexibility of output in the list system as opposed to 
the rigidity of the stack system. A suitable level of 
description might include algorithms (or sets) that only 
indicate the output operations and their order as in 




LIST = the algorithm containing the following sequences 




































The first algorithmic sequence in STACK can be shown to 
include a stack at a lower level of detail, following the 
verbal description. Using a typical stack description 
in terms of top and bottom pointers, a likely 
implementation of the sequence in STACK is: 
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output: U 
top: 1 bottom: 3 
stack: <(1, opl), (2, op2), (3, op3)> 
output: opl 
top: 2 bottom: 3 
stack: <(1, opl), (2, op2), (3, op3)> 
output: op2 
top: 3 bottom: 3 
stack: <(1, opl), (2, op2), (3, op3)> 
output: op3 
top: 0 bottom: 0 
stack: <(1, opl), (2, op2), (3, op3)> 
The stack value contains three items in 'addresses' 1, 2 
and 3. The top of the stack is at address 1 and the 
bottom is at address 3, initially. When the top item in 
the stack (opl) is output, the top pointer is moved to 2, 
and so on. Using a typical list description in terms of 
head and tail pointers, an implementation of the same 
sequence from LIST could be given as follows: 
output: U 
head: 1 tail: 3 
list: <(1, 0, opl, 2), (2, 1, op2, 3), (3, 2, op3, 0)> 
output: opl 
head: 1 tail: 3 
list: <(1, 0, opl, 2), (2, 1, op2, 3), (3, 2, op3, 0)> 
output: op2 
head: 1 tail: 3 
list: <(1, 0, opl, 2), (2, 1, op2, 3), (3, 2, op3, 0)> 
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output: op3 
head: 1 tail: 3 
list: <(1, 0, opl, 2), (2, 1, opt, 3), (3, 2, op3, 0)> 
The list value contains three items, again addressed by 
1, 2 and 3. In addition, each element of the list value 
includes a pointer or address of its predecessor and 
successor in the list. The list item (1, 0, opl, 2) can 
be interpreted as: the item at address 1 is opl, the 
preceding item in the list is at address 0 (i.e., there 
is no preceding item, and item 1 is the head of the list) 
and the succeeding item is at address 2. 
Even disregarding the fact that each operation in the 
stack system need not be performed when and only when it 
is removed from the stack, it is a mistake to conclude 
that the representations in STACK, or even any lower 
level representations on which they supervene, must 
change in order to be describable by LIST. For example 
it is possible that a valid lower level description of 
STACK may turn out to justify the assertion that the 
stack is implemented as a list, with the stack value 
<(1, opl), (2, op2), (3, op3)>, 
e.g., being implemented in the list value 
<(1, 0, opl, 2), (2, 1, opt, 3), (3, 2, op3, 0)> 
by the obvious functional relationship. 
There are two possible accounts of a change or 
redescription from STACK to LIST (ignoring for simplicity 
any combinations of the possibilities). One is a shift 
of perspective by the theorist, but let us assume that 
the differences are deeper than that and that some 
physical change has taken place. This second 
possibility, that of physical change, can take place in a 
number of ways. The parts of the physical system that 
underlie the algorithmic description can themselves 
change. This would be the case if in the above example, 
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STACK were not at first describable at any lower level as 
a list system. At a later time, the same system may be 
changed so that it is describable as a list system, but 
there is no valid abstraction that meets all constraints 
and includes a top and bottom pointer (so it is no longer 
a stack). This would be a destructive modification. 
It is also possible that the system could change in such 
a way that both abstractions would remain valid, 
retaining features describable as top and bottom pointers 
and also features describable as head and tail pointers. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the physical system may 
change in such a way that the components underlying the 
original algorithm do not participate in the change. 
This is what Clark and Karmiloff-Smith appear to have in 
mind for their conservative (with respect to old 
representations) theory, in which 
To become a data structure available to other 
parts of the ... system outside the particular 
content-bound, special-purpose procedure, the 
knowledge has to be redescribed into an 
accessible format. (p. 8). 
The algorithmic framework gives us a way to consider two 
ways in which this might happen without having to decide 
what is data and what is process across levels. The 
most likely equivalent of what Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 
mean, as I understand them, is that, while leaving in 
place the physical underpinnings of the stack algorithms, 
a change occurs which results in the system being 
describable in terms of lists as well. The talk of data 
structures leads me to think of this as some sort of copy 
of the implicit stack, now available to other procedures 
as a flexible list. Another possibility is that there 
is no such copy but that a change in the system has now 
allowed access by modified or new procedures to the very 
same 'implicit' data structure. Either of these cases 
would reveal the list as an explicit representation, 
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defined simply as a labelled value in an appropriate 
algorithm at some level of description in the multilevel 
framework. 
A more straightforward example is the well-worn virtual 
governor example from Dewan (1976), described by Hooker 
(1981), and repeated by P.S. Churchland (1986). Given the 
flexibility that must be built into multilevel 
representations if they are to cope with even ordinary 
computer systems, I find it compelling in advocating a 
generic framework for multilevel descriptions in terms of 
states. Here is the situation (Churchland, 1986, p. 
365): 
Consider a set of electrical generators G, each 
of which produces alternating current 
electrical power at 60 Hz but with fluctuations 
in frequency of 10% around some average value. 
Taken singly, the frequency variability of the 
generators is 10%. Taken joined together in a 
suitable network, their collective frequency 
variability is only a fraction of that figure 
because, statistically, generators momentarily 
fluctuating behind the average output in phase 
are compensated for by the remaining 
generators, and conversely, generators 
momentarily ahead in phase have their energy 
absorbed by the remainder. The entire system 
functions, from an input/output point of view, 
as a single generator with a greatly increased 
frequency reliability, or, as control engineers 
express it, with a single, more powerful, 
'virtual governor'. The property 'has a 
virtual governor of reliability f' is a 
property of the system as a whole, but of none 
of its components. 
The virtual governor is just distributed physically, as a 
perfectly acceptable 'explicit' data structure might be. 
There is a respectable function mapping the combined 
powers of the individual generators at one level of 
description to the power of the virtual governor. 
Similarly, the power of the individual governors is 
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describable as a function of the interaction of their 
components, so they are abstract or virtual as well. 
As a final point, the nature of programme and process 
explanations (as defined by Jackson and Pettit, 1988, and 
discussed by Clark, 1989) can be elucidated by the 
algorithmic approach. Of course, I balk at the 
terminology which distinguishes programme and process, 
seeing the distinction rather as one of more or less 
abstract algorithms (with respect to detail). Some 
examples are given by Jackson and Pettit (1988, p. 392 - 
393) and repeated by Clark (1989, p. 197). 
Electrons A and B are acted on by independent 
forces FA and FB respectively, and electron A 
then accelerates at the same rate as electron 
B. The explanation of this fact is that the 
magnitude of the two forces is the same ... But 
this sameness in magnitude is quite invisible 
to A ... This sameness does not make A move off 
more or less briskly; what determines the rate 
at which A accelerates is the magnitude of FA, 
not that magnitude's relationship to another 
force altogether. 
They go on to say (p. 393 - 394) that 
We can express the basic idea behind a 
programme explanation in terms of what remains 
constant under variation. Suppose state A 
caused state B. Variations on A, say, A', A", 
... would have caused variations on B, say, B', 
B", ..., respectively. It may be that if the 
Ai share a property P, the Bi would share a 
property Q: keep P constant among the actual 
and possible causes, and Q remains constant 
among the actual and possible effects. If you 
like, Q tracks P. Our point is that in such a 
case P causally explains Q by programming it 
even though it may be that P does not produce 
Q. 
In algorithmic terms, the example could be described as a 
state containing values for the acceleration of A, the 
acceleration of B and the forces FA and FB, as in 
245 
acceleration rate of A: vl 
acceleration rate of B: v2 
FA: v3 
FB: v3 
A more detailed description could include movement of A 
and B, and a causal story could be told at either level 
relating FA to A and FB to B. Nonetheless, the four- 
value state is a reasonable rendition of the level at 
which the problem is stated. The explanation suggested 
by Jackson and Pettit can be seen as an abstraction. FB 
and FA are combined and their values subtracted. The 
level of description of the explanation can be given as a 
state containing values for the acceleration of A, the 
acceleration of B and the magnitude of the difference of 
FA and FB, which will be close to zero when A and B's 
accelerations are close together: 
acceleration rate of A: vl 
acceleration rate of B: v2 
FA - FBI: 0 
The fact that 'sameness in magnitude is quite invisible 
to A' is reflected in the descriptions being given for a 
system containing more than just A. If A itself somehow 
recorded or remembered B's acceleration, then there may 
have been an explanatory algorithm involving levels of 
description of A alone. 
There is nothing special about the particular levels 
employed or of the particular context in which they are 
employed. There is no inherent 'programme' or 'process' 
level; all there is is a two-level description where one 
level has been described as an abstraction and one as an 
implementation relative to the other. Either of these 
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levels of detail could be abstracted in other ways or 
implemented in other ways. 
The new multilevel framework provides a way to relate 
various system descriptions at various levels of detail, 
constrained by bottom-up measurements and top-down 
theorising and perhaps independently motivated 
restrictions on abstraction functions. It provides a 
rigorous, formal foundation for claims that systems can 
share a property at one level and yet be radically 
different at another, without prejudging which level is 
right or more appropriate in a given context. Ignoring 
development, semantics and causation for the most part, 
this relatively simple state-based approach can be 
stretched surprisingly far. In contrast to virtual 
machines or instrumentalist explanations, it retains 
throughout the notions of strong equivalence between 
algorithms and well-defined supervenience of states at a 





In the massively multilevel theory of strong equivalence 
of complex systems, answers can be given to the questions 
raised in the introduction: What is an algorithm? When 
are two algorithms the same? 
An algorithm is a finite set of finite sequences of 
finite states, defining an ideal machine and a level of 
description. Two algorithms are the same when they are 
equal by the usual set equality. Given the definitions 
of abstraction and implementation, we might also say that 
two algorithms are the same in a different less precise 
sense if one is an abstraction of the other. In that 
case, they are the same when viewed at the level of 
description defined by the more abstract set; the more 
detailed version is defined as a valid implementation. 
The framework resulting from interdependent definitions 
of levels of detail, algorithms, algorithmic sequences, 
states, ideal machines, abstraction and implementation 
provides a foundation for all these terms as they are 
used in cognitive science and much of computer science. 
So when we speak of connectionist algorithms for pattern 
recognition, we can underwrite it with sequences of 
states of activation values for example. If the 
intended level of theoretical interest of a system 
realising such an algorithm is more or less detailed than 
that, it can still be specified within the framework. 
When students of programming are asked to implement a 
particular algorithm such as 'binary search' or 'heap 
sort' in some formal language, we can see it as an 
assignment to write a program that is an abbreviation for 
a set of state sequences, which is itself a more detailed 
version of the set of state sequences implied by the 
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given textbook description (very likely in procedural 
form) of binary search or heap sort. 
Most importantly, we now have the means to compare and 
contrast algorithms directly, across the boundaries of 
particular languages, architectures and hardware 
realisations. From this vantage point, individual 
connectionist and classical models can be compared in new 
ways. For instance, the claim that a connectionist 
model is an implementation of a classical one can be 
stated formally in terms of the level of description at 
which each model is intended. Their relationship in 
terms of abstraction and implementation can then be 
stated as a theorem and proved, if indeed it is true. 
On the other hand, no defining criteria emerge for 
distinguishing equivalence classes of connectionist or 
classical algorithms. Typical characteristics of 
connectionist systems at their usual levels of 
description are seen to be a large number of different 
paths from any input to its associated output(s) and a 
large number of different values changing with any single 
state change. Such distinctions are overshadowed, 
however, by the similarities of different types of models 
when viewed at multiple levels of description. 
The recognition of a systematic ambiguity between 
concreteness and detail in current usage of 
'implementation' and 'abstraction' motivated clarifi- 
cation and a natural extension of Marr's levels. The 
resultant closer look at algorithms at different levels 
of detail led to the new definition of algorithms in 
terms of state sequences. These sets of possible state 
sequences can be seen as ideal machines, since all 
attainable states and all (possibly context-dependent) 
transitions are given. They can be seen to extend 
Turing's ideal machine in a number of ways. First, there 
is not just one sort of machine with one set of 
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operations and one set of states. Instead, a complex 
system can be described by an arbitrarily large number of 
ideal machines, related by abstraction and implementation 
as defined. Turing's 'states of mind' (Turing, 1937) or 
machine states are still finite, consistent with his 
original exposition, but they can be described from 
infinitely many perspectives. Infinity still comes into 
the framework as a result, but not in any way analagous 
to Turing's infinite tape. Storage and input values are 
bounded, identifying a subset of partially computable 
functions as 'bounded' computable functions. This 
restriction is in keeping with Turing's arguments for 
finitude elsewhere in his theory on the basis of human 
limitations. For example, the symbol set is finite as 
is the set of internal states or 'states of mind': 
The reasons for this are of the same character 
as those which restrict the number of symbols. If we admitted an infinity of states of mind, 
some of them will be 'arbitrarily close' and 
will be confused. (Turing, 1937, p. 136 in 
Davis, 1965). 
These arguments were not carried over to the tape, 
perhaps because Turing saw the tape as part of the 
environment, outside the human system. (This appears to 
be the case according to his biographer; see Hodges, 
1983). The Turing machine was developed as a tool in 
the search for an unsolvable problem, which in Turing's 
framework amounted to an infinitely long number for which 
there was no possible 'definite procedure' to print the 
nth digit. For this project, an unbounded tape was 
essential. Limiting the input values is a restriction on 
Turing's formulation in one way; in another it is an 
extension of his appeal to finiteness, applied to cases 
where the tape is considered as part of the system rather 
than as something outside it. Furthermore, the Turing 
machine as originally defined was deterministic. That 
is, the internal state and the current symbol being 
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scanned completely determined the next state. Later, 
nondeterministic Turing machines were defined and shown 
to be equivalent to deterministic Turing machines (for a 
proof of this, see any standard theoretical computer 
science text, e.g. Davis and Weyuker, 1983). The new 
framework, with its many levels, shows how the same 
system might be described as deterministic at one level 
and nondeterministic at other -- possibly higher, 
possibly lower, possibly even both -- levels. Finally, 
Turing-machine equivalence is weak equivalence in 
contrast to the new theory's strong equivalence. Two 
procedures are Turing-machine equivalent if there exists 
a Turing machine, any Turing machine, that will calculate 
the same output from the same input. The same output 
can include being undefined, or not halting, in the case 
of functions that are not computable. Somewhat 
surprisingly, therefore, the class of algorithms may not 
be a straightforward subset of the class of partially 
computable functions. Inputs that are undefined at one 
level of description may or may not cause the system to 
halt, depending on more detailed implementations. 
Of course there is no claim that the multilevel framework 
as defined here is the last word. Even Turing's machine 
as originally defined was corrected (see the discussion 
in Davis, 1965, and in Post, 1948, reprinted in the same 
volume), and its implications are still being considered. 
Ideally, the new theory will be refined and widely 
applied. It has in common with Turing's machine 
definiteness (in the sense of rigour rather than 
determinacy) combined with a relatively simple and 
intuitive (perhaps operational) definition. It has the 
potential to provide a common foundation to facilitate 
not only the inevitable further debate about appropriate 
levels of description and explanation in general, but 
also comparisons between particular theories, models, 
programs and systems. 
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Apart from the continued application and testing of the 
framework in these ways, I will mention three general 
directions for further investigation. On the purely 
philosophical side, there is room for better 
understanding of the role of finite, state-based 
descriptions and how they fit into the large and growing 
literature about explanation and observation. 
On the computer science and software engineering side, 
the theory of states and algorithms at various levels of 
detail carries over quite directly into terms of design 
and development of complex systems. Confusion about 
levels, algorithms, abstraction and implementation in 
this area is remarkably similar to that in cognitive 
science. For example, software engineers tend to use a 
three-level system comprised of requirements, design and 
implementation, each with its own typical notation for 
system description. The data flow diagrams of 
requirements are frequently claimed to give the 'what' 
and not the (mere) 'how' of the lower levels which might 
be initially described in a flow chart (see, e.g., 
Fairley, 1985; Sommerville, 1982). Translation from one 
level to the next (one way of looking at the design 
problem) does not take into account any sort of strong 
equivalence, a major flaw in the foundations of software 
engineering. The new theory is just what is needed to 
begin to remedy this problem. In more practical terms, 
it is not clear that the cumbersome sets and states of 
the multilevel framework could themselves be turned into 
a new design methodology, but it is an area for continued 
investigation. 
Between these two extremes, or perhaps combining them, 
there is room for further exploration of the nature of 
the abstraction/implementation relationship, no doubt 
leading to refinements of the abstraction operations or 
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constraints on them. Such work may well be enhanced by 
a computer model of the framework for some particular 
algorithms, allowing descriptions at different levels to 
be extracted and simulated, related by the functions that 
define the abstractions. 
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APPENDIX_A 
A QUICKSORTw,_ALGORITHM BASED ON BROORSHEAR,'S 
PSEUDOCODE PROCEDURE 
The labels in the algorithm and their intended 
interpretation are: 
LIST: the current list of items to be sorted. 
PIVOT: the item selected to partition the current 
list. 
TOP: the pointer used to compare items, starting 
from the top (beginning) of the list, with the 
pivot. 
BOTTOM: the position used to compare items with the 
pivot, starting from the bottom (end) of the 
list. 
SUBLIST1: the sublist of the current list before the 
pivot. 
SUBLIST2: the sublist of the current list after the 
pivot. 
WHOLE LIST: the entire list, as opposed to the current 
(sub-) list. 
This algorithm contains only one sequence, the one for 
the input list comprising JANE, BOB, ALICE, TOM, CAROL, 
BILL, GEORGE, CHERYL, SUE and JOHN. A new state is 
given for each 'call' to the Brookshear procedure (see 
Chapter IV), each initialisation of local variables 
(PIVOT, TOP and BOTTOM), each (composite) move of the 
bottom pointer, each (composite) move of the top pointer, 
each interchange of names or a name and the pivot, and 
each 'return' to a calling procedure. Changed values 
between two adjacent states are underlined in the second 
state, as an aid to comprehension. Comments before each 





(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 






(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 10 
SUBLIST1: 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALI_CE_TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 8 
SUBLIST1: 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Interchange names indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 7 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
SUBLIST 2: 
TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
-(GORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
New initial state for sublist 1 above. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL- CAROL-BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
258 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 6 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: 




(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
New initial state for SUBLISTI above. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 






(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Initialise pivot and pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 1 BOTTOM: 
SUBLIST1: 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE-CHERYL CAROL) 
5 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange names indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
SALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
PIVOT: BILL TOP: 2 BOTTOM: 2 
SUBLIST1: 
_CAJU E ) 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB _CHERYL___CAROL ) 
WHOLE LIST 
(ALICE-BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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New initial state (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
(ALICE) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
New initial state for SUBLIST2 above. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 





(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
New initial state for SUBLIST1 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
( ) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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New initial state for SUBLIST2 above. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(CAROL-CHERYL) 





(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
New initial state for SUBLIST1 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
(CAROL) 

















(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
New initial state for SUBLIST2 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: ( ) 




















(BOB CAROL CHERYL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL) 




(BOB CAROL CHERYL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 6 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: 




(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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New initial state for SUBLIST2 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
( ) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 6 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: 




(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 7 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE) 
SUBLIST2: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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New initial state for SUBLIST2 above. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE TOM) 





(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
New initial state for SUBLIST1 above. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Interchange pivot and name indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
New initial state for SUBLIST1 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
( ) 
















(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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New initial state for SUBLIST2 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
(SUE) 
















(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE TOM) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
274 
New initial state for SUBLIST2 above (trivially sorted). 
LIST: 
( ) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE TOM) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Return. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 7 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CHERYL GEORGE) 
SUBLIST2: 
(JOHN SUE TOM) 
WHOLE LIST: 




A QUICKSORT ALGORITHM BASED ON KNUTH'S MIX PROGRAM 
The labels in the algorithm and their intended 
interpretation are: 
INPUT: the list of items to be sorted, preceded by 
-INF(inity) and followed by +INF(inity). 
N: the number of items in the original INPUT. 
M: the minimum list size; if M = 1 then lists of 
1 or fewer items are not sorted by the 
Quicksort method. 
STACK: explicit stack for handling recursion. 
rll: used in conjunction with moves to hold 
locations; miscellaneous integer values. 
r12: the position in INPUT of the first item in the 
list currently being sorted; Knuth also calls 
this '1' (for left). 
r13: the position in INPUT of the last item in the 
list currently being sorted; Knuth also calls 
this 'r' (for right). 
r14: the pointer used to compare items, starting 
from the left (beginning) of the list, with the 
pivot; Knuth also calls this 'i' It is close 
to 'TOP' in Appendix A. 
r15: the pointer used to compare items, starting 
from the right (end) of the list, with the 
pivot; Knuth also calls this 'j'. It is 
close to 'BOTTOM' in Appendix A. 
r16: the size of the stack. 
rA: the pivot; Knuth calls this 'K' for key. 
rX: miscellaneous integer and other values; used 
in exchanges, for example. 
This algorithm, like the one in Appendix A, contains only 
one sequence, again the one for the input list containing 
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JANE, BOB, ALICE, TOM, CAROL, BILL, GEORGE, CHERYL, SUE 
and JOHN. The values (for all label-value pairs except 
the INPUT, the STACK, N and M) are displayed in rows with 
column headings to indicate the labels. Only those 
values that have changed from the previous state are 
displayed, usually. Each row represents a new state. 
For changes to the input/output list or to the stack, the 
entire list or stack will be printed across the columns 
with the changed items underlined. No other values 
change at the same time, so no information will be lost. 
N and M remain constant throughout in this example, with 
N = 10 and M = 1. Comments appear at the right to 
associate the state change with Knuth's MIX program. 
Detailed explanations of the MIX assembly language and 
object language are given in Volume 1 of Knuth's The--Art 
of Computer Programming (1968). 
rIl r12 r13 r14 r15 r16 rA rX Comments 
(1) (r) (TOP)(BOT) (PIVOT) 
------------------------------------------------------- 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
0 ENT6 0 
1 ENT2 1 
10 ENT3 N 
11 ENT5 1,3 
JANE LDA INPUT,2 
2 ENT4 1,2 
3 INC4 1 
4 INC4 1 
10 DEC5 1 
9 DEC5 1 
8 DEC5 1 
8 ENTX 0,5 
4 DECX 0,4 
TOM LDX INPUT,4 
INPUT+4 ENT1 INPUT,4 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
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rIl r12 r13 r14 rI5 r16 rA rX Comments 
(1) (r) (TOP)(BOT) (PIVOT) 
MOVE INPUT,5 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
STX INPUT,5 
5 INC4 1 
6 INC4 1 
7 INC4 1 
8 INC4 1 
7 DEC5 1 
7 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
GEORGE LDX INPUT,5 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
7 
5 
10 ENT4 0,3 
2 DEC4 M,5 
ENT1 0,5 
DEC1 M,2 
2 ENTA 0,4 
-3 DECA 0,1 
1 INC6 1 
STACK: lU ST2 STACK,6(A) 
6 ENTA -1,5 
STACK: 16 STA STACK,6(B) 
8 ENT2 1,5 
11 ENT5 1,3 
TOM LDA INPUT,2 
9 ENT4 1,2 
10 INC4 1 
11 INC4 1 
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rIl r12 r13 r14 r15 r16 rA rX Comments 
(1) (r) (TOP)(BOT) (PIVOT) 
------------------------------------------------------- 
10 DEC5 1 
10 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
JOHN LDX INPUT,5 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE JOHN) 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
10 ENT4 0,3 
-1 DEC4 M,5 
10 ENT1 0,5 
1 DEC1 M,2 
-1 ENTA 0,4 
-2 DECA 0,1 
9 ENT3 -1,5 
10 ENT5 1,3 
JOHN LDA INPUT,2 
9 ENT4 1,2 
9 DEC5 1 
8 DEC5 1 
8 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
JOHN LDX INPUT,5 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
STX INPUT,2 









rIl r12 rI3 r14 rI5 rI6 rA rX Comments 






0 ENTA 0,4 
1 DECA 0,1 
LD2 STACK,6(A) 
LD3 STACK,6(B) 
0 DEC6 1 
7 ENT5 1,3 
GEORGE LDA INPUT,2 
2 ENT4 1,2 
3 INC4 1 
4 INC4 1 
5 INC4 1 
6 INC4 1 
7 INC4 1 
6 DEC5 1 
6 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
BILL LDX INPUT,5 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
STX INPUT,2 





6 ENT4 0,3 
-1 DEC4 M,5 
ENT1 0,5 
DEC1 M,2 
-1 ENTA 0,4 
-5 DECA 0,1 
ENT3 -1,5 
6 ENT5 1,3 
BILL LDA INPUT,2 
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rIl r12 r13 r14 rI5 rI6 rA rX Comments 
(1) (r) (TOP)(BOT) (PIVOT) 
INPUT+2 
ENT4 1,2 
5 DEC5 1 
4 DEC5 1 
3 DEC5 1 
3 ENTX 0,5 
1 DECX 0,4 
BOB LDX INPUT, 4 
ENT1 INPUT,4 
2 
(BILL ALICE ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
MOVE INPUT,5 






2 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
ALICE LDX INPUT,5 
(ALICE ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
STX INPUT,2 




2 DEC4 M,5 
2 ENT1 0,5 
0 DEC1 M,2 
2 ENTA 0,4 
2 DECA 0,1 
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rIl r12 r13 r14 r15 r16 rA rX Comments 
(1) (r) (TOP)(BOT) (PIVOT) 
3 ENT2 1,5 
6 ENT5 1,3 
BOB LDA INPUT,2 
4 ENT4 1,2 
5 DEC5 1 
4 DEC5 1 
3 DEC5 1 
3 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
BOB LDX INPUT,5 
(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
STX INPUT,2 













1 ENTA 0,4 
2 DECA 0,1 
ENT2 1,5 
ENT5 A,3 




5 ENTX 0,5 
-1 DECX 0,4 
CAROL LDX INPUT,5 
(ALICE BILL BOB CAROL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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rIl r12 r13 r14 r15 rI6 rA rX Comments 
(1) (r) (TOP)(BOT) (PIVOT) 
STX INPUT,2 




-1 DECO M,5 
5 ENT1 0,5 
0 DEC1 M,2 
-1 ENTA 0,4 
-1 DECA 0,1 
1 LD2 STACK,6(A) 
6 LD3 STACK,6(B) 
-1 DEC6 1 
At this point the stack is empty, and the algorithm is 
finished. Since M = 1, I have not included states for 
the final sort which could be used for cases when M is 
greater than 1. 
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APPENDIX ,,,,C 
.AQUICMSORT ALGORITHM ABSTRACTED FROM AN ALGORITHM 
BASED ON KNUTH'S MIX PROGRAM 
The labels in the algorithm and their intended 
interpretation are: 
LIST: the current list of items to be sorted. 
PIVOT: the item selected to partition the current 
list. 
TOP: the pointer used to compare items, starting 
from the top (beginning) of the list, with the 
pivot. 
BOTTOM: the pointer used to compare items with the 
pivot, starting from the bottom (end) of the 
list. 
SUBLIST1: the sublist of the current list before the 
pivot. 
SUBLIST2: the sublist of the current list after the 
pivot. 
WHOLE LIST:the entire list, as opposed to the current 
(sub-) list. 
As in Appendix A and Appendix B, this algorithm contains 
only one sequence, the one for the input list JANE, BOB, 
ALICE, TOM, CAROL, BILL, GEORGE, CHERYL, SUE and JOHN. 
It has been abstracted from the algorithm of Appendix B 
in a way that is meant to be suggestive of and bring it 
into more direct comparison with the algorithm of 
Appendix A. The following abstraction operations were 
used. The (unlabelled) list of Appendix B is now called 
WHOLE LIST. In this appendix, LIST, the current list 
being sorted, is a function of WHOLE LIST and r12 (left, 
1) and r13 (right, r) which give the boundary items of 
the current list in the more detailed version. PIVOT, 
TOP and BOTTOM are renamings of rA, r14 and r15, 
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respectively. SUBLIST1 and SUBLIST2 can be defined as 
functions of the current list (or the whole list and end 
points) and PIVOT. A new state is recorded for changes 
to these values, generally. A new state may be recorded 
as well for an interchange which leaves the list the same 
(an item is changed with itself), and only one cumulative 
state change is given for the incremental changes to the 
top and bottom pointers. 
Initial state. 
LIST 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 






(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Initialise PIVOT and pointers. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 




(BOB--- LICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOAN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE TOM CAROL BILL GEORGE CHERYL SUE JOHN) 
Interchange names indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE 91ERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(JANE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL GEORGE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
PIVOT: JANE TOP: 8 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICECHERYL_CAROL BILL) 
SUBLIST2: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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New initial state for SUBLIST2 above. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
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Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(TOM SUE JOHN) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE TOM SUE JOHN) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE TOM) 





(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
New initial state for SUBLIST1 above. 
LIST: 
LJOHN_SiJE) 





(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 





(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(JOHN SUE) 






(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOH1 SUE TOM) 
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New initial state for earlier SUBLIST1. 
LIST: 
,(,GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 





(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 2 BOTTOM: 7 
SUBLIST1: 
SUBLIST2: 
(BOB ALICE CHERYL-CAROL BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(GEORGE BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL BILL JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(.BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE) 
PIVOT: GEORGE TOP: 7 BOTTOM: 6 
SUBLIST1: 




BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
New initial state for SUBLISTI above. 
LIST: 
(BILL _BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 






(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 




LBOB. ALICE_ CHERYL, CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 




(BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL BOB ALICE CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Interchange names indexed by pointers. 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
293 
Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




(ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(BILL ALICE BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL) 




.,(,.,BOB CHERYL CAROL) 
WHOLE LIST: 
(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Initial state for SUBLIST2 above. 
LIST: 
_(BOB CHERYL- CAROL) 





(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(BOB CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
New initial state for SUBLIST2 above. 
LIST: 
LCHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Initialise pivot and pointers. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
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Move top pointer. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Move bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(CHERYL CAROL) 






(ALICE BILL BOB CHERYL CAROL GEORGE JANE JOHN SUE TOM) 
Interchange pivot and name indexed by bottom pointer. 
LIST: 
(CAROL CHERYL) 
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